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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) is often seen as a global leader in environmental 
causes ranging from climate change to biodiversity. However, in the case of 
sustainable forest management the EU has had difficulties in exercising 
influence over the international negotiation process despite initial 
enthusiasm amongst its member states. This thesis attempts to explain this 
paradox by examining the extent of the EU’s influence and by studying 
how that influence is shaped by interest-based, institutional-based and 
ideational-based considerations.  
By disaggregating influence into three different components, the 
explanatory framework highlights the ways influence can be enabled or 
constrained. The explanatory framework is applied to the case of 
international forest negotiations between 1995 and 2007. This complicated 
and complex case is divided into three sub-cases to improve analytical 
clarity. The first sub-case concerns the effort to build a legal binding 
instrument on global forest management. The second sub-case focuses on 
the issue of certification. The third sub-case concerns the drive to create a 
global fund for financing sustainable forest management. Each case sheds 
critical light on the subtle and complex factors shaping the EU’s influence 
on process and outcomes.  
Examining data from participant interviews, textual analysis, and 
secondary accounts, analysis shows that the EU’s influence varied in 
different sub-issues within the negotiations and that the factors acting on the 
EU’s influence are more subtle than previously understood. The findings 
deepen our understanding of the EU’s role in global policymaking and offer 
insights into how the EU may help restart global forest negotiations. 
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  11 1  Introduction 
1.1  The EU and the International Forest Negotiations 
Over the past quarter century, the European Union (EU) has raised its 
profile in world affairs, particularly in the area of global environmental 
policy.
1 On ecological issues, ranging from climate change to 
biodiversity, the EU has set itself the goal of being a pivotal driver in 
global environmental cooperation. Successes in this endeavour followed 
quickly: today scholars describe the EU as a central actor on most 
international environmental issues (Carter, 2007; Delreux, 2006; Sbragia, 
2005; Vogler, 2005). Scholars point to the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 as the starting 
point of the EU’s climb to influence. Since then, a number of 
multilateral environmental agreements have taken root and the EU has 
played a strong role in almost all of them. The EU’s rescue of the Kyoto 
Protocol, or the embedding of the EU’s “precautionary principle” into a 
global agreement on biosafety, are prominent examples, driving up 
public opinion polls on the EU’s environmental policy and seeming to 
confirm that the EU has had a “significant effect” on the global 
environmental agenda (see e.g. Vogler, 2005). 
 
                                                 
1 After the entry of force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, the European 
Economic Community became the European Community (EC), which is still the official 
term for the first pillar where trade and environmental policymaking is pursued. Together 
with the two other pillars, the EC is collectively known as the European Union (EU). EU 
will be used in the discussions in this study, except when its legal personality is discussed, 
when it is referred to as the EC.  
  13 However, in one area of global environmental policy, the EU’s 
influence over outcomes is less clear and more puzzling. In 1992, the 
UNCED established sustainable forest management as a key objective on 
the global agenda. Initially, the EU took a strong stance in favour of an 
international agreement on the issue and mobilised towards that goal. 
Yet the EU’s goals were not met in the international discussions and 
negotiations. The UN’s goals of building an international policy regime 
for the management of forests failed. Currently, international enthusiasm 
is low and the negotiations have largely stalled. 
 
Studies of these events have been scarce, and the few that exist are 
contradictory. Some scholars maintain that the EU was influential 
through its ability to “speak with one voice” (Jokela, 2006: 241), while 
others argue internal conflict (both among member states and the EU’s 
own institutions) hinders the EU’s influence (Chaban et al. 2006; see 
also Vogler, 2005). This seems to confirm that EU influence may be 
more difficult to discern in international agreements, and that “the role 
of the EU in global environmental politics is very complicated” 
(Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005: 81). Against the backdrop of 
contradictory findings, and considering the EU’s apparent success in 
influencing global environmental outcomes under similar negotiating 
conditions, a deeper understanding of the EU’s influence in global forest 
policymaking is needed. This thesis pursues that goal by specifying and 
explaining the EU’s influence in global forest policymaking in greater 
analytical depth. 
 
1.2  Research Question  
The thesis seeks to answer the question to what extent the EU had 
influence on the process and outcomes of the international forest 
negotiations, and why. In posing this particular research question, the 
thesis also pinpoints the opportunities and constraints to EU influence in 
order to improve and broaden understanding of the conditions under 
which the EU carries influence. The explanatory framework designed in 
this study breaks down the sources of influence into three different 
components, each highlighting the ways influence can be enabled or 
  14 constrained. The first considers interest-based considerations, including 
the ways that the EU’s influence is shaped by the interests and 
preferences of the member states. The second examines institution-based 
considerations, including the ways the EU’s rules shape its ability to 
exercise influence. The third component consists of idea-based 
considerations, including how ideational frameworks in which 
negotiations take place shape the influence of the EU. 
 
This explanatory framework is applied to the case of international forest 
negotiations between 1995 and 2007. This complicated and complex 
case is divided into three sub-cases to improve analytical clarity. The first 
sub-case concerns the effort to build a legally binding instrument on 
global forest management. The second sub-case focuses on the issue of 
certification, and the extent these schemes should be market-based. The 
third sub-case concerns the drive to create a fund for financing 
sustainable forest management across the world. Each case sheds critical 
light on the subtle and complex factors shaping the EU’s influence on 
process and outcome. Combined, the cases offer a richer and more 
nuanced understanding on the international forest negotiations. 
 
Answering the research question presented in this thesis is critical on 
several fronts. First, and most broadly, it improves understanding of the 
EU’s role as an international environmental actor. By investigating a case 
where the EU has been unable to contribute to successful cooperation, 
the thesis sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of the EU and its 
policy-making capacities in this arena. In a wider sense, this contributes 
to the knowledge of actors in international negotiations more generally. 
Second, this particular case has not been widely studied, and only a 
handful of explanations (several of them contradictory) are available. 
Finally, and most practically, the thesis helps practitioners and negotiators 
understand the complex reasons that led to the failure of the 
international forest negotiations. In turn, those findings may light the 
path towards improved cooperation on combating the causes of 
deforestation and its consequences on ecosystems and economies. 
 
The remainder of this chapter sets out the components of the thesis. It 
begins by situating the study in existing literature and discussing the 
  15 theoretical approach in more detail before presenting research design and 
methodology. The chapter concludes with an overview of the 
subsequent chapters in the thesis. 
 
1.3  Previous Research 
This thesis can be positioned within the framework of International 
Environmental Politics (IEP), a growing sub-discipline of international 
relations. The expansion of IEP reflects a growing awareness of 
environmental issues at the policy level, which has led to an increasing 
demand for international interventions and cooperation among state and 
non-state actors (Baker, 2006). Since the end of the Cold War, 
environmental diplomacy and international environmental law have 
developed rapidly. Scholars within IEP have focused on explaining this 
evolution in terms of the outcomes of environmental summits, 
agreements and negotiations (see e.g. Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). 
 
The EU’s role in international environmental politics and environmental 
negotiations in general has been studied from different perspectives. 
Some of these relate to the broader IEP discipline, e.g. the EU and 
specific regimes (see e.g. Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003; Gupta and 
Ringius, 2001; Sjöstedt, 1998). Other perspectives can be positioned 
within the field of EU studies, in particular within the literature on the 
EU as a global actor or global environmental actor (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006; Vogler, 2005), and the literature on the EU’s internal 
decision-making structures and how they affect the EU’s external 
behaviour in environmental politics (see e.g. Delreux, 2006; Rhinard 
and Kaeding, 2006).  
 
Specific literature on the role of the EU in world affairs emphasises the 
generic foundations upon which EU influence is built, one of which is 
the EU’s economic weight and large share of world trade activities 
(Smith, 2001). Another important resource is the access to expertise, 
both in the form of scientific knowledge and administrative experts 
(Elgström and Strömvik, 2005; Radaelli, 1999). The EU has taken the 
lead in setting targets, polices and goals in the environmental arena. 
  16 These targets often become international standards to which other actors 
must respond. By setting examples and taking the lead, the EU can 
exercise the “power of persuasion” and put itself in a central role in 
international cooperation (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007: 24). 
However, these foundations for influence are generic, and more subtle 
factors are also involved.  
 
The EU is a complex actor: within negotiations, internal divisions and 
shared competence between member states and the Community often 
pose a problem for the EU. In environmental negotiations, the EU’s 
aspiration for leadership occasionally collides with its self-interests, e.g. in 
the form of its trade and agriculture policies (Coates, 2002). Thus, the 
EU is sometimes a leading actor in global environmental politics, but its 
actual record in environmental cooperation varies between different 
cases (Vogler, 2005). The case of international forest negotiations appears 
to constitute a case with a varied EU record. The uncertainty that seems 
to surrounding the EU and these negotiations requires in-depth analysis 
of this case. 
 
Existing research on the EU in global environmental politics have 
addressed this issue-area from the angles of “leadership” and “actorness”. 
Discussions typically focus on the role, participation, and leadership of 
the EU. The EU’s leadership in the environmental arena has attracted 
significant attention from scholars (see e.g. Jordan, 2005; McCormick, 
2001; Gupta and Grubb, 2000). In this context, leadership has been 
considered along different dimensions: structural, instrumental, and 
directional (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002). Actorness has been used to 
explain how internal and external factors constrain or develop the EU as 
a global actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; 
Sjöstedt, 1977). Other scholars place their emphasis on the EU’s external 
bargaining partners to explain the EU’s influence (Meunier, 2000). Yet, 
on environmental issues, the preferences of the EU’s bargaining 
opponents are broadly similar and cannot explain variation in individual 
cases alone. 
 
These approaches offer a useful context for considering the case and for 
exposing critical questions addressed by this thesis. However, most 
  17 existing approaches are broad in character and generic in prescription: 
they cannot explain subtle variations between environmental policy 
outcomes and tend to emphasise factors explaining the EU’s success in 
influencing outcomes. Instead, this thesis returns to some core meanings 
of influence and some central factors enabling or constraining the EU’s 
influence. In defining and operationalising the concept of influence, this 
study draws on “traditional” influence literature (Clegg, 1989; Lukes, 
1974; Cox and Jabobson, 1973). However, understanding and 
explaining an actor’s influence in international negotiations is complex. 
The complexity relates to the difficulty in determining what influence is, 
how to measure it, and what affects it (Lukes, 1974; Bell, 1969). The 
approach taken in this thesis is to measure influence as an actors’ effect 
on process, as well as outcomes, in relation to its original policy goals. 
The next section outlines these theoretical foundations, while Chapter 
Two expounds upon the theoretical approach in further detail. 
 
1.4  Theoretical Foundations 
The theoretical argument of this thesis is that the EU’s influence on the 
forest negotiations is best understood as a factor of interest-based 
considerations, institutional considerations, and ideational frameworks. 
These explanations relate to the basic “building blocks” traditionally 
used to explain political outcomes: interests, institutions, and ideas 
(Heclo, 1994: 375). These three blocks enables influence to be broken 
down into component parts and to expand potential explanations of the 
research question. In other words, the three-part approach enables 
explanatory factors to be “caught” that a unicausal approach may fail to 
identify. In developing this approach, this study draws upon the general 
bodies of literature associated with interest -based, institution-based, and 
idea-based approaches to understand political outcomes. Each approach 
produces a set of theoretical expectations (e.g. predictions) about how 
the prioritised variables affect the EU’s influence. 
 
Interest-based approaches explain outcomes by focusing on the actor and 
material factors that are shaping actor preferences. The strict application 
of this approach considers that interests (especially materially derived 
  18 interests) are the main determinants of preferences. The premise of this 
approach is that actors have fundamental interests which they attempt to 
maximise in the course of a political situation. In this context, interests 
form the fundamental goals of an actor, while preferences refer “to the 
specific policy choice that actors believe will maximize their gains” 
(Milner, 1997: 15, n.14). This leads to the assumption that ”an actor 
prefers some outcomes to others and pursues a strategy to achieve its 
most preferred possible outcome” (Frieden, 1999: 41). In this study, the 
focus is on how the preferences and material motivations of the EU 
explained its influence or non-influence.  
 
Institution-based approaches remind us that actors’ pursuit of its interests 
is not conducted in the absence of structures, rules, and procedures, i.e. 
institutions. Those institutions tend to refract the pursuit of interests and 
shape outcomes in critical ways (Meunier 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Analytically speaking, institutions can be seen as exogenously given, 
meaning that they intervene in political outcomes to structure 
incentives, define roles, and propagate norms relative to what would 
have occurred in the absence of institutions (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). 
In this study, institutions are examined in the way they channel the EU’s 
bargaining positions and constrain the key actors involved in 
international affairs, namely the member states (acting in the Council of 
Ministers) and the European Commission.  
 
The third body of literature argues that outcomes cannot be understood 
only in terms of interests and institutions. Policymaking also takes place 
within ideational frameworks. Idea-based approaches consider cognitive 
aspects and stress the role of ideas, norms, and epistemic communities 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Goldstein 1993; Haas 1992; Hall, 1989). 
The general premise is that “ideas matter”, as mental constructions play a 
crucial part in shaping what happens in politics (Heclo, 1994: 375). This 
body of literature is rather diverse, and includes studies that use 
ideational factors in different ways and attach different levels of causal 
priority to ideational considerations (Hall, 1997).  
 
This thesis does not give causal priority to ideas, but it does argue that 
understanding the ideational framework in which international 
  19 policymaking occurs is necessary alongside interests and institutions. 
More specifically, the thesis draws upon the specific literature focused on 
“strategic framing” (which highlights the need to express priorities in 
symbolically appealing language) and “ideational nesting” (which 
emphasises the need to nest frames within a pre-existing dominant policy 
paradigm (Campbell, 1998; Mazey and Richardson, 1998). When 
strategic framing of policy priorities “fit” with broader values and meta-
level frames, those priorities gain additional support in the political 
process and can improve an actor’s influence on political outcomes.  
 
By combining the different bodies of literature, the thesis emphasises that 
interests, institutions, and ideas are all key components in explaining EU 
influence. Predictions on how the EU’s influence is enhanced or 
constrained as a result of the presence (or non-presence) of the respective 
explanatory variables can be derived from each set of literature. The 
resulting explanatory framework will guide analysis of the sub-cases.  
 
1.5  Research Design and Methodology 
The above-mentioned theoretical framework will guide an empirical 
analysis of the EU’s influence on three sub-issues in the international 
forest negotiations: the legally binding instrument, certification, and the 
global fund for financing sustainable forest management. These three 
sub-cases are embedded in one case that represents an example of EU 
influence in international environmental politics. This case reveals a 
different set of dynamics and outcomes than other international 
environmental processes initiated by the UNCED conference, both in 
terms of the outcome and EU influence in that the process of 
international forest negotiations did not result in a legally binding 
instrument and the EU’s influence has been indecisive. The study is 
designed as a qualitative case study (further discussed below) with 
embedded sub-cases within a larger case, which serve to illuminate the 
broader case (see Baxter and Jack, 2008).  
 
The selection of studying three sub-cases within the same case makes 
generalization to the broader area of international environmental 
  20 cooperation and the EU’s influence in this area somewhat difficult. To 
fully fulfil such an objective, the sub-cases should have been selected 
from different environmental processes. The selection of three sub-cases 
within the same case will primarily improve on existing knowledge of 
the international forest negotiations and the EU’s influence on these 
negotiations. However, the in-depth analysis of the EU’s influence in 
this case will strengthen the understanding of international 
environmental cooperation and help to build more complete 
explanations for less successful cases of international environmental 
cooperation (see e.g. Dimitrov et al. 2007). 
 
The research design used in this study is a qualitative case study design 
(case studies can be qualitative or quantitative depending on which 
method of data analysis is used (Yin, 1989)). As designed as a qualitative 
case study, it focuses on understanding, discovery and interpretation in a 
bounded context (Merriam, 1994). A qualitative case study design is 
useful when seeking a better understanding of dynamics of outcomes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Qualitative research focuses on in-depth analysis of 
the data material, or as it has been phrased “qualitative researchers 
generally unearth enormous amounts of information from their studies” 
(King et al. 1994: 4). As the aim of the thesis is to explain and create 
deeper understanding of one case, a qualitative case study design was 
most appropriate. However, despite the appropriateness for this study 
there are some limitations with this research strategy. Most important is 
the limitations of providing a basis for scientific generalisation. This 
relates to the intrinsic compromise of qualitative and quantitative 
research, i.e. detailed understanding or generalisable conclusions.  
 
However, qualitative case studies can be part of construction and 
development of theory or as George expresses it: “prescriptive theories 
that purport to provide guidelines for policy must have a strong 
empirical base; good explanatory theory regarding phenomena is a 
precondition for the development of prescriptive theory covering these 
activities” (George 1979: 48). Thus, if the same theoretical framework is 
utilized on series of repeated case studies it can provide a solid base for 
cumulative development of theory (Eckstein, 1975). In future research, 
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additional case studies.  
 
This study has an explanatory ambition and in pursuing this ambition it 
uses predictions derived from the respective explanatory approaches. The 
predictions should be considered as explanations deriving from different 
bodies of literature and which were verified for their feasibility at an 
early empirical research stage. Therefore, rather than strict hypothesis 
testing, the approach of this study should be seen as an attempt to 
evaluate the utility of the constructed framework. In accordance with 
efforts to conduct a “plausibility probe” (Eckstein, 1975: 81), this thesis 
builds a preliminary framework for understanding outcomes of the case 
being considered. Where predictions seem borne out by evidence, the 
explanatory potential of the theory behind that prediction is more likely 
valid. 
 
Methods of reasoning and explanatory models are often divided between 
induction and deduction and normally these are viewed as exclusive 
alternatives. Deductive reasoning involves drawing logical consequences 
from one set of premises. The conclusion is true if the premises are true 
(Andersen, 1998: 29). Inductive reasoning works the other way, moving, 
from specific empirical observations to broader generalisations and 
theories (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008: 54-55). However, another 
model, abduction, is often employed in many case studies (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 1994). This means that an individual case is interpreted by a 
hypothetical overarching pattern, which if accurate, explains the case in 
consideration. The interpretation should then be confirmed by new 
cases. Although the method has elements of both induction and 
deduction, abduction is not a simple mix of both.  
 
During the research process, the understanding of the empirical field 
develops and the theory is adjusted and refined. Abduction departs from 
empirical facts, similar to induction, but does not reject theoretical pre-
understandings. The analysis can be combined with, or preceded by, 
studies of theory in the field, not as a mechanical application on single 
cases, rather as a source of inspiration for a discovered pattern that 
provides understanding. During the research process, there is an 
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gradually re-interpreted in the light of each other (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 2008 and 1994; Mitchell and Bernauer, 1998).  
 
This study employs the logic of abduction. At the beginning of the 
study, (also before even starting the PhD project), the author had the 
opportunity of attending one session of UN negotiations on forests. 
Interviews and observation at this session created an understanding of the 
research topic and uncovered the most interesting elements of this case. 
After attending three additional sessions of UN-negotiations during the 
course of the project, a broader idea of the research topic was 
established. Gradually, understanding deepened and the research 
questions became more focused on what was important analytically in 
this case. The different bodies of literature improved understanding of 
empirical details, at the same time they provided focus for the interviews 
and research questions. This reflects the abductive method of research 
design, including the use of theory and analysis of empirics, as employed 
in this thesis.   
 
The empirical focus of this thesis is the EU’s influence in the 
international forest negotiations between 1995 and 2007, conducted 
under the auspices of the UN. The origin of the forest negotiation 
process can be traced to the UNCED, held in 1992, where delegates 
failed in their attempt to negotiate a forest convention. That conference 
then gave rise to three main periods of negotiation (each associated with 
a different forum: the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (1995-1997), 
the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (1997-2000), and the UN 
Forum on Forests (2000 – ongoing). The main empirical focus of the 
thesis is the period between 1995 and 2007 and the related forums. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) was mandated to “to 
pursue consensus and formulate options for further actions in order to 
combat deforestation, and forest degradation and to promote the 
management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of 
forests” (ECOSOC, 1997a). During its four sessions, delegates did not 
manage to agree on the issue of a legally binding instrument, trade 
related issues, and financial issues. The international forest policy 
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which had a mandate inter alia to consider matters left pending from the 
IPF. After the Forum’s fourth session, the Economic and Social Council 
established UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) for the continuation of 
international deliberations on global forest policy.  
 
The UNFF had an initial five year mandate and aimed at promoting 
“management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of 
forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end” 
(ECOSOC, 2001). However, at its fifth session negotiations broke down 
and discussions were adjourned. The UNFF continued with a sixth 
session, where its mandate got extended until the year 2015. At the 
seventh session of the Forum, a non-legally binding instrument was 
adopted: “Non-legally binding agreement on all types of forests”. The 
policy recommendations from the IPF and IFF and the non-legally 
binding instrument aim at achieving sustainable forest management and 
are the formal outcome of this negotiation process.  
 
As a whole, the international forest negotiations address a number of 
forest-related issues, including environmental concerns, development 
issues, and economic priorities. To assess and explain the EU’s influence 
on these wide-ranging issues within the negotiation process would have 
been beyond the scope of this study. Early research for this thesis focused 
only on the issue of a legally binding instrument as this attracted the 
most public attention and interest among scholars and practitioners. 
However, it soon became apparent that this single issue may not fully 
represent process and outcomes, nor allow for comprehensive 
understanding of EU influence. Moreover, additional cases were 
required to adequately evaluate the theoretical framework designed for 
this study. As such, the decision was made to expand the analysis to 
encompass two additional issues: certification and a global forest fund. 
These two issues are linked to broader policy agendas in terms of trade 
and finance. Together, these three cases offered a more encompassing 
empirical focus and generated significant empirics. All three issues were 
subject to considerable discussion and debate in the negotiations, 
revealed clear positions of various actors, and provided adequate data on 
process and outcomes in order for the study to proceed.  
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1.6  Data Collection 
The empirical foundations of this study rest on a combination of primary 
and secondary sources, in the form of interviews, documents, and 
previous research. The most important source of evidence for the thesis 
was documentary material, including UN documents, EU documents, 
material from the negotiations (such as opening statements), and reports 
from a practitioner periodical called the Earth Negotiations Bulletin
2. 
Many of these documents are accessible via the Internet, in particular 
official documents from the EU and UN. Other documents were 
obtained at negotiation sessions and at meetings with respondents. 
Through a specific governmental official, working actively in the 
negotiation process between 1990 and 2004, access to a large archive of 
documents containing meeting notes from main negotiations and 
internal EU negotiations, personal notes, and correspondence between 
different actors was granted. This archive was extremely useful for 
revealing information of the EU’s positions, strategies and priorities in 
the negotiations.  
 
Interviews with delegates at four UN negotiation sessions on forests,
3  
officials at the EU-institutions and at the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), Swedish policy-makers, and representatives from 
non-state organisations were undertaken during the course of the 
project. The interviews, particular in the beginning of the research 
process, helped to frame the research problem and specify the research 
questions. First-hand experience also provided understanding of the 
research topic and to some extent the interviews were used as evidence 
for the research questions. Altogether, 57 interviews lasting between 30 
minutes and 1.5 hours were carried out. Respondents were identified by 
their formal position and by others’ judgements on who was 
                                                 
2 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) provides a conference 
reporting service on international environmental negotiations, the Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin. The reports from the negotiation sessions summarise details and briefly analyse the 
outcome. The ENB’s summaries cover almost all negotiation sessions of the international 
forest negotiations.   
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technique is called “snowball technique” (Laurmann et al. 1992: 67-68). 
In the context of the forest negotiations, this strategy was very useful, 
especially during the negotiations, as respondents either pointed out or 
introduced the author to other important respondents. This strategy 
might have introduced biased selection of respondents; however, 
scanning documents for additional names and pursuing informal talks 
with several different actors minimised this risk.  
 
Conducting field interviews (i.e. at negotiations) was sometimes a 
difficult task. Delegates were busy, and the interviews were sometimes 
interrupted by distractions. Another problem at the negotiations was the 
author’s accreditation to the Swedish delegation, and thus to the EU 
caucus. Some respondents expressed reluctance to speak with someone 
who might be considered to be an official state delegate. The problem 
was partially solved by contacting potential respondents with a request 
for an interview in advance of the negotiations and with providing 
information on the researcher and the research. In addition, the 
possibility of follow-up with the respondents after the interview for 
additional information if necessary was ensured. Ultimately, state 
accreditation turned out to be an advantage, as within the EU group, it 
was easier for respondents to talk to a “familiar” face. In the last rounds 
of interviews the author’s increased knowledge of the case appeared to 
have made respondents were more informative and talkative.   
 
Semi-structured interviews are suitable for interviewing elites or 
bureaucrats, which in this case are composed by the people attending the 
negotiations and policy-makers. These respondents often provide a good 
source of information and are knowledgeable of the concerned area. 
However, some methodological problems need consideration when 
conducting this kind of interview. At an early stage in data collection, 
difficulties in using tape recorder were discovered. In general, it led to 
hesitation and it was hard to convince some officials to be interviewed. 
Thus, hand-written notes were used instead and the respondents were 
assured of anonymity. After the interviews, the notes were transcribed. 
                                                                                                             
3 The third, fourth, fifth and seventh sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests. 
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reformulated. The last rounds of interviews were guided by a standard 
set of questions and the information was crosschecked against other 
respondent’s answers and documents.
4 The interviews are listed by 
category, date and location of the interview in the Appendix.  
 
An additional source of information was provided through participant 
observation. Through this method, it is possible to become a part of the 
“field”, in that people become familiar with the researcher and are more 
willing to share sensitive information. In this case, the field was the 
negotiations at the United Nations Forum on Forests and the EU 
coordination meetings at these negotiations. From these sessions and 
meetings, observations were written in note form.  Although these 
observations are not used as evidence in the thesis, they served as an 
important underpinning for the research problem and design of the 
project. 
 
The wide variety of empirical material used in this thesis allows for 
“triangulation”, which means that different sources of data make it 
possible to verify information received from one source with help of the 
other sources (Yin, 1994: 97). Triangulation is particularly important 
when data is heavily dependent on others’ perceptions of the issues and 
subjective opinions about events. Even for documentary material, 
especially non-public memos, the researcher must remember there is a 
subjective voice behind each document. The authors of these documents 
are involved in the process in different ways, e.g. working as delegates or 
policy-makers, and are thus expressions of that person’s view of an issue. 
When utilising such material in this thesis, critical questions were asked, 
such as: is it possible to see who wrote it, what do we know about the 
views of the author’s ministry/organisation/country? When was the 
document written? If a report from an internal EU meeting was written 
directly after a difficult meeting, for example, the perspective of the 
author writing the report might be affected. Triangulation “irons out” 
extreme views and offers better empirical accuracy. 
 
                                                 
4 The preparations, conduct, and assessment of the interviews build on Kvale, 1997. 
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The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis of the three issue cases. The first part 
of the chapter discusses the literature on the EU in international politics 
and how this study considers the EU in this context. The bulk of the 
chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework, by defining and 
operationalising the central concept of influence, by defining the 
explanatory factors, and developing predictions on the EU’s influence.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the larger context for the thesis, by placing the 
forest negotiations in a broader framework of global environmental 
politics and negotiations. The chapter briefly addresses global 
environmental governance and regimes. In addition, earlier research on 
international forest policy is reviewed. The evolution of the EU’s 
policy-making in the environmental arena is discussed, as its functioning 
in these particular negotiations. Further, the chapter discusses forest 
issues on the international political agenda and how the process of 
international forest negotiations has emerged.  
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six are devoted to the empirical analysis of the 
sub-cases guided by the theoretical framework. These chapters are 
organised in a similar way: the negotiations on the issue are placed in a 
broader context; the negotiation process on the particular topic is 
outlined, the EU’s participation and the outcome of the negotiations are 
reviewed. Then the EU’s influence is analysed and explained with help 
of the theoretical framework. The analysis is organised according to the 
order of the theoretical chapter: first the interest-based approach is 
considered, then the institutional-based approach, and last the idea-based 
approach.  
 
Chapter Four analyses the EU’s influence on the issue of a legally 
binding instrument. The EU’s position in the negotiations was in favour 
of creating such an instrument. Chapter Five examines the case of 
certification in the international forest negotiations. In this case, the EU 
argued for the importance of this tool being market based and that it 
should not be considered as a barrier to trade. Chapter Six analyses the 
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global forest fund for financing sustainable forest management. The EU 
was firmly against the creation of a fund.  
 
Chapter Seven summarises the thesis chapters and provides an overview 
of the empirical findings, it revisits the research question, and discusses 
the utility of the approach and the implications of the findings. 
Limitations of the study and suggestion for future research are also 
addressed.  
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As outlined in Chapter One, the objective of this thesis is to examine 
and explain the extent of the EU’s influence in global forest 
negotiations. The concept of “influence” is elusive, and the methods of 
measuring it and the factors that may condition it are difficult to 
pinpoint. In constructing a theoretical framework that can operationalise 
influence and explain why the EU’s influence may vary, these difficulties 
need to be overcome. In this chapter, the EU’s role in international 
politics is broadly outlined and the EU as a functioning political system 
with global responsibilities is described. Traditional concepts of 
“leadership”, often used to highlight the EU’s role abroad, are discussed 
before turning to the main thrust of the explanatory framework, which 
will guide analysis in this thesis. The first step is to define and elaborate 
the concept of influence, thus helping to operationalise this central 
concept. The second step is to introduce the three main variables that 
will comprise the explanatory framework and to theorise how factors 
related to interests, institutions, and ideas impact upon the EU’s 
influence during global policy negotiation. 
 
2.1  Defining the Actor: the European Union 
As aforementioned, the focus of this thesis is the EU and its influence in 
one international environmental negotiation process. The EU plays an 
important role in global policymaking and is widely seen as a major actor 
in international negotiations (Vogler, 2005; Zito, 2005). As the EU’s 
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followed suit. Scholars have examined the EU’s international role 
generally (Smith, 2001) and the EU as an actor in international policy 
agreements (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). In conventional international 
relations terms, an actor in the international system is a sovereign state 
that pursues negotiations and commits to treaties with other sovereign 
states (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 15).  
 
The EU is a special kind of actor in the international community, 
however, and as a point of departure the question of how the EU can be 
conceptualised as an actor must be addressed. A first distinction can be 
made between the EU within its own borders and the EU in the 
international system. For the purpose of this study the focus is on the EU 
in the latter context, i.e. the EU as an actor in the international system. 
The EU can be categorised along a continuum: at one end, the EU is a 
nascent state with potential state-like functions in international politics, 
while at the other end, the EU is an international organisation with 
fragmented participation, acting as a coordination venue for member 
states (Elgström and Smith, 2006). The EU has also been discussed in 
terms of a sui generis actor, i.e. an actor of its own kind or unique in its 
characteristics (Vogler, 1999), as it has special legal status in the 
international system and it is not an international organisation or a state. 
 
An international actor is defined as “being delimited from others and its 
environment, being autonomous and possessing certain structural 
prerequisites, such as legal personality, a diplomatic corps, and the ability 
to negotiate with other international actors” (Sjöstedt, 1977: 16). To 
capture the EU’s status and impact in international politics, the notions 
of “actorness” and “presence” have evolved. Actorness is used to explain 
the extent to which the EU is an actor. The concept has been central to 
discussions about the EU as an actor since the 1970s, and several 
attempts to define indicators of actorness have emerged (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Hill, 1993; Sjöstedt, 1977). 
Actorness relates to how internal and external factors constrain or enable 
the EU as an actor in international politics. 
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on explaining the EU’s increased participation on the international stage 
while recognising the EU is not a state as a “presence” (Allen, 1998; 
Hill, 1993). The view of the EU as a presence, with its own behavioural 
traits and influence, similarly confirms that the EU cannot be ignored by 
states, non-state actors, or international organisations (Smith, 2001; 
Ginsberg, 1999). Today, the EU’s presence on the international stage is 
uncontested and most observers consider the EU as having the status of 
an actor in international politics and as demonstrating actorness in a wide 
range of policy areas (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). However, these 
approaches do not solve the difficulties inherent to understanding the 
EU as a united actor and the persistence of member states’ national 
power (Smith, 2001).  
 
A common approach to overcoming the distinction between 
understanding the EU as an international organisation and understanding 
the EU with reference to state-like actors is to view the EU as a political 
system (Hix, 2005; Richardson, 2001). As a political system, the EU 
comprises political actors, political institutions, and decision-making 
processes (Hix, 2005). This view implies that the EU is a robust political 
system with a set of interdependent institutions representing different 
interests in European policymaking. Those institutions include the 
Council of Ministers, representing member states, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of 
Justice. In this study, particular attention will be placed on the Council 
and Commission, along with national governments that almost always 
play a role in international organisations alongside the EU institutions 
per se. In general, the Commission serves as the guardian of treaties and 
represents the interests of the European population, and the Council 
protects the interests of the member states. While the Council holds 
decision-making power, the actual coordination among member states 
takes place in Council working groups (Christiansen, 2001). How this 
works in the case of international forest negotiations is outlined in 
Chapter Three.  
 
The division of decision-making power between the Community and 
the member states, which is reflected in the discussion on “exclusive” or 
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international negotiations.
5 To act externally, e.g. to participate in 
international negotiations, the EU requires external competence in the 
policy area concerned. The EU has external competence in a wide range 
of policy areas and the competence can be exclusively attributed to the 
Commission or to the member states. Competence can also be shared 
between member states and the Commission. The way competence is 
attributed determines how the EU negotiates in international 
negotiations (Eeckhout, 2004). In most trade negotiations, a Community 
exclusive area, the EU is represented by the Commission and member 
states are not permitted to act directly. In shared competence 
negotiations, the member state holding the Presidency represents the 
EU. In external environmental policy, competence is shared for most 
cases (Delreux, 2006)
6. The system of shared competence means that the 
Presidency represents the EU in these kinds of negotiations, and when 
the negotiations move to issues of exclusive Community competence, 
the Commission represents the EU in the negotiations. Occasionally, 
this can produce a situation of concurrent powers, i.e. institutional 
friction between the Presidency and the Commission (Heliskoski, 2001). 
 
In defining the EU in this study, the EU is considered as an actor, 
alongside others, in negotiations and as such it has the ability to pursue 
negotiations and interact with other actors. The EU is an influential 
actor in international politics and its influence is based on its presence in 
the international system and on different resources, such as economic 
weight and expertise (Elgström and Strömvik, 2005). Yet for this study it 
is crucial to recall that the EU is an active political system, with 
institutional structures and policy processes which affect its behaviour in 
international negotiations and enables or constrains how it acts in such 
                                                 
5 Competence can be defined as the authority to undertake negotiations, conclude binding 
agreements, and adopt implementation measures. Where competence is exclusive, it 
belongs solely to the European Community to the exclusion of the member states. Where 
it is concurrent either the Community or the member states may act, but not 
simultaneously (Macrory and Hession, 1996:183). 
6 Many environmental agreements have a trade component and when 
negotiations/agreements deal with this component, competence may be exclusive. 
However, when the environmental component is sufficiently large, competence are not 
exclusive (Delreux, 2006: 235-236). 
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and behaviour are shaped crucially by its political system. Thus, although 
the EU is an influential actor in general, how it pursues negotiations is 
determined in large part by its political system.  
  
The question of competence (e.g. either Community, shared, or 
member state) and the behavioural effects of the EU’s political system 
feature prominently in many studies of the EU in international politics 
including those focused on the EU as a global environmental actor 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Vogler, 2005) and on how the EU’s 
internal decision-making structures shape the EU’s role in environmental 
politics (Delreux, 2006; Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006). In addition, the 
EU’s actions in specific regimes have been analysed (see e.g. Christiansen 
and Wettestad, 2003; Gupta and Ringius, 2001; Sjöstedt, 1998) and EU 
leadership within specific environmental regimes and in broader global 
environmental politics has become a recurrent theme (see e.g. Schreurs 
and Tiberghien, 2007; Gupta and Grubb, 2000).  
 
EU leadership per se has been studied along three dimensions: structural, 
instrumental, and directional. Structural leadership is derived from its 
political strength in the international system and its reputation in the area 
of environmental politics. Instrumental leadership refers to how the EU 
effectively uses its negotiation skills and the instrumental design of 
regimes in accommodating the different needs of its member states and 
other country actors. Directional leadership implies changing the 
perceptions of other actors. (Gupta and Ringius, 2001: 282-283; see also 
Grubb and Gupta, 2000.) For the purpose of specifying the EU’s role in 
international negotiations, however, these broad categories do not 
suffice, nor do they account for the sub-systemic factors that shape how 
leadership by one actor may be enabled or constrained. The concept of 
“influence”, although rarely defined and operationalised in most studies 
of the EU as a global actor, offers a broader and more fundamental 
approach. The following section outlines the concept of influence before 
building this study’s theoretical framework. 
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This study focuses on EU influence because the concept is broader than 
that of leadership or bargaining power, which are the most common 
focus for studies of the EU in international negotiations (see e.g. 
Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006; Gupta and 
Grubb, 2000; Meunier, 2000). The concept of influence allows us to 
break down its components and assess how it may be constrained or 
enabled by the EU’s institutional structures and policy processes, thus 
allowing for an in-depth analysis of the EU in forest negotiations. Yet 
assessments of influence are complicated, especially in complex decision-
making processes such as multilateral negotiations. Although the concept 
influence is contested and it is difficult to measure, a clear specification 
of terms, stating how influence can be operationalised, and by defining 
how to measure and assess influence, these problems can be overcome 
through careful consideration. This begins with a definition of influence, 
an outline of different forms of influence and resources, and a discussion 
on measuring influence at different stages of the policy process. 
 
Before defining the concept of influence used in this study, there are 
two concerns that need addressing. The first is the use of the concept of 
influence in earlier research and the second concerns the relationship 
between influence and power. Traditionally, research on influence 
focuses on the influence of state actors (Holsti, 1995). Classical influence 
assessments have been utilised by several scholars (see e.g. Banfield, 1961; 
Dahl, 1961).  More recently, theoretical development of assessing 
influence considers the influence of non-state actors in international 
negotiations (Betsill and Corell, 2001; Corell, 1999; Arts, 1998). Studies 
focusing on the influence of non-state actors are often concerned with 
how these actors can influence a system built for state actors. Most 
studies discussing the EU’s influence are not primarily concerned with 
influence, rather with leadership or bargaining power. Hence, earlier 
research either assesses influence carefully but focuses on a different type 
of actor, or focuses on the EU without precisely defining influence. 
Therefore, the study first turn to the traditional influence literature, 
which also relates to the second concern raised in the beginning of this 
section: the relationship between influence and power.  
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Influence is closely related to power, a core concept of political science. 
These concepts are essentially contested and a wide range of 
interpretations exists (see e.g. Ball, 1988; Gray, 1983; Lukes, 1974). 
Depending on how scholars view the relationship between power and 
influence, the concept is defined differently. Dahl defines power as “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B 
would not otherwise do” (1961: 9). In another definition power means 
capability: “Power is the aggregate of political resources that are available 
to an actor […]. Power may be converted into influence, but it is not 
necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent” (Cox and Jacobson, 
1973: 4).  
 
Cox and Jacobson argue that power and influence should be separated 
from each other. They define influence accordingly: “[…] influence 
means the modification of one actor’s behaviour by that of another” 
(1973: 3). That is, one actor modifies the behaviour of other actors in a 
political arena, which results in a modified decision. This modification 
might be the result of the presence and/or actions of the actor, but it 
need not link directly to power. If the influence exercised is a result of 
presence and not direct intervention, it is indirect influence. In the 
literature on influence, this is called “anticipation”, and should according 
to some studies be part of the definition of influence (Clegg, 1989; Bell 
et al. 1969). In addition to modification and anticipation, goal 
achievement is crucial for understanding influence. A goal can have 
different characteristics, e.g. a material goal, an immaterial goal, or a 
solution of a problem (Arts and Vershuren, 1999).  
 
Building on the definition and elements above, Arts and Vershuren 
develop a definition of political influence: “the achievement of an actor’s 
goal (or part of it) in political decision-making, which is either caused by 
one’s own intervention or by decision-makers’ anticipation” (1999: 412-
413). When considering the definition as counterfactual, political 
influence implies the decision concerned is more in accordance with the 
goal of the player involved than would have been the case if the actor 
had not intervened or decision-makers would not have anticipated him 
(Lukes, 1974). Consequently, in order to be influential, the actor’s goal 
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is reached by the intervention of others or caused by external events, it is 
not influence according to this definition. This study builds on the 
definition of influence outlined above, i.e. when an actor achieves its 
goal (or part of it) through deliberate intervention it has influence.  
 
This definition allows for different forms of influence, e.g. anticipation, 
moral persuasion, or deployment of material resources. Different forms 
of influence highlight the importance of actors’ resources, as actors 
possess different kinds of resources, they have differing ability for 
wielding influence. The EU’s resources are diverse, but include 
economic strength (as a major trading bloc), financial weight (as a major 
donor and supporting a common currency), expert knowledge (as a 
centre of information and expertise), and normative power (as an entity 
with moral weight on the world stage) (see Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006; Falkner, 2005; Zito, 2005; Radaelli, 1999).  
 
To be sure, the EU’s influence on the global environmental arena is 
much affected by its economic strength. Global negotiations on 
environmental questions often include issues related to trade and foreign 
aid. Based on its economic resources, the EU could exercise influence 
over environmental negotiations considering the linkages to trade, aid, 
agriculture and investment for example. However, at occasions these 
linkages have diluted the EU’s striving for leadership in the 
environmental arena (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Coates, 2002).  
 
Another important resource for the EU is the ability to mobilise 
scientific knowledge. As Radaelli puts it, “sophisticated expertise remains 
a key political resource in the policy process” (1999: 25). Scientific 
knowledge and expertise play a central role in global policymaking on 
environmental issues, as these issues tend to be highly technical and 
complex, as well as in negotiation processes, which are characterised by 
uncertainty (Sebenius, 1992). Through its networks of scientific 
expertise, the EU can provide information under conditions of policy 
uncertainty (Haas, 1992).  
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terms of a “power” on the world stage (Manners, 2002: 235). That 
discussion stems from the debate on the EU as a civilian rather than a 
military power, on the basis that the EU has economic power but 
under-developed military capacity. In a seminal article, Manners suggests 
the EU is a normative power and not a conventional great power 
(2002). As a normative power, the EU acts through ideas and values 
rather than on economic or military power. The notion of the EU as a 
normative power launched a debate among EU scholars (see e.g. Pace, 
2007). In the area of global environmental politics, the normative power 
of the EU has generated great attention (see e.g. Baker, 2006; Lightfoot 
and Burchell, 2005; Vogler, 2005) as it explains how the EU can wield 
influence by diffusion of norms. The EU gains credibility in persuading 
other actors of the advantages of international cooperation by taking the 
lead in setting polices and goals (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007).  
 
Influence is a basic concept yet difficult to define and measure. To 
operationalise influence, focus should be placed on some essential 
questions: How is influence in international negotiations measured? Is 
analysis focused on influence over processes or outcomes? Is the concern 
with influence on specific issues or in general? What are the 
requirements for an actor to be regarded as influential? What are the 
causal mechanisms of influence, i.e. what explains the influence?  
 
According to the definition outlined above, influence occurs when an 
actor achieves its goal (or part of it) in political decision-making through 
its own intervention or by decision-makers’ anticipation. In order to 
have influence, an actor must attain its goal or part of the goal. 
Therefore, goal achievement must be caused by the actor’s interventions 
or be the result of the presence and/or intentions of the actor and cannot 
be an effect of an external event or intervention. The actor can have 
influence at different stages of the policy process and here goal 
achievement refers to both the outcome of a policy process and the 
policy process itself. Influence on the outcome implies the actor 
achieved an outcome consistent with its goals. Influence on the process 
implies the actor shapes the decision process in line with its goals (and in 
interest of affecting eventual outcomes). In the context of this study, for 
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“alive” or fought an issue off the agenda, e.g. by keeping discussions of a 
general nature. Examination of influence on both process and outcome 
offers a more illuminating account of the EU’s total influence. Thus, the 
study considers summarised influence on process and outcome, although 
it should be stated that analytical priority is placed more on examining 
influence on outcomes and secondarily on process. 
 
There are two alternatives for measuring the level of influence an actor 
may have. The first involves a binary decision as to whether the actor 
has influence (yes or no). The second option uses a continuum: an actor 
could have much influence, more or less influence, or no influence. In 
this study, the second alternative is more suitably categorised into levels 
of influence as outlined in Table 1.
7 The level of influence relates to the 
actor’s goal achievement regarding both process and outcome. Thus, the 
goals can be linked to the actor’s goal of the policy process itself and goal 
of the outcome of the process.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Measurement of the level of influence on process and outcome.  
Significant influence  Goal achievement by intervention 
and/or anticipation 
 
Some limited influence  Part goal achievement by intervention 
and/or anticipation 
 
Insignificant influence  No goal achievement by intervention 
and/or anticipation 
 
 
 
In sum, this study interprets the concept of influence narrowly and 
identifies the key “moments” when influence can be exercised:  when 
the EU attains its goals, or part of them, it has influence on the process 
                                                 
7 The levels of influence used in this study builds on Corell, 1999: 107.  
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empirical data capable of comparing initial positions of an actor with 
eventual outcomes.  
 
 
2.3  Defining the Explanatory Factors: Interests, Institutions, and 
Ideas 
As stated above, the primary goal of this study is to explain the EU’s 
influence, or lack thereof, in the international forest negotiations. To 
pursue this line of inquiry, a theoretical framework capable of identifying 
the central explanatory factors of the EU’s influence is elaborated in this 
section. A framework containing all possible explanatory factors would 
be difficult to use, of course, and would weaken its analytical power. 
Conversely, a framework that considers too few factors becomes 
reductionist and cannot explain the whole picture. This dilemma needs 
addressing when constructing frameworks. Influence in complex 
decision-making processes depends on a number of factors and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to cover all possible explanatory factors. 
The main question posed in this context is: what accounts for the EU's 
influence or lack of influence in this case? There are many theoretical 
options for studying the role of actors in international politics and their 
influence, and in addition a variety of contending explanatory 
frameworks. 
 
One body of literature, as the preceding discussion outlined, focuses on 
explaining the influence of non-state actors in international negotiations 
and emphasises factors typically related to these actors’ position in the 
international system, such as non-state actors’ opportunity to gain access 
to the negotiations (Betsill and Corell, 2001; Corell, 1999; Arts, 1998). 
However, these explanatory factors are not completely relevant for 
explaining EU influence as the actors examined are of a different nature. 
Other studies focus intently on the positions of bargaining partners and 
structural power frameworks (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999). Here, 
scholars look towards the position of the “opponent” as a crucial factor 
when explaining the influence of an actor in an international 
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resisting the initiatives or strategies of the actor in question often holds 
the “key” to explaining why that actor will, or will not, succeed in its 
endeavours (Meunier, 2005; and 2000). In this case, however, the 
opponents in question had a consistent position in all three of the sub-
cases (e.g. against the EU), which cannot adequately explain variation in 
the outcomes.
8  
 
For this reason, the dissertation here focused on the “EU side” of 
influence and the factors that shape influence under the conditions of 
consistent negotiation partner opposition. Turning to earlier research 
related to this topic, previous studies of the EU in international 
environmental politics stress the EU’s internal divisions or inflexible 
structures as explanations for its failures (Carter, 2007; Chaban et al. 
2006; Vogler, 2005). These explanations are relevant for explaining EU 
influence or lack of influence. However, the explanations need clarifying 
in order to provide a more nuanced and rich account of the EU’s role in 
these negotiations. The explanatory approach designed in this section 
will take a different tack, going back the three general “building blocks” 
of political explanation: interests, institutions, and ideas (Heclo, 1994: 
375) to extract relevant predictions of how the EU may or may not 
exercise influence.  
 
The creation of the theoretical framework reflects an abductive approach 
(as described in Chapter One). At the start of the research process, the 
most important insights of existing scholarship on the EU as an actor in 
international environmental negotiations were extracted. During the 
interviews and observations of negotiations, the understanding of EU 
participation in this process became more nuanced and refined, allowing 
focus on several possible explanations of EU influence. Subsequent 
interviews and observations were used to evaluate these explanations and 
determine their accuracy, per methodological principles (Laurmann et al. 
1992). The literature on interests, institutions, and ideas captured and 
structured the explanations identified from the empirics and helped build 
                                                 
8 The EU’s opponents shifted in the three sub-cases, but the “amount” of opposition appears 
to have been constant.  
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explained through combining three approaches to political outcomes: 
interests, institutions and ideas. From the information in the literature 
and data from pre-studies, possible explanations were elaborated and the 
framework for analyses of the three issue cases was constructed. Three 
factors explain EU influence or non-influence: interests and preferences, 
institutional structures and ideational frames.  
 
2.4  The Interest-based Approach 
The first explanatory factor is derived from interest-based approaches, 
which are used to explain outcomes and how interests shape state 
preferences (Singer, 1961). The basic conjecture is that actors are 
assumed to have “fundamental interests” which they pursue and attempt 
to see reflected in outcomes (Milner, 1997: 33). Interests represent the 
fundamental goal of the actor and can involve maximising economic 
returns, defending a territory, or withholding political power. Interests 
are traditionally considered to be the real, material interests of actors 
(Hall, 1997), an interpretation deriving from comparative political 
economy. Material interest is often defined as “economic and military 
assets” (Herrman and Shannon, 2001: 624). In addition to these strict 
material interests, broader views encompass values such as status and 
power (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Interest-based approaches explain 
outcomes by focusing on the actor (the unit level), and the factors that 
shape preferences, the perceived rank order of policy choices that best 
maximise gains (Druckman and Lupia, 2000). An orthodox application 
of interest-based approaches implies preferences are determined by the 
material interests of an actor (Wildavsky: 1987: 4). However, identifying 
interests is complex and the relation between interests and preferences is 
contested. Scholars also emphasis the importance of ideas in shaping 
preferences, for instance (Niemann, 2004; Kahler, 1985). 
 
The first part of the explanatory framework discussed below is 
concerned with preferences, which can be seen as derived primarily (but 
not exclusively) from material interests. Interests are seen as the 
fundamental goals of an actor, and preferences refer “to the specific 
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1997: 15 n.14). According to Frieden, “an actor prefers some outcomes 
to others and pursues a strategy to achieve its most preferred possible 
outcome” and “an actor’s preferences are the way it orders the possible 
outcomes of an interaction” (Frieden, 1999: 41). The emphasis on 
ranking objectives is also stressed by other scholars: ”preferences are a 
comparative evaluation of (i.e. ranking over) a set of objects” 
(Druckman and Lupia, 2000: 2). Thus, a preference is the preferred 
policy choice of an actor, and the preference is a result of the actor’s 
comparative evaluation of set of objectives.  
 
According to this specific approach, preferences are a function of 
interests, such as economic or security interests (Gowa, 1994). The 
discussion of determinants of the EU’s preferences in international 
negotiations is prominent in research on international trade negotiations 
and economic interests, such as exporters, importers, and import-
competing interests, are addressed (Dür, 2008). This research notes, 
however, that linking preferences solely to material interests, especially 
in the context of trade and environmental negotiations where 
developmental and environmental goals are considered together with 
economic interests, can be difficult (Dür and Zimmerman, 2007; 
Gerlach, 2006).  
 
Having reviewed that interest-based approaches prioritize actor interests 
and preferences, the next question is how they are relevant for 
explaining outcomes. Earlier research has showed the importance of 
actor preferences for shaping outcomes. Moravscik argues that the nature 
and intensity of actors’ preferences determines the willingness to make 
concessions in a negotiation (Moravscik, 1998). Lukes writes that “an 
actor with […] greater intensity of concern may achieve greater 
influence. Intensity of interests may also explain why some actors are 
harder to influence than others who care less about the matter in 
question” (Lukes, 1974: 4). These arguments confirm that analysts 
should look towards actors’ preferences, and as importantly, the strength 
of those preferences, as condition on actors influence. If the actor has 
evaluated alternative objectives, and concluded that one policy choice is 
the more desirable than another and thus important to achieve, then 
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influence and outcomes.  
 
An interest-based approach has intuitive appeal in so far as political 
outcomes partially are determined by “what actors want”. Several further 
considerations need to be addressed if the study is to utilize this approach 
as part of the explanatory framework. Deciding the strength and 
intensity of an actor’s preference is a rather complex matter. In order to 
overcome the impediments, a number of assumptions of the interaction 
of preferences and interests and the strength of preferences need to be 
made.  
 
The central assumption is that strengths of preferences matter: 
preferences can be weak or strong, and where preferences fall on that 
spectrum affects an actor’s influence. If an actor has a strong preference, 
it is more influential, and if it has a weak preference, its influence is 
limited. The logic behind this assumption is that an actor is more or less 
willing to “fight” for its preference depending on how strong it is. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that interests are a fundamental driver of an 
actor and that preferences are derived from these interests: the actor 
makes policy choices that maximise their interests. When interests are 
clear and obvious, they will likely shape a strong preference. States with 
a robust and lucrative type of industry are likely to see the protection of 
that industry in policy discussions as a priority, and thus shape 
preferences. Interests are then an indicator of how important a 
preference is for the actor. 
 
This same logic can be applied to the EU’s overall position in a 
negotiation. The EU consists of 27 members, each with their own set of 
preferences. Hence, in international negotiations, the EU has to 
aggregate the member states’ set of preferences into one, which means 
that the member states’ preferences can be closer or more distant from 
the median preference. The wider the distribution of member state 
preferences, the weaker the EU’s overall preference in a negotiation 
(Jupille, 1999). The division or alignment of the member states is 
important for explaining how the EU acts in international cooperation. 
Several authors have argued that the EU’s external influence is hampered 
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et al. 2006; Marsh, 2005).  Although alignment and division cannot be 
equated to strength or weaknesses of preferences, these features provide 
an understanding of the importance of distribution of preferences among 
the member states, with the assumption there is correlation between the 
strength of a preference and the distribution of preferences among the 
member states.  
 
Based on the above points, it seems reasonable to make the following 
predictions regarding how the EU’s strength of preferences in an 
international negotiation may affect its influence:  
 
- If the EU’s preference for a policy choice is strong, it is more likely to 
be influential in those negotiations. 
 
- If the EU’s preference for a policy choice is weak, it is less likely to be 
influential in those negotiations. 
 
A strong preference for certain policy outcome makes an actor more 
influential because of the intensity of its preference. Intensity makes the 
actor more devoted to achieving its goal and to using all available 
instruments to attain it. A weak preference makes the actor less 
influential, as it will concede to others more easily. In order to utilise 
these predictions, strength and weakness must be defined. The nature of 
the interests that underlie the preference affects its strength. If the 
interests are important to the actor, the preference should be stronger. 
Hence, EU preferences need to be identified in the case and then the 
strength of the preferences determined through examining fundamental 
interests. A way to operationalise this explanatory factor is to envision 
four feasible scenarios that describe the strength of the preferences in 
relation to distribution of preferences and the predicted effect on 
influence in each situation. (The scenarios are also summarised in Table 
2.)  
 
1.  If all member states have the same preference and this preference is 
strong, the EU should be influential as it will act on its position of 
strength and unity. A situation where all member states hold an exact 
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differing, preferences, the collective preference of the EU becomes 
weaker and the EU becomes less influential as it is more difficult for the 
EU to reach a collective position that both groups are satisfied with.  
3.  If one member state faction holds preferences but another holds weak 
preferences, the EU should be influential, as the strong preference 
decides the EU’s collective position.  
4.  If all member states hold weak preferences, the EU should be less 
influential, as it is not devoted to the outcome.  
 
As stated above, to analyze preferences and interests, the EU’s preference 
is first identified and the underlying interests examined to determine 
what may lay behind a strong preference. When clear interests (usually 
material) underpin preferences, it is likely to lead to strong preferences. 
Then, the distribution of preferences is measured in each case along the 
lines of these four scenarios to determine if this could explain the EU’s 
influence.  
 
 
Table 2: Scenarios of preference strength.  
Scenario    Preference  Prediction of Influence 
1. All member states hold 
the same strong preference 
 
One strong preference  Influential 
2. There are two different 
preferences within the EU 
 
Two different preferences: 
both strong 
Less influence 
3. There are two different 
preferences within the EU 
 
Two different preferences: 
one strong and one weak 
Influential 
4. All member states hold 
the same weak preference  
 
One weak preference  Less influential 
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The second component of the explanatory framework concerns 
institutions, i.e. how rules, procedures, and other structures shape an 
actor’s influence. Institutional structures can be seen as formalized 
structures which both set boundaries for an actor and facilitate its actions 
(March and Olsen, 2008). The assumption here is that if the institutions 
in place at the EU level can constrain or enable the EU’s role in the 
world they should affect its influence therein. This explanatory 
component is drawn from the literature on institutionalism, a broad 
approach with a variety of interpretations of how to define, empirically 
identify, and explain outcomes by examining institutions.  
 
One approach to understanding institutions comes from a rational choice 
perspective. Institutions can be defined as: “the sets of working rules that 
are used to determine […] what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed” 
(Ostrom, 1990: 51). Jupille and Caporaso (1999) discuss institutions as 
given outside of theory and as explained in theoretical terms. When 
institutions are considered outside of theory, they can explain political 
dynamics and outcomes. These explanations examine the ways which 
institutions structure incentives, define roles, instantiate norms, and alter 
political outcomes relative to what would have occurred in the absence 
of institutions. When institutions are the dependent variable, they are 
usually treated “endogenously”, i.e. the concern is to explain 
institutions, e.g. why certain institutions “take hold” while others do not 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 431-432). In this study, the first view is 
used: institutions are an explanatory factor used to explain the extent of 
influence. It is assumed the institutional context constrains and shapes 
the behaviour of an actor and is important for the actor’s influence.  
 
For the EU’s part, its institutional structures affect how it engages in 
international negotiations. Such structures include rules on how interests 
are aggregated, procedures on how decisions are made, and legal 
structures determining when and where the EU can speak as a whole. 
Several scholars have stressed the importance of the EU’s institutional 
framework as a factor in explaining outcomes (see e.g. Elgström and 
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EU’s institutional structure exerts an independent effect on the process 
and outcome of international negotiations” (Meunier, 2005: 16). A 
common assumption is that: “the EU is handicapped internationally by 
complexity of its institutions […].” (Meunier, 2000: 105). Indeed, the 
rather complex institutional structure of the EU is sometimes considered 
“a source of confusion and even bewilderment for those who have to 
deal with it” (Vogler, 1999: 26).  
 
These views suggest that the institutional structure of the EU is a 
constraint in international negotiations; hence, its structure produces a 
number of weaknesses and can limit influence. However, negotiation 
theory asserts that institutional structures can sometimes generate 
strengths since the ostensible “constraints” on a negotiator (e.g. the need 
to ratify domestically an agreement) can sometimes work in an actor’s 
favour (Schelling, 1960: 19; see also Meunier, 2000; Putnam, 1988). 
This “Schelling conjuncture”
9 reminds us that the EU can leverage its 
institutional “weaknesses” strategically to gain concessions from, or avoid 
making concessions to, its opponents.  
 
Other research highlights the EU’s institutional structures to explain and 
understand the EU in international negotiations (Delreux, 2006; 
Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006; Elgström and Strömvik, 2005; Young, 
2002; Meunier, 2000). One of the core institutional features of the EU 
concerns the dynamic relationship between member states and 
supranational institutions. Competence is central for how the EU can act 
in international negotiations, as briefly discussed above. The division of 
competence does not only determine representation at the negotiations. 
Whether a policy area is of shared or exclusive competence determines if 
member states are legally bound to act jointly and to delegate negotiation 
authority to the EU via a negotiation mandate. Under exclusive 
competence, member states must delegate authority. In shared 
competence areas, Community and member states negotiators are bound 
                                                 
9 The Shelling conjuncture is defined as: “The power of negotiators rests on a manifest 
inability to make concessions and to meet demands” (Schelling, 1960: 19). 
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10 In those areas, the member states 
can choose to join a common position, but there is no EU framework 
that forces the member states to do so. Although a common position 
never reflects a member state’s preferences exactly, the overall advantage 
is larger bargaining power (Delreux, 2006; Frieden, 2004). Hence, the 
legal structures that determine competence in turn shape the EU’s 
representation and which decision-making rules to apply to the policy 
area.  
 
For international negotiations, the member states decide upon a 
negotiation mandate by different voting rules. The Commission drafts a 
mandate on the basis of which it will negotiate. The Council then 
discusses the Commission’s proposal and adopts it by unanimity or 
qualified majority voting (Jupille, 1999). Voting rules shape the outcome 
in different ways. Three main voting rules tend to characterize the EU’s 
decision-making in international negotiations: some form of majority 
voting, unanimity, or consensus decision-making. Under majority 
voting, the common EU position has the summed voting weight of all 
EU members (Jupille, 1999). Unanimity voting means that each member 
state has one vote and the decision cannot be approved if one or more 
member states vote against, i.e. they possess a veto (Hix, 2005). It is 
important to note that even if actual voting does not occur, negotiations 
take place “in the shadow of the vote” (Tallberg, 2006: 119).   
 
Negotiation competence and voting rules are institutional features that 
have been used to explain the bargaining power of the EU in 
international negotiations concerning both exclusive and shared 
competence areas. These studies have taken a systematic approach and 
developed sophisticated models for assessing how the EU’s institutional 
structures can explain its bargaining power in international trade and 
environmental negotiations (Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006; Meunier, 2005 
and 2000). Such research suggests that the institutional design of the EU 
is important for explaining outcomes, particularly when the EU is 
                                                 
10 However, member states are not free to act internationally in a completely unbound 
manner. Article 10 TEC stipulates a loyalty clause, which means that the member states and 
the EC institutions are committed to cooperate and fulfill the obligations of the Treaties 
(Delreaux, 2006: 242).  
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seeking change (Meunier, 2000: 104; see also Rhinard and Kaeding, 
2006). These studies derive predictions of the EU’s bargaining power 
from a combination several variables, including the nature of the 
delegation mandate to supranational actors, the EU’s internal voting 
rules used to determine the mandate, and the characteristics of the 
international negotiating context.  
 
Internal EU negotiations focus on constructing a negotiation mandate 
and a negotiation strategy. The mandate is needed for participation in 
international negotiation and must be designed for the negotiation in 
question and then approved through voting (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 
1999). The nature of the mandate can affect the EU’s manoeuvrability in 
international negotiations. One important attribute of the mandate is its 
degree of flexibility, which relates to how the mandate is formulated. 
The mandate can be very precise in formulating the EU’s position, what 
issues are at stake in the negotiations, and what specific concessions are 
acceptable. The mandate can also be extensive in terms of providing 
only a vague formulation and less oversight of the Commission at the 
negotiations, which allows the negotiator to “do the best they can” 
(Meunier, 2000: 111).  
 
The negotiating context is not an institutional variable; however, the 
institutional structures play different roles depending on the orientation 
of the EU in the negotiations (Jupille, 1999). As earlier research shows, 
the institutional structure needs to be connected to the negotiation 
context either as reformist or conservative, which refers to the EU’s 
preference in relation to the status quo, i.e. whether the EU wants to 
achieve change or maintain the status quo in the negotiation (Rhinard 
and Kaeding, 2006; Meunier, 2005 and 2000; Jupille, 1999). Although 
narrow views of the EU’s institutional framework presented in some 
studies has been criticised (Young, 2002), for the purpose of this study, a 
focus on the EU’s institutional framework allows for analytical precision 
and for the ability to generate predictions.  
 
The above mentioned studies are used as a point of departure for the 
discussion on how institutions can explain influence. Drawing on this 
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precise nature of the EU’s influence in the case under examination. 
However, this study does not use the above mentioned approaches 
exactly, since here a new explanatory framework is designed. Previous 
institutional approaches have been used in conjunction with other 
factors deemed important by those actors. Here, the central focus is on 
the EU’s influence over negotiations and the attainment of goals. The 
use of institutional explanatory factors is thus focused specifically on how 
institutions enable or constrain the EU’s ability to influence outcomes. 
The central argument outlined below is that while institutions can 
impose restrictions on the EU, they can also enable its action.  
 
Before moving to the arguments below, a brief discussion of the 
relationship between influence and institutional structures is in order. 
This relationship is not always straightforward. Moreover, the 
institutional variables identified have to be considered within the context 
of the case being examined. This study argues that the degree of 
flexibility of the mandate shapes how the EU can act in a negotiation. If 
a negotiating mandate is vague, the negotiators can take different 
positions during the negotiations, i.e. they can adjust to what happens in 
the negotiations. If a mandate is narrow, the negotiators do not have the 
possibility to change a decision; hence, they are inflexible in the 
negotiations. Thus, the flexibility of the mandate results in different 
approaches in negotiations, but does not necessarily provide a direct 
indication of the EU’s influence. Therefore the mandate needs to be 
considered within the context of the negotiation i.e. what did the EU 
want to achieve in the negotiations? When the EU wants change in a 
negotiation situation, its position is reformist, and when it is defending 
the status quo, its position is conservative. Change is more difficult to 
obtain than defending the status quo. The shape of the mandate 
combined with the negotiation context, affects how the EU can 
intervene in order to achieve its goals.  
 
The combination of the flexibility of the mandate and the negotiation 
context results in the following predictions for the EU’s influence:   
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conservative, the EU should be influential, as the EU has strict 
orders to defend a position.  
2.  If the negotiating mandate is narrow and the position is 
reformative, the EU should not be influential. Achieving change 
is more difficult with a narrow mandate, due to an inability to 
give concessions and to adjust to what happens in negotiations.  
3.  If the negotiating mandate is extensive and the position is 
conservative, the EU should have some limited influence. 
4.  If the negotiating mandate is extensive and the position is 
reformative, the EU should not be influential. 
 
However, with these predictions, negotiation strategy needs to be 
considered, as internal difficulties can be used as an advantage in 
negotiations. The EU can use its inflexibility in the negotiations and 
create an advantage. Thus, in addition to analysing the above mentioned 
potential situations, examining the strategy of the EU is important to 
understanding the outcome. In analysing how institutional structures are 
enabling or constraining the EU, the mandate for the negotiations and 
negotiation context are also examined for each of the three issue cases.  
 
2.6  The Ideational-based Approach 
Preferences and institutions provide important explanations for EU 
influence. However, if policy-making and outcomes are understood only 
in terms of interests and institutions, it is easy to “miss a great deal” 
(Majone, 1989: 2). Ideational factors are important for understanding 
outcomes, as they provide the cognitive context in which political action 
takes place (Jönsson, 1991). Hall states that “Policymakers work within a 
framework of ideas […] that specifies not only the goals of policy and 
the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of problems they are meant to address” (Hall, 1993: 279). Idea-
based approaches to understanding political outcomes take cognitive 
aspects into account and stress the role of ideas, norms, epistemic 
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11 and social learning processes (see e.g. Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Goldstein 1993; Haas 1992). The general premise is that 
“ideas matter”, as mental constructions play a crucial part in shaping 
what happens in politics (Heclo, 1994: 375). For example, shared 
understandings can create standards of appropriate behaviour that 
generate mutual expectations of social conduct. The value of ideational 
approaches lies in their ability to capture “dimensions of human 
interaction”, which often get lost in other perspectives (Hall, 1997: 185).  
 
There are different scholarly approaches to how ideational factors are 
used, and to the degree to which causal priority is attached to ideas 
(Hall, 1997). What many of these different approaches have in common 
is they consider ideas as existing at different levels of generalisation, 
which relate to each other. As Campbell puts it, the ideas that operate in 
policymaking processes do so “in a hierarchically nested fashion” (1998: 
399). Campbell posits a close relationship between different ideational 
levels, and argues for the importance of “nesting” ideas at different 
levels. For ideas to matter, they must link to one another at different 
levels of abstraction. Campbell also introduces a degree of actor 
intentionality in ideational approaches, arguing that new policy ideas 
must be presented so that   
 
the perception of a problem must be credible for the policymakers in the 
sense that it fits the dominant policy paradigm. If it fits, they must believe 
that it provides an effective solution to a policy problem. If policy makers 
perceive an idea to be useful in this sense, then it must fit with prevailing 
public sentiment. If it does not, then it must be framed so as to improve this 
fit (Campbell, 1998: 399-400).  
 
This reasoning of hierarchically nesting ideas reflects the assumption 
made earlier by Hall, that all policy-making processes takes place within 
an ideational framework. 
 
                                                 
11 An epistemic community, or literally knowledge society, is a network of professionals 
recognised as having expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issues area (Haas, 1992: 3).  
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ideational framework exists at different levels of abstraction. As Rhinard 
argues, the effect of new, policy-specific ideas in a political process “are 
conditioned by how they relate to broader values” (2002: 42). Building 
on Sikkink, Rhinard develops the assumption that “specific policy 
choices must be seen to resonate or “nest” with broader values in order 
to gain support in the political process” (Rhinard, 2002: 42; Sikkink 
1991). In this context, the acts of “persuasion” and “framing” become 
important. The actors advocating a specific policy choice confront 
different and competing ideational frameworks and need to persuade the 
target audience (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). This echoes 
arguments made by Payne, who states that  “persuasion is considered the 
centrally important mechanism for constructing and reconstructing social 
facts” (Payne, 2001: 38).  
 
Framing, in turn, is considered as part of successful persuasion and the 
concept of frames is useful for explaining influence. A frame can be 
defined as “an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the 
“world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, 
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s 
present or past environment” (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). Barnett 
stresses the “persuasion element” in his definition and suggests that “a 
frame is a persuasive device to fix meanings, organize experience, alert 
others that their interests and possibly identities are at stake, and propose 
solution to ongoing problems” (Barnett, 1999: 25).  
 
Most authors using the “framing” concept include some element of 
intentionality. Frames held by various actors reflect a certain problem 
definition and potential solution that they perceive to be in their 
interests. For that reasons, different “frames” can explain political 
conflict. Schön and Rein (1994) produced the seminal work on “frame 
competition” as an explanation for intractable policy disputes in the 
public setting. They argued that competing actors hold particular 
problem formulations and preferred solutions; only by “reframing” may 
some deep disputes be resolved (Schön and Rein, 1994). Mirroring the 
approaches described above regarding different frame levels and 
hierarchical nesting, Schön and Rein distinguish three types of frame.  
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A policy frame is the frame an actor uses to construct the problem of a 
specific policy situation. An institutional frame is a more generic frame 
from which actors derive specific policy frames used to structure a wide 
range of problematic policy situations. In turn, institutional frames are 
local expressions of broad culturally shared systems of belief, which the 
authors call “metacultural frames”. Metacultural frames are at the root of 
most policy narratives, organized around generative metaphors (Schön 
and Rein, 1994: 32-34).  
 
To further clarify the concepts of policy frames and metacultural frames, 
Schön and Rein’s examples serve as illustrations. First, the example of a 
policy frame:  
 
In the mid-1970s the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) framed the 
problem of low- and middle-income housing mainly in terms of the need to 
“preserve the city’s healthy housing stock”, which led the BRA to adopt 
policies that gave priority to the rehabilitation of existing stock and the 
clearer separation of decayed from healthy stock. This policy frame did not 
lead to policies that emphasized either the income level of the occupants of 
rehabilitated housing or the shortfall between the need for affordable housing 
and the available supply (Schön and Rein, 1994: 33).  
 
The nature versus nurture debate serves as an illustration of metacultural 
frames:  
 
In the policy domain of crime […] cultural metaframes of nature and nurture 
remain powerful for thought and action in our society. The nature frame 
lends itself to prescriptions that favour restraint and segregation of criminals, 
swift and sure punishment and (at worst) attempts to control the reproductive 
behaviour of people who are believed to carry the wrong kinds of generic 
material. The nurture frame suggests policies that remove or mitigate 
environmental factors presumed to be conducive to criminality or other 
forms of social pathology. Traditionally, liberals in American society have 
tended to favour the nurture frame, which is consistent with the idea of 
public responsibility for the improvement of environmental conditions […]. 
It is among conservatives that the nature frame is held, in conjunction with a 
broad prescription of social control: rigorous law enforcement coupled with 
mote and better prisons (Rein and Schön, 1994: 34). 
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In this study, framing at the policy level and meta-level are considered, 
thus, the focus is on policy frame and meta-level frames (equal to Schön 
and Rein’s metacultural frames). By combining Schön and Rein’s 
differentiated frames and previous approaches arguing for the importance 
of hierarchically nested ideas, this study can derive some predictions 
regarding how the EU may or may not exercise influence. When an 
actor’s preferred policy choice can be framed in term of a policy idea 
“fits” with broader institutional and meta-cultural values, that policy idea 
will likely gain support in the political process. This shows how frames 
enable an actor to link specific policy choice to generic interests and 
values (Barletta, 2001). Policymakers need a mechanism for constructing 
and reconstructing their understanding of the reality, and frames 
constitute one such mechanism. If done successfully, a framing strategy 
can enable the actor to exercise a greater degree of influence.  If done 
poorly, e.g. if new policy ideas do not fit prevailing meta-level ideas, 
influence is less likely.  
 
A convincing framing of an issue indicates the EU manages to connect 
its policy frame to a more generic frame. Empirical attention must be 
given to the broader values that prevail within a particular context (e.g. 
“environmental sustainability” or “trade liberalisation”) which can be 
derived by observing debates and reconstructing the political and social 
context in which the negotiations took place. Attention must also be 
given to the presentation of new policy ideas, including how a 
negotiating actor (in the case, the EU) couches arguments and frames 
policy preferences. This requires close study of word usage, generative 
metaphors, and linguistic turns used by the EU in the pursuit of 
particular outcomes. The easiest way of identifying both policy specific 
frames and broader meta-level frames is through close textual analysis of 
negotiation documents, especially those used in the preparation of 
positions. General accounts of the negotiations, by third parties or 
negotiation opponents, can be used to clarify and confirm a particular 
framing strategy. Outcomes that reflect a particular framing strategy 
suggest a successful effort. 
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influence, there are two scenarios that can be envisioned. 
 
1. The EU manages to nest its policy specific frame to the broader meta-
level frame, and that framing is reflected in outcomes. This suggests that 
the EU’s framing effort enabled a greater degree of influence.  The EU 
frames the problem in a manner that makes it appear credible and more 
convincing in the context of prevailing values.  
 
2. The EU cannot manage to nest its policy frame to the broader meta-
level frame, either because of a failed strategy or because frame conflict 
exists at either level. In this scenario, the EU’s influence is likely to 
suffer.  
 
In general, the challenge of using ideational approaches lies in the 
difficulty in separating out the various explanatory factors that may affect 
outcomes (Hall, 1997). There are several pitfalls with frame analysis. 
Frames can be seen as tacit, and thus belong to the “taken-for-granted 
world of policy making”, which means their impact on actions and 
perceptions are not always clear (Schön and Rein, 1994: 34). 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to understand what frame really underlies 
an actor’s position. Policy statements are not necessarily congruent with 
their frames. All of these potential problems require carefully defining 
and operationalising the concepts of frames and nesting (Schön and 
Rein, 1994).  
 
As described above, frames can be identified through textual analysis of 
policy documents and through observations of speeches and policy 
declarations. The EU’s policy specific frame can be identified by 
examining its internal negotiation memos to see how arguments are 
justified and positions rationalized. The arguments and positions can also 
be identified through the interviews, which asked participants to 
describe the EU position and why it took a particular position.  The 
next step in the analysis is to identify the meta-level frame from which 
the policy frame is derived. Schön and Rein give guidance on how to 
identify meta-level frames: “The broader frames are identified by 
dichotomies, such as natural–artificial” (Schön and Rein, 1994: 34). To 
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the policy frames are derived are identified, along with statements about 
the prevailing political and social context in which the negotiations took 
place. For each case analysed in this study, a specific frame is first 
identified and then examined in terms of how it links to broader debates, 
e.g. trade liberalisation or national sovereignty over natural resources. 
Evidence from negotiation debates and statements from participants offer 
an indication of effective frame linkages, and outcomes that reflect a 
preferred policy frame provide further evidence of success.  
 
2.7  Drawing the Framework Together 
Although the three components of the explanatory framework utilized 
in this study were presented separately above, in practice they are 
interlinked. To understand the extent to which the EU influence 
processes and outcomes, the effect of interest-based factors, institution-
based factors, and ideas-based factor must each be analysed. Analysis in 
each case study will look sequentially at each factor to examine if the 
predictions of EU influence are fulfilled. The scenarios of EU influence, 
including strong EU preferences, enabling institutional structures, and 
linked policy frames, combine to suggest an aggregate scenario by which 
the EU would exercise the highest level of influence. If none of these 
conditions are met, the EU will not be influential. Any values in 
between those two extremes suggest varying influence for the EU. 
Those exact values, and their relation to the predictions, will be analysed 
for each case in Chapters Four, Five and Six, respectively. The analysis 
follows the same logic in each sub-case: first the EU’s influence on 
process and outcome is decided with help of the definition and 
operationalisation outline above. Then this outcome, i.e. the level of EU 
influence, is explained by the interest-based approach, then by the 
institutional-based approach and lastly the idea-based approach. The 
conclusion of each case will draw the explanatory factors together. 
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This chapter defined the central actor and the central concept of the 
study, and elaborated on the theoretical framework. In defining the EU 
in this study, the EU was considered as an influential actor with the 
ability to pursue negotiations and interact with other actors. In addition, 
the discussion reminded that the EU is an active political system, with 
institutional structures and policy processes which determine its 
behaviour in international negotiations. In operationalising the concept 
of influence, this study has defined influence as an actor’s goal attainment 
and has argued that measuring influence should include an actors’ effect 
on process, as well as outcomes, in relation to its original policy goals. 
The preceding discussion elaborated on the argument that influence is 
best understood as a factor of interest-based considerations, institutional 
considerations, and ideational frameworks. These factors build on the 
three building blocks used to explain political outcomes, which allow 
the influence to be broken down in components and derive potential 
explanations of the research question.  
 
Interest-based approaches explain outcomes by focusing on the actor and 
the factors shaping actor preferences. The premise of this approach is that 
actors have fundamental interests which they attempt to maximise in the 
course of a political situation. The focus here was to outline how the 
preferences and material motivations of the EU can explain its influence 
or non-influence. Institution-based approaches remind us that actors’ 
pursuit of its interests is not conducted in the absence of institutional 
structures. Here, institutions were examined in the way they channel the 
EU’s bargaining positions and constrain the EU key actors involved in 
international affairs. Idea-based approaches consider the role of ideas, 
norms, and epistemic communities in explaining political outcomes. 
This chapter drew upon “strategic framing” and “ideational nesting”. 
When strategic framing of policy priorities “fit” or “nest” with broader 
values and meta-level frames, those priorities gain additional support in 
the political process and can improve an actor’s influence on political 
outcomes.  
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components in explaining EU influence. The theoretical framework 
derived predictions on how the EU’s influence is enhanced or 
constrained as a result of the presence (or non-presence) of the respective 
explanatory variables. The resulting explanatory framework will guide 
analysis of the sub-cases. 
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Negotiations 
 
Global environmental problems have become an increasingly important 
part of the international political agenda, as has the EU’s role in 
environmental cooperation. These two relatively recent phenomena 
have attracted interest from both scholars and policy-makers. This 
chapter contextualises the international forest negotiations and the EU 
within this broader framework. The first half of the chapter is concerned 
with the concept of global environmental governance, what 
environmental cooperation aims at, and the EU’s development and 
functioning in this policy area. The second half of the chapter addresses 
forest issues on the international political agenda. The international forest 
negotiation process is briefly discussed in order to provide a background 
for the issue cases analysed in the following chapters.  
 
3.1  Global Environmental Governance 
The rise of global environmental problems, such as climate change, 
deforestation, and loss of biodiversity, has created growing demand for 
international interventions and increased cooperation among state and 
non-state actors (Baker, 2006). Global environmental problems have 
become an increasingly important and acknowledged part of the 
international political agenda. This growing awareness of environmental 
issues on the global scale has occurred in parallel with an expansion of 
the sub-discipline of international environmental politics (IEP). Since the 
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environmental change” and “sustainable development”, which replaced 
“limits to the growth” and “scarcities”, the grand narratives of the 1970s 
(Stevis, 2006: 29-39). The term “global governance” has become a key 
topic within the environmental discourse of today (Biermann, 2006: 
237).  
 
There are a number of conceptual approaches and a theoretical debate 
over the term of global environmental governance (see e.g. Biermann, 
2006; Paterson et al. 2003). The conventional understanding of global 
environmental governance refers to the international cooperation on 
environmental issues; it is the network of international environmental 
organisations and international environmental agreements (Vogler, 2005; 
Paterson et al. 2003). In the field of IEP, the primary focus has been to 
explain the practice of global environmental politics or particular sectors 
within this area (Betsill, et al. 2006). The evolution of global 
environmental cooperation in terms of the outcomes of summits, 
agreements and negotiations has attracted extensive scholarly interest 
(Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). One important dimension of this research 
has been to study the establishment of regimes to foster rule-governed 
activity, which will be further discussed below.  
 
The framework of global environmental governance has emerged 
through the UN-summits: 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment, Stockholm, 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, and 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg. The UN has played an important role in 
the international response to environmental problems and the most 
important international initiatives for protecting the global environment 
have been negotiated within the UN system. Through UN-meetings, 
the environmental problems have become part of the international 
political agenda, drawn attention to environmental problems, and 
increased knowledge about the environment (Bäckstrand, 2006).  
 
The summits have become a “space for joint thinking” (Seyfang, 2003: 
225). Simultaneously, there are limitations on what can be discussed 
within this framework. Another problem is the principle of sovereignty, 
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denominator (Bäckstrand, 2006). This problem reflects on negotiations 
pursued within the framework of the UN, as the state with least 
incentive to create regulations, tends to set the level of ambition (Chasek 
et al. 2006). Despite this problem, negotiation the most utilised mode of 
decision-making in this area (see Zartman, 1994). Thus, agreements, or 
other form of cooperative solutions, are the result of international 
negotiations (Kremenyuk, 1991).  
 
Negotiations are used to identify common interests, bring parties closer, 
and to work out acceptable solutions to a variety of issues (Sjöstedt, 
1993). Every negotiation has its own characteristics depending on the 
area it covers. The characteristics relate to the issues being discussed, the 
actors, and the solution or outcome of a negotiation. Environmental 
issues are complex, involve multiple actors, and broach other central 
issues, such as economy, development, and equity (Sjöstedt, 1993). In 
the context of environmental issues, negotiations in general aim at 
attaining an agreement to mitigate the problem at hand, often in the 
form of a convention, principles, guidelines, or plan of action. Given the 
complexity involved in these processes, such agreements are often quite 
difficult to reach.  
 
3.2  The Aim of Global Environmental Governance 
The goal of international environmental cooperation is to curb and 
mitigate certain environmental problems, and is normally achieved by 
the creation of an agreement regulating damaging actions (Baker, 2006). 
The complexities of these issues and their transboundary effects have led 
to a need for multilateral management. The interdependence makes it 
impossible for one actor to manage environmental problems alone, as 
what one actor does can be harmful to others. Hence, there are 
problems that cannot be managed by single states; therefore, they 
cooperate in different issue areas. In many cases, the cooperation has led 
to the creation of regimes, which could be seen as ”a response to the 
demand for governance in a specific issue area” (Young and Zürn, 2006: 
121).  
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Regimes are a form of institutional framework consisting of agreements 
with formal rules: within the frameworks, informal practices have arisen 
that are important in the way they shape and constrain actors’ behaviour 
(Young and Zürn, 2006). In practice, the understanding that 
cooperation is crucial for tackling global policy problems has given rise 
to a wide range of issue specific governance systems. In the context of 
the study of global environmental politics, regime analysis has been 
utilised to analyse institutional response to different environmental 
problems, such as climate change and ozone depletion (Andresen, 2000; 
Sjöstedt, 1998; Paterson, 1996; Benedick, 1991; Haas, 1990; Young, 
1989). 
 
The standard definition of an international regime identifies the 
components of a regime and takes formal and informal aspects into 
consideration. According to this definition, a regime is a framework of 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (Krasner, 1983: 2).
12 These components cover 
formal agreements and the more elusive parts of cooperation. Hence, a 
regime can be viewed as an international institutional arrangement of 
informal and formal elements, such as norms and rules. These elements 
guide and regulate actors’ behaviour within an issue area of international 
politics. Some regime scholars attach importance to the formal elements, 
in the form of hard-law, and argue that such an instrument is central to a 
regime:  
 
It is difficult to identify norms and rules […] that are not defined by a specific 
agreement (Porter and Brown, 1991: 20).  
 
However, there are differing views on this topic, e.g. Vogler suggests 
this perspective is  
 
                                                 
12  Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions 
for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice’ (Krasner, 1983: 2). 
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understandings that make the bare bones of legal text both comprehensible 
and workable (2000: 21).  
 
Scholars have traditionally focused their research on environmental issues 
where a legal agreement has been achieved and thus a regime been 
formed (Dimitrov et al. 2007). For example, the regime for stratospheric 
ozone is viewed as a success story of regime building and environmental 
cooperation. In the regime-building process, a framework convention 
and a protocol were agreed. The ozone regime rests on a common and 
deepening understanding of the relationship between chemicals and the 
depletion of the ozone layer. Key to the regime is the ability to address 
and reduce scientific uncertainty, which has stimulated policy 
development but has not allowed uncertainty restraint action (Chasek et 
al. 2006; Benedick: 1991). In general, actors’ involvement in 
international environmental processes aims at building a similar 
framework to respond to the problem in consideration.
13  
 
Recent research stresses the importance of studying “non-regimes” in 
order to investigate cases where there are no agreements in place 
(Dimitrov et al. 2007; Dimitrov, 2006). Follow on the text after 
Dimitrov a non-regime is “a public policy arena characterized by the 
absence of an interstate policy agreement where states have either tried 
or failed to create one, or when governments have not even initiated 
negotiations”(Dimitrov, 2006: 9). Dimitrov uses the international forest 
negotiations as a case of failed regime building, meaning that the 
negotiations have not led to a formal treaty and therefore no regime has 
come into existence (Dimitrov, 2006 and 2003). Others argue that 
indeed there is a forest regime, and then include the broader forest 
governance area (see e.g. Humphreys, 2006; Rosendal, 2001; Glück et 
al. 1997).  
 
In this study, the focus is on the international forest negotiations. The 
outcome of the process adds to a body of soft law, which could have 
                                                 
13 The motives for such involvement can be very different, e.g. related to power play, 
vulnerability or environmental concerns. Actors can also be more interested in showing an 
effort to address the problem and less interested in creating a functioning framework. 
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to have missed the window of opportunity to create such platform, it is 
even regarded as a failure that lacks in purpose and outcome (Dimitrov, 
2006: 109). In this study, the body of soft law created in the 
international forest negotiations is regarded as having contributed to the 
wider forest governance area. However, while this body of soft law 
certainly have been important for the development of international forest 
policy, the international forest negotiations in large appear to have stalled 
constructive cooperation in this area.  
 
The failure of this process has been attributed to a range of factors. The 
absence of a convention has been explained by the domination of 
principles of neoliberal free trade, which came to dominate the 
negotiations and restricted the possibilities to create an adequate response 
to deforestation and forest degradation (Humphreys, 2006). The lack of 
reliable scientific information is another plausible explanation for this 
outcome. According to this, the incomplete scientific knowledge on the 
transboundary effects of deforestation explains the hampered 
international cooperation in this area (Dimitrov, 2006). Only a handful 
of explanations have focused on key actors in the process. For instance, 
Davenport explains the outcome through the unwillingness of the US to 
build a pro-treaty coalition in the early 1990s. According to Davenport, 
the US was not prepared to bear the cost of leadership needed to create a 
forest treaty (2005).  
 
As aforementioned, scholars have addressed the EU in the forest 
negotiations. However, the studies of the EU in this area are few and 
arrive at somewhat different conclusions. One of these studies 
emphasizes the lack of EU leadership in the process and argues that 
although not being a leader, the EU has exercised some degree of 
influence. The main reason for the lack of leadership has been identified 
as the EU’s internal coordination problems (Chaban et al. 2006). On the 
other hand, it has also been stated that “the EU seems to have been able, 
almost as a rule, to speak with one voice” (Jokela, 2006: 241). Previous 
research on the international forest negotiations and the EU’s role in it 
offer useful insights, and serve as a point of departure for this study. By 
examining the EU, this study shed light on one aspect of the failed 
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the environmental area, which might contribute to further explain the 
outcome of the failed negotiations.   
  
3.3  The EU and Global Environmental Cooperation 
14  
In Chapters One and Two, the EU as an actor and political system and 
EU leadership within global environmental politics were discussed. In 
this section, EU policy development and functioning within this area is 
outlined. Alongside the emergence of global environmental politics, the 
EU has evolved as an important actor, both within this framework and 
more generally in world politics. EU evolution from the late 1980 to the 
Kyoto-negotiations is described as: “the EU moved from being the 
Vienna laggard to the Kyoto leader” (Sbragia and Damro 1999: 53). This 
refers to EU participation in the creation of the ozone and climate 
change regimes. In the ozone case, the EU was initially a reluctant 
participant, but later “played a key role in brokering the agreement” 
(McCormick, 2001: 262). In the case of climate change, the EU became 
a leading proponent of cutting greenhouse gases. When the US rejected 
the protocol in 2001, the EU was determined to save the protocol, 
which survived and eventually entered into force in 2005 (Carter, 2007).  
 
The growing importance of the EU within the international 
environmental cooperation is linked to institutional development and 
evolution of internal environmental policy-making (Sbragia, 2005). The 
domestic and institutional features of the EU are crucial for 
understanding EU performance and action at the international level 
(Delreux, 2006; Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006).  
 
                                                 
14 The forest negotiations are part of the broader framework of global environmental 
governance, although forest issues are multidimensional and cross boundaries of several 
policy areas. In this thesis, forest negotiations are viewed as part of global environmental 
politics and within the EU they are considered to be environmental negotiations, i.e. when 
EU’s structures relevant for this case are discussed, the forest policy is not discussed more 
broadly. For the EU’s internal forest policy, see Andersson, 2007.  
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(EEC) in 1957 with the task of establishing a common market and of 
coordinating the economic policies of member states. Environmental 
issues were absent in this treaty, as was the case with environmental 
issues in world politics more generally at this time (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006). This changed gradually over time as EU competences 
grew to include social, environmental, and regional policy areas. In 
1973, EU member states launched a series of Environmental Action 
Programmes (EAP), of which there have been six (Baker, 2006).  
 
These multi-annual programmes set objectives, defined key-principles, 
selected priorities, and described measures for different policy sectors 
related to the environment. The action programmes displayed increasing 
commitment to environmental protection; however, they were only 
guidelines for action and did not have the same force of law as treaty 
articles (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). With the European Single Act 
(SEA) of 1987, environmental policy became a formal EU competence. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 introduced the principle of sustainable 
development as a central aim of the EU and confirmed the growing 
importance of this policy area (Baker, 2006). The Maastricht Treaty also 
deemed the promotion of measures at the international level to deal with 
regional or international environmental problems as a key policy 
objective (Hix, 2005).  
 
The EAPs reveal the EU’s move into a prominent international 
environmental role and its more general commitment to sustainable 
development (Baker, 2006). In 2002, the Commissioner for 
Environment, Margot Wallström, stated “the EU has to play the leading 
role in ensuring that Johannesburg delivers concrete progress towards 
sustainability goals” (Commissioner Margot Wallström quoted in 
Burchell and Lightfoot, 2004: 169). Hence, the EU appears committed 
to working towards sustainable development and to playing a leading 
role.  
 
An important milestone for the EU’s global role was the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in the 1970s, that in areas where the EU 
had passed internal legislation, it also had the right to handle external 
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principle) (European Courts Report, 1971). Even so, ambiguity over the 
proper division of labour in negotiating international environmental 
agreements remained (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). In 1992, the 
European Community (EC) was granted full participant status at the 
UNCED, meaning that it had the same rights as the participating states 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). The EC achieved legal status and was 
entitled to act only in areas of legally established competence. Unlike the 
EC, the EU cannot conclude international agreements; the EU does not 
have international legal personality (Delreux, 2006).  
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the environment policy area is formally 
recognised as an area of shared competence within the EU
15, and 
international forest negotiations are subsumed under EU environmental 
policies. When discussions in negotiations concern issues under exclusive 
competence, representatives from the Commission take the floor, in 
issues under the jurisdiction of the member states, national diplomats 
decide. In areas under the jurisdiction of both member states and the EU 
(shared competence), the EU is sometimes represented by the Council 
Presidency, sometimes by the Commission (Elgström and Strömvik, 
2005).  
 
For the international forest negotiations, shared competence applies. The 
Presidency represents the member states and there are representatives 
from the Commission present at the negotiations. When negotiations 
broach trade related issues, the Commission can step in and represent the 
EU. Within the Commission, the forest negotiations are subsumed 
under the Directorate General Environment, and the Council Working 
Group of Forestry is the responsible Council Working Group under the 
Council. This makes forest negotiations different from other 
environmental negotiations, such as climate change and biodiversity. 
These issues are also subsumed under the Directorate General of 
Environment, but at the Council Working Party on International 
Environmental Issues at the Council (European Commission, 2003).  
                                                 
15 For a discussion on shared (or mixed) competence in environmental negotiations see 
Rhinard and Kaeding, 2006.  
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The EU position in forest negotiations is decided by the Council 
working group. In these meetings, Council conclusions are drafted in 
which the EU’s aims and objectives are stated, which could be seen as 
the “mechanism” for the common position. In the context of the forest 
negotiations, the Council conclusions are generally weak in formulation 
and serve to provide a political signal. In the process, Council 
conclusions have sometimes served as the negotiation strategy. However, 
sometimes there is a specific written negotiation strategy: this is up to the 
Presidency to decide. Sometimes a problem is posed with written 
strategies, as there are many people involved that receive the strategy in 
writing. The EU’s more specific negotiation strategies and tactics are 
decided foremost by the member states’ negotiations within the Council 
working group. The functioning outlined here is typically for forest 
negotiations, different rules apply for other international issues and also 
for other forest policy areas.
16 
 
3.4  Forests in the Context of Global Environmental Governance  
Forest issues are deeply entangled in different international policy areas, 
such as international trade and financing for development (Chaytor, 
2001). Forests encompass a wide range of issues that cut across policy 
boundaries. Thus, there are conflicting views on the forests that are 
internationally significant, as is illustrated in the following quote:  
 
Some see a stock of timber to be exploited for economic gain. Others see a 
complex ecological system that holds the soil in place, stabilizes the local 
water cycle, moderates the local climate and fosters biological diversity.  Still 
others see the forests as a home for people and other living things, or perhaps 
as an ancestral burial ground. Finally, some see the forests as a powerful 
cultural symbol on broader scales: The forest as a dynamic living system 
reflects the potential harmony between humanity and nature provides link 
between the past and the future. […] [At the international level] forests could 
be seen as an important source of international economic power or as 
                                                 
16 The understanding of the EU’s particular functioning in the international forest 
negotiations has been derived from interviews, in particular interviews no. 24, 25, 43, 55, 
56  
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global consequences of local acts in that its destruction alter global climate or 
deplete the global stock of biological diversity. For others the forests represent 
the national sovereignty in that it confirms the right of a nation to do as it 
sees fit within its territory. (Conca and Dabelko, 1998: 2).  
 
The most acknowledged international forest-related problem is 
deforestation.
17 Deforestation is not just an environmental problem in 
itself, it also causes other environmental problems and has severe effects 
on welfare and productivity in many developing countries. There are 
both natural and human induced causes of deforestation; natural factors 
include repeated fires, attacks by insects, disease, and destruction by 
storms. Deforestation due to human activities is connected to the global 
economy and involves among others: commercial logging, agriculture, 
pasture, and mining and military activities. (Dimitrov, 2006: 114.)  
 
However, deforestation is also a prerequisite for human settlement: in 
order to obtain agricultural land, forests need to be cleared. Most 
deforestation occurs as the result of the landless rural-poor. Faced with 
few other economic options, they clear forested land for small-scale 
subsistence agriculture (Cámara-Cabrales, 1999). Deforestation and 
degradation of forests became an international concern during 1970s and 
1980s and spurred international action in different forums. Over time, 
forest issues on the international agenda have broadened and been 
connected to sustainable development, in particular with the emergence 
of the concept of sustainable forest management. Sustainable forest 
management aims to ensure that goods and services derived from the 
forest meet present-day needs, while securing continued availability and 
contribution to long-term development. In its broadest sense, sustainable 
forest management encompasses the administrative, legal, technical, 
economic, social, and environmental aspects of conservation and use of 
forests. Many of the world's forests and woodlands, however, especially 
                                                 
17 Forests cover about 30% of the world’s land area, distributed unevenly around the world. 
Over the 15 years from 1990 to 2005, the world lost 3% of its total forest area. About 40% 
of the earth’s forests are in relatively undisturbed tracts; these are large enough to provide 
habitats for large species of mammals. Actual forestland has increased in some regions due 
to new plantation of forests. However, globally, deforestation continues to be a severe 
problem (FAO, 2005). 
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the Forest Principles adopted at UNCED (FAO, 2005). (For an 
overview of the development of the forest issue on the international 
agenda, see Holmgren, 2008,). 
 
Thus, forest issues have emerged as an important priority on the 
international political agenda for sustainable development. In the 1980s, 
the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) was initiated because of 
increasing awareness of deforestation in the tropics. The International 
Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) was also established in the 1980s 
(Humphreys, 1996). Forest issues are discussed in negotiations of other 
conventions, such as the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES). The EU is profoundly involved in a process called Forest Law 
Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT), which aims at halting 
illegal logging through trade measures (Brack, 2007). Most recently, 
forests have become an integral part of the climate change agenda by the 
UN initiative Reducing Emissions by Deforestation and Degradation of 
forests (REDD) (Engel and Palmer, 2008).  
 
Forest governance involves a variety of actors: governments, 
international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), the UN Environment Programme, the UN 
Development Programme, and the World Bank. There are also different 
certification systems, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and 
the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes 
(PEFC, the programme was relaunched from Pan European Forest 
Certification in 2003, but retained its acronym). (See Humphreys, 2006 
for an overview of forest governance). Hence, several international 
forums cover forest issues and involve a number of actors at the 
international level; although this highlights the importance of forest 
issues, it also reveals fragmentation (Humphreys, 2006). Forest related 
issues are considered in a number of processes. However, there is one 
process that exclusively concerns forests issues at the UN-level:  the 
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which is the focus of this study.  
 
3.5  The International Forest Negotiation Process  
The forest negotiation process emerges from the run-up to the UNCED 
that took place in 1992. When the World Commission on Environment 
and Development presented its report to the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) in 1987, there were recommendations for the UN to convene 
an international conference on environment and development to address 
environmental protection and sustainable development (Humphreys, 
1996). UNGA formally established UNCED in December 1989. In the 
Assembly Resolution 44/228, it was stated that the purpose of UNCED 
was to: “elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects 
of environmental degradation in the context of increased national and 
international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound 
development in all countries” (United Nations, 1989). The resolution 
furthered declared that combating deforestation was going to be one of 
the agenda items in the upcoming summit and that: ”Protection and 
management of land resources by, inter alia, combating deforestation, 
desertification and drought” (United Nations, 1989). 
 
During the negotiations undertaken in the UNCED Preparatory 
Committees, the forest issue became polarised. The disagreement 
concerned the plan to start negotiations on a forests convention (Chasek 
et al. 2006). Certain countries wanted a decision to negotiate a forest 
convention. Ideas for the contents of such a convention ranged from 
establishing national forest policies to stopping deforestation or 
developing detailed rules for (Humphreys, 1996). However, the attempts 
to establish what proved to be a controversial convention failed. At the 
second preparatory meeting, held in Geneva 1991, it was decided that 
“the minimum goal should be the adoption of a non-legally binding 
declaration” (Kolk, 1996: 154). The result was The Non-legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of 
Forests (also known as the “Forest Principles”), as well as Chapter 11 of 
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Humphreys, 1996).  
 
The Forest Principles are often described as representing a result of the 
lowest common denominator between North and South (Kolk, 1996: 
159-160). The hostilities between the partners closed the door for 
international discussions on forests (Chasek et al. 2006; Humphreys, 
1996). However, despite the deep division between North and South, a 
series of international meetings and initiatives took place between 1992 
and 1995, and the process of sustainable forest management took form. 
Eventually, these initiatives led to an understanding that there was a need 
for a process exclusively focused on forests and resulted in a review of 
the Forest Principles and identified areas of common interests, which led 
to the development of a common international agenda on forests 
(Chasek et al. 2006).  
 
In 1995, at the third session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), it was decided to create an open-ended ad hoc 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF). The same year the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), on the recommendation of 
the CSD approved the establishment of the Panel. The IPF was intended 
to construct a dialogue in the polarised political context that UNCED 
gave rise to (Tarasofsky, 1995). Thus, the Panel was established in order 
to continue the international dialogue on forests and had a two-year 
mandate “to pursue consensus and formulate options for further actions 
in order to combat deforestation, and forest degradation and to promote 
the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types 
of forests” (ECOSOC, 1997b: paras.1-2).  
 
The panel met four times and resulted in over 140 proposals for action
18 
on a number of issues related to its agenda, with 12 elements concerning 
sustainable development of all types of forests. The items on the agenda 
included national forest and land-use plans; underlying causes of 
deforestation; protection and use of traditional forest-related knowledge; 
                                                 
18 In the context of the forest negotiations a proposal of action is a policy recommendation 
for advancing international understanding and consensus on forest issues (ECOSOC, 1995) 
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criteria and indicators; trade and environment in relation to forest 
products and services; and international organisations, multilateral 
institutions, and instruments, including appropriate legal mechanisms 
(ECOSOC, 1995).  
 
The negotiations were to great extent carried out during a period of 
confidence building and when the discussions concerned “softer issues”, 
the sessions were fruitful. However, there was an underlying mistrust, 
which came into open as soon as the negotiations moved on to more 
political issues (Humphreys, 2001). Participants were unable to agree on 
financial issues, trade-related matters, and whether or not to begin 
negotiations on a forest convention (ECOSOC, 1997b). The divisions 
between actors were in general the same as at the time of UNCED, with 
some important changes regarding the convention issue. The most 
remarkable changes were the US and Malaysia. The US had supported 
the idea of a convention at the UNCED, but was now opposing it. 
Malaysia shifted its position before the IPF, from being a stern opponent 
to favouring a convention. Also the majority of the NGO community 
shifted position at IPF where many NGOs declared their opposition 
against a convention (Chasek et al. 2006).  
 
The formal results from the IPF were the institutional set-up, in the 
form of elected officers, dates and venues for forthcoming meetings, and 
the adoption of elements for a programme of work. During the 18 
months the panel was in place, research, intersessional meetings, 
discussions and negotiations were carried out. The issues of a global 
forest convention, trade and finance for implementing sustainable forest 
management exposed the long-standing divisions, and resulted in 
tentative and vague language in the reports on these issues (ENB, 1997). 
These issues were left pending, and it was decided to continue the 
deliberations in a new forum: the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. 
 
The Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (1997-2000) was mandated to 
promote and facilitate the implementation of the IPF proposals for 
action; review, monitor and report on progress in the management, 
conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests; and 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, in particular trade and environment 
in relation to forest products and services, transfer of technology and the 
need for financial resources (ECOSOC, 1997a).  
 
The Forum was broadly similar to the IPF and followed the same 
pattern: it produced 120 proposals for action in areas related to 
sustainable forest management. The issues that thwarted the IPF 
continued to be difficult for the IFF: trade, finance, and the forest 
convention provided the most intense debates in the negotiation sessions 
(ENB, 2000). At the fourth and last session of the Forum, delegates 
agreed to recommend the establishment of an intergovernmental body 
called the UN Forum on Forests to the CSD, and within five years, 
“consider with a view to recommending the parameters of a mandate for 
developing a legal framework on all types of forests” (ECOSOC, 2000a). 
The language was sufficiently obscure to satisfy different camps so all felt 
they had achieved a successful outcome to the negotiations (Dimitrov, 
2005). At the IFF, it was agreed to continue the deliberations with the 
establishment of United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) (ECOSOC, 
2000a).  
  
The UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) was established by the ECOSOC 
resolution 2000/35 in 2000 as a “central intergovernmental forum to 
deliberate international policy” (ECOSOC, 2000a) and holds a unique 
position in the UN system, with universal membership and reporting 
directly to the ECOSOC (Humphreys, 2003). The Forum’s original 
mandate was five years and the main objective is to ”promote the 
management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of 
forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end” 
(ECOSOC, 2001). A Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) was 
also established to support the work of UNFF and its member countries, 
and to foster increased cooperation and coordination on forests 
(Humphreys, 2003).  
 
One important task of the Forum was to take a position on how future 
cooperation on forest policy would continue. As stated above, at the 
fifth session the UNFF had to “consider with a view to recommending 
  78 the parameters of a mandate for developing a legal framework on all 
types of forests” (ECOSOC, 2000a). At the fifth session, the delegates 
were incapable of reaching agreement and could not produce either a 
ministerial statement or a negotiated outcome (ENB, 2005). The 
delegates decided on the last day to forward the draft negotiating text to 
UNFF-6, which was held in February 2006. Thus, the sixth session took 
place almost a year after the fifth session that was intended to be the last 
session in this process. At the Forum’s sixth session, the long-discussed 
agenda item of whether or not to commence negotiations on a forest 
convention was finally abandoned (ENB: 2006). Instead, it was decided 
to adopt a non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests at the 
seventh session in April 2007. In the final text, a review was scheduled 
for 2015 (ECOSOC, 2006). Hence, negotiations did not end in 2005, 
but will continue until at least 2015.  
 
The IPF and IFF contributed to building confidence between the North 
and South. Since the UNCED meeting, positions changed and it was no 
longer a matter of clear-cut North-South issues, instead the positions 
were more related to the role of forests in the countries (Humphreys, 
2006). One problem for the IPF and IFF appears to have been too many 
items on their agendas. This undermined the authority and power of 
these bodies. The idea of a body with a holistic approach to forests was 
challenged by the complexity of the issues. Thus, it generated a long, 
complex process and run in a political dead end. The reason for 
establishing the UNFF was in part to obscure the failure of IFF-4 
(Interview no. 49). The opportunity of having a high level UN body for 
forests was lost, it could have been an opportunity for creating a strong 
international forest policy and strengthening existing arrangements. 
Instead, the UNFF is viewed as a failure and empty compromise with 
weak substantial outcomes and policy coordination (Dimitrov, 2006).   
 
3.6  Conclusion  
This chapter aimed at outlining the broader context of the international 
forest negotiations and the EU in this policy area. In this study, the EU 
and the forest negotiations are seen as a part of global environmental 
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used here, refers to the international cooperation on environmental 
issues in forms of negotiations and treaties. The standard assumption in 
this area is that global environmental cooperation aims at creating 
regimes, normally including a convention for regulating the issue area. 
These are the result of international negotiations.  
 
In this context, the forest negotiations have been characterised as a 
failure. The failure of this process has been attributed to a range of 
factors, such as lack of reliable scientific information and unwillingness of 
key actors. The EU’s role in global environmental governance has been 
characterised by a remarkable development since the 1990s. It has had a 
strong internal policy development and been able to play an increasingly 
important external role within the environmental area. The second half 
of the chapter discussed forests in the context of global environmental 
governance, asserting that forests encompass a wide range of issues that 
give rise conflicting views of international significance. Deforestation and 
degradation of forests has long been an international concern. Over time, 
forest issues on the international agenda have broadened and been 
connected to sustainable development, with the central concept of 
sustainable forest management. Forest related issues are important on the 
international agenda, and part of a number of international processes. 
However, as this chapter outlined there is only one international process 
that exclusively focus on forests issues at the UN-level. This process is 
the concern of this study and the remaining chapters.  
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Legally Binding or Not 
 
In this chapter, EU influence on the issue of a legally binding instrument 
on forests is investigated. The question of whether or not to create such 
an instrument has generated an intense and enduring debate in the 
negotiations. The issue had a background presence in the negotiations 
and surfaced at the end of each session until 2005, when negotiations 
broke down. In 2007, participants decided to adopt a non-legally 
binding instrument instead. The EU has been a long-standing supporter 
of the creation of a legally binding instrument and this position appeared 
well established among member states, and in line with the EU 
overarching goals of strengthening global environmental cooperation. 
Despite this, the EU could not gain enough support for achieving its 
objective. This chapter begins by addressing the broader debate on hard 
and soft law instruments. Then it briefly discusses the arguments in 
favour of and against a legally binding instrument on forests. The bulk of 
the chapter focuses on negotiation process on the legally binding 
instrument by outlining this process, identifying the EU’s position and 
analysing its influence.  
 
4.1  The Broader Debate on Instruments in International 
Environmental Cooperation 
In response to global environmental problems, a variety of policy 
instruments, such binding treaties and guidelines have been created. The 
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“hard law” or “soft law” (Abbot and Snidal, 2000: 421-422). 
Cooperation on environmental issues often results in multilateral 
agreements (MEAs), or treaties, which normally are legally binding for 
the undersigning states, although there are no sanctioning mechanisms in 
place at the international level. The process of crafting treaties can be 
rather complex and difficult. As a result, the use soft law instruments 
such as resolutions have increased (Birnie and Boyle, 2002). The Forest 
Principles are an example of a soft law instrument.  
 
In the context of forests negotiations, the discussions concerned whether 
or not to create some sort of legally binding instrument. Thus, the two 
main contradictory categories in these negotiations have been a legally 
binding instrument or a non-legally binding instrument. There were 
several proposals for the design of such an instrument for a non-legally 
binding instrument. Suggestions for a legally binding instrument were 
directed towards negotiating a new legally binding instrument in the 
form of a framework convention or as an extended scope of existing 
instruments, e.g. create a forest protocol under CBD (Humphreys, 
1996). Alternatives to a legally binding instrument focused on creating 
an intergovernmental forum for policy discussions and improvement of 
the soft law body for forests in the form of a non-legally binding 
instrument (ECOSOC, 2000b). Until around 2000, most policy-makers 
and analysts used the term “convention” for the legally binding 
instrument. After this point it has become more common to refer to a 
“legally binding instrument” (see Table 3. below). This study alternates 
between these terms, according to the policy debate.  
 
There are several arguments in favour of and against a legally binding 
instrument. Humphreys has outlined these generalized arguments. The 
arguments in favour stress that such an instrument is needed to reduce 
the existing fragmentation in forest governance, a convention would 
function as an umbrella for other forest related instruments. It would also 
complement and strengthen existing multilateral agreements with forests 
provisions and support the work of these instruments. This would create 
a “holistic”, “integrated” and “comprehensive” treatment of forests in 
international law. In addition, a convention would provide clear, focused 
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as the CBD. Existing arrangements that deal with forests have, to date, 
been ineffective and limited in scope. Forests are multifaceted and as 
such, there is a need for a broad and all-encompassing instrument can 
deal meaningfully with the diverse complexities of the problem. Further, 
a convention would demonstrate high-level political commitment to 
conserve and sustainably manage forests. There is also a need for 
clarification in this area. The arguments against a convention emphasize 
that a convention only would lead to increased political and legal 
uncertainties. The added value of an additional forest related instrument 
is unclear. A convention would add another layer of international 
regulation and further complicate the area. It is also argued that a 
convention would not guarantee an effective solution for the problems 
at stake. In addition, there are actor specific arguments that are based on 
their different concerns. (Humphreys, 2005: 3-4.)  
 
4.2  Negotiations on a Legally Binding Instrument  
As outlined above, the issue of a global forest convention has been 
discussed since the beginning of the 1990s, when it became clear the 
UNCED process intended to address deforestation and forest 
degradation. An UN resolution announced that combating deforestation 
would be one of the agenda items in the upcoming summit (United 
Nations, 1989). This spurred different suggestions regarding a global 
policy instrument on forests (i.e. a forest convention). Amongst others, 
the proposals brought forward ideas of a forestry protocol under a 
climate change convention or a global forest convention or agreement. 
The latter was advanced by the developed countries at a Group Seven 
(G7) meeting and in the European Parliament (Humphreys, 1996). 
However, at UNCED in 1992, consensus on the issue of a forest 
convention was not reached as the negotiations became polarised and 
created such a hostile atmosphere that it was difficult to discuss forest 
issues at the international level in the subsequent three years (Chasek et 
al. 2006).   
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number of actors had changed their opinions regarding a forest 
convention. The USA and Malaysia were the two most remarkable shifts 
of positions. During UNCED, the USA had been in favour of a 
convention, but at the IPF, it opposed this idea. Malaysia, which 
strongly resisted a convention at UNCED, was supportive by the end of 
the IPF (Humphreys, 2006). The issue of a legally binding instrument 
dominated the fourth and final session of the IPF in 1997. Despite the 
new alignment countries, the debate of a global forest convention was 
just as polarised as in 1992, and finally, the IPF was unable to agree on 
the issue (Chasek et al. 2006).  
 
During the IFF, the convention issue developed the same as at the IPF; 
the issue was present in the background until the final round of 
negotiations held in 2000 and long-standing differences remained 
(Humphreys, 2005), but not with the standard North-South divide 
(ENB, 2000). There were two options at stake: “a legally binding 
instrument or a new UN-body for forests” (ENB 2000: 11). There was 
no agreement for a legally binding instrument; instead, it was decided to 
create a new body: the United Nations Forum on Forests. The new 
body was created with a mandate, to within five years “consider with at 
view to recommending the parameters of a mandate for developing a 
legal framework on all types of forests” (ECOSOC, 2000a). As 
mentioned above, the ambiguous wording was deliberately vague 
formulated to make both sides satisfied, or to “save faces” on both sides 
(Dimitrov, 2006: 108).  
 
At UNFF, a similar set of events occurred. According to earlier 
decisions, delegates were supposed to come to an agreement on whether 
or not to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument at the forum’s 
fifth session in May 2005 (ECOSOC, 2000a). After the fourth session of 
UNFF an expert group responsible for generating the international 
options for the international arrangement on forests was created.
19 In 
                                                 
19 The full name was the Ad Hoc Expert Group on Consideration with a View to 
Recommending the Parameters of a Mandate for Developing a Legal Framework on All 
Types of Forests.  
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the expert group meeting in September 2004 and the country-led 
intersessional meeting in January 2005, two categories of options for an 
international arrangement on forests were stressed. The first category 
concerned a legally binding instrument, a forest convention or a forest 
protocol to another convention. The second category consisted of 
different alternatives for strengthening the UNFF. Two proposals came 
to dominate the negotiations at the fifth session of UNFF. The first 
concerned development of quantifiable and time-bound targets e.g. the 
rate of deforestation should be reduced by a certain percent by a certain 
year. The second proposal stressed negotiations on a non-legally binding 
instrument. (Humphreys, 2006: 109-110; see also ECOSOC, 2005.) 
 
 At the fifth UNFF session, the idea of a non-legally binding instrument 
emerged and informal proposals advocating a voluntary code circulated. 
The issue of quantified and time-bound targets created a major 
disagreement. The EU, together with Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Norway, and Switzerland supported quantifiable and time-bound targets, 
and Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iran, Peru, and the USA opposed 
(Humphreys, 2006). Later, this demand was abandoned and instead, the 
EU and Canada asked for “a quid pro quo commitment to strong time-
bound commitments from other countries” (Humphreys, 2006: 112). As 
this was not achieved, the negotiations at UNFF 5 ended with a collapse 
(Humphreys, 2006; see also ENB, 2005). The negotiations at UNFF 5 
ended with an agreement to postpone decisions to a resumed sixth 
session in 2006, where it was decided to renew the UNFF mandate until 
2015 and the option of a legally binding instrument could be considered 
among alternatives in the future review of the international arrangement 
in 2015 (ECOSOC, 2006). In 2007, the Forum held its seventh session, 
where a non-legally binding was adopted (ECOSOC, 2007).  
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Forum and year  Alternatives 
UNCED, 1992  Convention  Principles  
 
IPF, 1995 - 1997  Convention   Continue discussions in 
a new forums 
IFF 1998-2000  Convention/LBI   Continue discussions in 
new forums, create a 
new body 
UNFF 2000  LBI   NLBI 
 
UNFF 6-7, 2006-2007  NLBI with quantifiable and 
time- bound targets 
embedded  
NLBI without 
quantifiable and time- 
bound elements 
 
 
4.3  The EU and the Negotiations on the Legally Binding 
Instrument  
Before UNCED, the EC was in favour of creating a forest convention, 
as were most industrialised states at this time (Presidency Conclusions of 
the European Council, 1990: 8 and 26). Initially, the Council argued for 
a convention on tropical forests; however, after the Houston meeting of 
G7, the Parliament proposed a convention for all types of forests, which 
was a shift towards the proposal of the G7 (Humphreys, 1996). The EU 
continued to support the convention idea in the IPF. In March 1995, 
before the first session of the Panel, the Council stated:  “The 
management, conservation and sustainable development of forests 
concern many aspects, especially socio-economic ones which go beyond 
issues of biological diversity and climate change. Therefore, the Council 
considers that, in addition to the Conventions agreed at Rio, a specific 
legally binding instrument on forests is needed to manage all aspects of 
this holistic approach” (Council of European Union, 1995).  
 
Before the fourth and final session of IPF in 1997, the Commission 
issued a working paper suggesting a binding forest convention, which 
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approach towards the issue in the negotiations: 
 
a) that the IPF recommends the creation of an Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC) to CSD and at a later stage to UNGASS.  
b) if participants are not ready to accept an INC from the outset, a fall-
back position for the EU could be to accept the establishment by 
UNGASS of a preparatory process for an INC with the mandate to 
prepare these negotiations (European Union Commission, 1996).  
 
This meant that the EU wanted negotiations for a convention to start as 
soon as possible after the Panel ended, and a negotiation committee 
would have corresponded with this plan. The recommended fallback 
position suggests that the aim with the subsequent process was to start 
negotiations for a convention. The approach suggested by the 
Commission became the collective EU position for IPF 4. In notes from 
a preparatory coordination meeting, before IPF-4, it is stated that: “The 
EU should work to get a decision to start negotiations of a global forest 
convention. The EU is in favour of a global forest convention and to 
establish an INC” (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997c: 3-4). The main 
arguments among member states favourable to a convention were to 
“get a holistic approach to forest issues and a better use of financial 
resources” (Interview no. 46). 
 
After the fourth session, when there was no agreement on a convention, 
the EU continued to emphasise its support for such instrument. In the 
preparations of forest issues for UNGASS in June 1997, the EU position 
was:  
 
A holistic view would be a step forward towards sustainable forest 
management for all types of forests. A legally binding instrument would 
safeguard such holistic view and would further contribute to the 
implementation of the Forest Principles and the IPF proposals for action. 
Therefore, the EU strongly argues for establishing a convention […]. The EU 
believes that CSD should recommend the UNGA to establish an 
intergovernmental negotiation committee with a clear mission and time limit 
to negotiate a forest convention that should be open for ratification at the 
latest 2000 (Council of the European Union, 1997b).  
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Among the member states, some were strongly in favour of a convention 
and others were lukewarm. Before the fourth session of IPF, when the 
convention issue was to be decided, internal EU discussions revealed a 
growing sense of division: there were no outspoken arguments, but a 
change of attitudes. The notes of one internal coordination meeting 
indicated Sweden, Denmark, and the UK emphasised the importance of 
considering both alternatives to a convention and having fallback 
positions if a convention was not attained. However, in the conclusions 
from the meeting, the EU’s position was still to work in favour of a 
convention (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997b).  
 
During the IFF, the EU’s position was still in favour of a convention, 
although, a growing divide between member states emerged during the 
process. In the preparations for IFF-3, some member states questioned 
the EU goal and the legal basis for this negotiation position. In response 
to these concerns, the Presidency commented that the EU had already 
formulated its position and the Council secretary referred to the three 
Council conclusions that were the basis of the EU position. The 
Council secretary stated:  
 
If the member states wished to change the mandate, they needed new 
decisions from the Council. The Presidency emphasised the EU had a clear 
mandate and that member states had accepted this mandate (Swedish Ministry 
of Industry, 1999a).  
 
Also during the EU’s preparations for IFF-4, the mandate gave rise to 
discussion. One member state again brought up the issue of a changed 
mandate for the EU position at IFF-4. The motive was to encourage a 
more flexible attitude and openness to other actors’ views. The member 
states considered the negotiation mandate too narrow and stated the EU 
needed to have a common view of the alternative solutions for creating a 
clear focus of forests on the global agenda. Another member state posed 
the question if there really was consensus within the EU of the 
convention issue (DFID, 1999; Interview no. 36).  
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legal basis, and thought that the Council conclusions from May 1997 
could serve its purpose. Even though most member states recognised the 
difficulties to reach international consensus that were needed to start 
negotiations for a convention, they did not want to change the mandate 
(Interview no. 48). At the internal preparation meeting, participants 
considered the problems the EU had experienced in previous sessions 
with its locked attitude. This led to a rethinking with an emphasis on 
flexibility. However, at this meeting some member states cautioned that 
even if flexibility was important, it was critical the EU was explicit about 
what they wanted and what they would not give up (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1999).  
 
Discussions at the preparatory meeting led to discussions of two scenarios 
for IFF-4:  that the EU withheld the goal of a convention and that the 
EU showed flexibility without abandoning the long term goal of a 
convention. The perception was that the second alternative would lead 
to other states displaying flexibility on other issues, i.e. issues under 
programme element II, which dealt with trade and financial issues. 
Several member states considered the legal base for the EU position as 
still valid and that it could serve as a basis for action, if the EU adopted a 
more open and flexible attitude (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 
1999; Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999d). Hence, the EU position on 
the convention issue before IFF-4 was in favour of such instrument, 
similar to what was expressed in the Council conclusions. However, 
growing recognition of the problems with an unyielding position on this 
issue resulted in the decision to maintain the convention line in 
combination with a signal of flexibility.  
 
This became the EU’s negotiation strategy, i.e. the EU based its 
negotiation mandate on the Council conclusions that explicitly 
demanded a convention but combined it with a more flexible attitude. 
This strategy proved to be difficult in the main negotiations at the fourth 
session. The issue of whether or not to initiate negotiations for a 
convention generated an intense debate, and many delegations adopted a 
“winner-take-all-attitude” (ENB, 2000: 13). The EU became 
handicapped when some member states emphasised the Council 
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approach (Council of the European Union, 2000d). As a result, the 
Portuguese Presidency faced major difficulties in finalising a common 
negotiation position for the EU (Council of the European Union, 
2000c) and “could not offer a clear EU position on the issue” 
(Humphreys, 2006: 85).  
 
In December 2004, the EU discussed its position on the international 
arrangements on forests at a Council Working Group meeting. The 
most important question was how to proceed on the convention issue 
that would be settled at the fifth session of UNFF. In a questionnaire 
issued by the Presidency before the internal meeting, the member states 
answered the question: “Should the EU maintain its focus on achieving 
a legally binding instrument for all types of forests?” (Council Working 
Party of Forestry, 2004).  The answer was unified and summarised as: 
“No, the focus should rather be on forming a solution that makes it 
viable to come back to this question at a later stage given a positive 
development of an alternative International Arrangement of Forest-
solution” (Council Working Party of Forestry, 2004). This should not 
be interpreted as united EU position against a convention. Despite this 
answer, there were some member states that wished to achieve a legally 
binding instrument. Rather this could be seen in the light of stronger 
opposition towards a convention among some member states.  
 
Despite this, the EU long-term goal and preferred outcome of UNFF-5 
was a legally binding instrument. Disappointment with the achievements 
of the UNFF rendered a legally binding instrument even more desirable 
for some member states due to the belief that such an instrument could 
actually achieve change (Interview no. 42). The argument was that a 
legally binding instrument was politically respected and could raise 
awareness of forest issues. The form of the instrument was less important: 
a framework convention or a protocol under another convention was 
suggested (Council Working Party of Forestry, 2004). The goals of the 
EU were to achieve an effective instrument. However, in the discussions 
on the minimum fallback positions for the negotiations the member 
states were less unified. Some member states stated that “a legally binding 
instrument is necessary”, others said they could accept and interim 
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binding instrument. Yet others argued that this was unrealistic fallback 
positions for the negotiations (Council Working Party of Forestry, 
2004).  
 
At the time of the Country-led initiative, held in January 2005, a 
majority of member states were rhetorically still in favour of a legally 
binding instrument, although, the more hesitant member states expressed 
their doubts more clearly. They feared that the EU’s position was 
unrealistic after the outcome of the expert group meeting. In 
commenting on the Country-led meeting, one participant from one EU 
member state expressed concerns over the EU’s position:  
 
Hardliners within the EU seemed infatuated by a convention. They regard 
the UNFF as having failed to mobilize operative changes of the forest 
situation in the world and they believe that a legally binding instrument will 
increase political attention and resources. Some member states seem prepared 
to leave the UNFF if the legally binding instrument was not achieved 
(Interview no. 42).  
 
Before the supposedly concluding fifth session of UNFF, the EU 
decided to adopt new Council conclusions. In the negotiations on these 
Council conclusions, some member states urged others to be realistic. 
According to them, it was obvious that after the expert group meeting 
and the Country led meeting, there was no international consensus on a 
legally binding instrument (Interview no. 35). Some member states 
argued in favour of a convention and stated that this was the goal of the 
UNFF. Others were astonished that the EU appeared prepared to attend 
UNFF-5 with the aim to reach an impossible goal and on top of that 
without compromise proposals or Presidency mandate to take others’ 
proposals into consideration. They predicted that this would make the 
EU a very slow negotiating partner and coordination meetings difficult. 
In particular, the question of what the EU could accept within the 
framework of the Council conclusions was raised. One member state 
urged the Presidency to compose a negotiation strategy for UNFF5, as 
there was a risk of the EU being in a “responding negotiation seat” if 
there were no realistic compromise proposals (Interview no. 42). In 
  91 previous sessions, this had been a problem, as everything but a 
convention was regarded as lack of loyalty to the ultimate goal, despite 
that this is a utopia at present (Interviews no. 47 and 50).  
 
The negotiations on the Council conclusions became somewhat difficult. 
The wording of paragraph 14 in the Council conclusions: “best be 
achieved through a legally binding instrument”, became contentious. 
One member state wanted to condition the paragraph: “best be achieved 
through a legally binding instrument if enjoying broad support” 
(Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005a; Interview no. 42). The EU 
adopted Council conclusions that promoted a legally binding instrument 
and paragraph 14 remained without change. However, member states 
argued that other actors within the EU were aware of its position 
(Interview no. 44). 
 
Despite the controversies around the EU position, the pro-convention 
line remained at the fifth session of the UNFF, and the EU arrived in 
New York with the ambition of achieving its goal. The member states 
against a convention viewed the EU position as an unrealistic 
compromise taken for dogmatic reasons. During the second week, the 
EU came up with a negotiating strategy with fallbacks and bottom lines: 
quantifiable and time-bound targets and legally binding instrument 
/voluntary code/guidelines (Interview no. 42). The tone was sharpened 
and the message was that the EU was willing to leave the negotiations if 
the bottom lines were not achieved. As the status quo would have been 
unacceptable, the only option left for the EU would have been to leave 
the negotiations. The US was worried by the threat to leave the 
negotiations of the EU ministers, who argued that the likely outcome of 
the negotiations would not represent an improvement upon the status 
quo. In the end of this session, the supposedly hard-nosed EU position 
crumbled. Most member states were willing to compromise, but still 
there were a few that wanted to stick to the EU position (Interview no. 
42). As mentioned above, the outcome of UNFF-5 was a negotiation 
collapse without any agreement. Instead of being the final session, 
delegates agreed to continue the process into 2007. The sixth session of 
UNFF was held in 2006 and the seventh session in 2007.  
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conclude a text of a non-legally binding instrument: it proved to be too 
ambitious. Participants agreed on a draft resolution with a commitment 
to negotiate for a non-legally binding instrument that should pursue four 
global objectives. The time-bound dimension on these objectives, on 
which the EU and Canada had insisted at the fifth session, was lost in the 
negotiations. States agreed to extend the UNFF to 2015, with a review 
of the effectiveness of the international arrangement on forests 
(ECOSOC, 2006). The EU proposed a sunset clause to discontinue the 
instrument in 2015 unless its effectiveness is established, which was not 
accepted. The EU also pushed for the retaining the legally binding 
instrument as an option for the future. Delegates agreed, after quite 
intense debate, to include the legally binding instrument as a future 
option (ENB, 2006).  
 
4.4  Analysis of the EU’s Influence on the Negotiations on a 
Legally Binding Instrument  
The EU argued for the creation of a convention at the IPF, the IFF and 
the UNFF, but did not attain this goal. When discussions commenced at 
the IPF, the issue of a convention was on the agenda. In preparing the 
agenda for the IPF, the EU had three issues that it wished to be 
addressed, among them the issue of a forest convention
20 (Interview no. 
43; Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1995b). At the IPF, the discussions 
directly addressed the issue of a forest convention.
21 However, the IPF 
did not result in a forest convention, but the item was on the agenda of 
the IFF.
22 At the fourth session of the IFF, discussions focused on two 
proposals: a legally binding instrument or a new body within the UN-
system (Humphreys, 2006). The latter was created after the IFF, with the 
mandate to “consider with a view to recommending the parameters of a 
                                                 
20 The other two issues were: Criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management and 
the convergence of different processes and the issue of certification of timber and the 
creation of an international regulation for certification (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 
1995b). All issues were on the agenda of the IPF.  
21 Under the programme element V: International organisations, multilateral institutions, 
and instruments, including appropriate legal mechanisms (ECOSOC, 1995). 
22 Element III: International arrangement and mechanisms (ECOSOC, 1997a). 
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(ECOSOC, 2000a). As mentioned above, this was the result of a 
compromise that satisfied both anti- and pro-convention groups, and 
sufficiently obscured language to “save faces” on both sides (Dimitrov, 
2006: 109). The obscured language indicates that the alternative of a 
legally binding instrument became more unlikely after the fifth session.  
 
From how the issue of a convention was treated on the agenda, it was 
apparent that discussions on this instrument should continue from the 
IPF to the IFF and that this policy choice was a realistic option at this 
time. At the end of the IFF, the convention alternative appeared a less 
likely option. This development continued with the creation of the 
UNFF and the compromised language and opaque wording of the 
agenda item. This indicates that the convention proponents became less 
influential over time in the negotiation process. The EU managed to 
retain the issue on the agenda, which was part of its goal. The EU 
repeatedly mentioned that it was not an option to continue the process 
without any conclusion or promise to create a negotiating committee 
with a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument. In the end of 
the negotiation process, as noted above, at the sixth session of UNFF, 
the EU got through inclusion of a reference to a legally binding 
instrument as a future option (ENB, 2006). Thus, the issue is still on the 
agenda, albeit far in the future and the opponents have consented to 
similar proposals several times in the past without feeling obliged to 
seriously consider a legally binding instrument.  
 
As aforementioned, the EU did not get through a sunset clause that 
would have discontinued the process after 2015, in case a legally binding 
instrument would not be achieved (ENB, 2006). When the EU realised 
it was impossible to achieving a legally binding instrument, it tried to 
push for time bounded targets and quantifiable goals instead. Thus, the 
EU wanted to make the instrument as similar to a legally binding 
instrument as possible. This was most obvious with regard to quantifiable 
and time-bound targets discussed in earlier sections. When quantifiable 
and time-bound targets proved to be unfeasible, the EU dropped this 
demand and argued for a quid pro quo commitment to strong time-bound 
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other actors did not concede to this (Humphreys, 2006: 112).  
 
The EU was not sufficiently influential to achieve its goal of a legally 
binding instrument, but still pressed for its goals. When the goals were 
not achieved, the EU threatened to leave the negotiations. This is an 
indication of the EU’s importance, the process could not continue 
without the EU, and they would not concede. Hence, negotiations 
broke down. The EU had influence on the process, i.e. it managed to 
retain the convention issue on the agenda over the years. However, the 
EU did not have influence on the outcome, as it did not attain the goal 
of starting negotiations on a convention. Instead, a non-legally binding 
instrument was created. Despite the EU’s influence on the process, the 
lack of influence on the outcome suggests the EU did not have influence 
in the case of a forest convention.  
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the EU’s goal achievement regarding the convention. 
Goal of the EU  Achieved   Partly 
achieved  
Not 
achieved  
A convention/legally binding 
instrument  
    X 
Keep the issue on the agenda  X     
 
Not continue the process if no LBI 
(sunset clause) 
    X 
Quantifiable and time-bound targets 
 
    X 
 
 
4.5  Interest-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
In order to explain the EU’s limited influence on the convention issue, 
this section turns to the analysis of interests and preferences. As 
demonstrated in the Council conclusions, various statements at the 
negotiation sessions, and internal meeting notes, the EU had a collective 
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a convention implies a wish for some kind of legally binding instrument. 
The kind of instrument and the elements that would be part of the 
instrument were discussed and elaborated in the internal EU discussions. 
However, the legal status of the instrument appeared most important. 
This preference was the formal and aggregated preference of the EU.  
 
To determine the strength of the preference, the emergence of the EU’s 
common preference during the process is investigated. The material 
interests underlying the preference are rather difficult to identify in this 
case, which is partly related to the member states having different 
perceptions of what a convention should regulate. As demonstrated in 
the beginning of this chapter, the incentives for establishing a 
convention are various. However, a convention would address 
deforestation and as this is not a problem in the EU’s member states 
(FAO, 2005), they would not consider such instrument to have an 
impact on their forest management practices. Thus, a convention would 
not likely impose burdensome measures and thus not generate difficulties 
to implement such an instrument at the national level. As Dimitrov 
expresses it: “For European governments an agreement would entail 
zero policy costs” (Dimitrov, 2006: 106). In interviews, respondents 
stated there are no economic interests at stake for EU member states in 
creating a convention:  
 
The convention debate is not a prioritized issue within the EU, as a 
convention would not be a driving force for change in the EU member 
states’ own forestry sectors. A convention would not have any impact on the 
member states’ own forestry (Interview no. 35). 
 
The EU would not provide funds for a convention, because it is not a prime 
issue for the member states’ governments, neither a priority for the EU 
(Interview no. 55). 
 
None of the member states believe that their forest industry will be affected 
by a convention, there are no strong economic interests at stake for us or for 
any other the EU country (Interview no. 46). 
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shown in the preceding discussion. However, a closer analysis of the 
expressions of this preference reveals subtleties in the EU’s preference. In 
order to determine how strong the preference is behind the rhetoric, the 
development of the wordings in EU documents is useful to examine. 
The Council conclusions from 1992 stated: “A forest convention is a 
clear goal of the negotiations” (Interview no. 43). At the IPF, the 
preference for a forest convention was expressed in terms of: “A specific 
legally binding instrument is needed” (Interview no. 43); ”The EU 
favours a global forests convention” (Council of European Union, 
1997b); “The EU is […] positive towards a global forest convention on 
forests” (Council of the European Union, 1997a).   
 
At the IPF, the preference is straightforward and emphasised in that the 
EU strongly argues for establishing a convention. The majority of 
member states were in favour of a convention at the IPF: some member 
states were strongly in favour of a convention and others were lukewarm 
(Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997b; Interview no. 35). Hence, at this 
time the collective preference of the EU enjoyed broad support among 
the member states. The EU’s opening statement at the fourth session of 
the IFF expressed:  
 
The Presidency noted that while the EU has supported negotiating a legally 
binding instrument, it remains open to other proposals (ENB, 2000:2).  
 
After the IFF, the EU clearly stated its desired outcome from UNFF:  
 
[…] the EU maintains its belief of the requirement to stipulate a clear 
political and legal foundation, which best could be achieved through 
negotiations on a legally binding instrument (Council of the European 
Union, 2000b: para. 3).  
 
The EU still supported a legally binding instrument at the IFF, but the 
EU’s wish for such an instrument became conditioned by “best could be 
achieved through negotiations on a legally binding instrument” (Council 
of the European Union, 2000d).  
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internal differences stemmed from an increasing concern of the 
possibility of reaching the goal of a legally binding instrument due to the 
unyielding resistance among other actors. Discussions at preparatory 
meetings before the third and fourth sessions of the Forum revealed the 
position of the EU was increasingly questioned. However, the majority 
of the member states still favoured the convention line or had a 
lukewarm attitude. The opposition came from member states that 
wanted the EU to be pragmatic in the negotiations and not “lock itself 
to a position” that was impossible to achieve (Interview no. 35).  
 
Even though these member states did not strongly oppose a legally 
binding instrument, they requested more flexibility in the negotiations. 
The result was a decision to maintain the convention line in 
combination with a signal of flexibility. This is an indication the EU 
preference for a convention was weakening. The EU started to consider 
alternatives in its statements and in negotiation strategy. The preference 
was still that a legally binding instrument was the best alternative, but the 
EU was receptive to other options; hence, the preference appeared to 
weaken. The strongest evidence of the weakened preference is the 
situation that occurred at IFF4 discussed above, where the EU got 
paralysed by internal divisions which resulted in the Portuguese 
Presidency could not present a clear EU position at the negotiations.  
 
In 2005, before the fifth session of UNFF, the EU stated:  
 
[…] can best be achieved through a legally binding instrument [if this does 
not receive broad support,] any alternatives should offer equivalent guarantees 
for success and should significantly strengthen the IAF (Council of the 
European Union, 2005b).  
 
Simultaneously, the member states emphasised a wish to shift focus from 
the convention, instead “the focus should rather be on forming a 
solution that makes it viable to come back to this question at a later stage 
given a positive development of an alternative IAF-solution” (Council 
Working Group of Forestry, 2004). Thus, before the important fifth 
session the preference was questioned. 
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At the fifth session of the UNFF, the Presidency stated  
 
that the present IAF has not achieved its full potential, […] and clear, 
quantitative targets and goals were essential for securing political commitment 
and accountability. The EU has advocated the creation of a legally binding 
instrument (ENB, 2005: 3-4).  
 
The draft Council conclusions from 2005 contained an interesting 
bracket: “if this does not receive broad support” (Council of the 
European Union, 2005b). Although this bracket disappeared in the final 
version of the Council conclusions, it represented a compromise 
between the EU convention line and member states that saw the legally 
binding instrument as an unrealistic option without broad international 
support.
23 As with the IFF, a compromise had been agreed orally. At the 
UNFF, the member states not believing in the possibility of a 
convention appeared determined to condition the EU’s preference. At 
the same time as these member states became more hesitant towards the 
possibility of an international agreement on a convention, some pro-
convention member states became more convinced that this was the 
only alternative. This view can be seen in light of the disappointment 
many actors felt due to the failure to implement decisions and improve 
the forest situation. As mentioned elsewhere, according to the pro-
convention member states, such instrument could help the situation and 
increase political attention and resources to forests.  
 
The strength of the preference at this time becomes difficult to 
determine. When the EU did not attain quantifiable targets or strong 
time-bound commitments the negotiations collapsed. This indicates that 
the EU was unwilling to move away from its preference, which could be 
a sign of preference strength. However, the differences between the 
                                                 
23 The wording of paragraph 14 (‘best be achieved through a legally binding instrument‘) in 
the Council conclusions became contentious. One member state wanted to put a condition 
the paragraph: ‘best be achieved through a legally binding instrument enjoying a broad 
support’ (Council of European Union, 2005b). The EU adopted council conclusions that 
promoted a legally binding instrument, and paragraph 14 remained without the change 
mentioned above (Council of European Union, 2005a). 
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preference but in this case seems to have pervaded the EU. The member 
states in favour became more persistent, e.g. the EU’s threat to leave the 
negotiations if only achieving status quo. At the same time, the more 
cautious and hesitant member states started to get frustrated with the 
“unrealistic” pro-convention line, although they were not strongly 
against a convention, they were reluctant about the unrealistic position 
of the EU. Hence, at the UNFF, there was a group of member states 
with a strong preference for a convention and a group with a preference 
for pragmatism. As a result, the EU’s collective preference becomes less 
intense. The EU was more willing to concede at the sixth and seventh 
sessions when the EU had to give up the sunset clause. 
 
At the beginning of the process, there was a group of member states 
with a strong preference for a legally binding instrument, and one with a 
weak preference. According to the scenarios outlined in Chapter Two 
(see Section 2.4 and Table 2.), this corresponds with scenario 3: If one 
member state faction holds preferences but another holds weak 
preferences, the EU should be influential, as the strong preference 
decides the EU’s collective position.  
 
Later in the process, the situation that occurred resembled scenario 2: If 
different member state factions within the EU each hold strong, but 
differing, preferences, the collective preference of the EU becomes 
weaker and the EU becomes less influential as it is more difficult for the 
EU to reach a collective position that both groups are satisfied with.  
 
This indicates that the EU should have been more influential in the 
beginning in the process. As the preceding discussion showed, the EU 
had influence on the process, particularly during the IPF and in the 
beginning of the IFF. However, it did not have influence on the 
outcome. Thus, the distribution of preferences only partly explains the 
outcome. However, connecting the distribution of preferences with 
interests increases the explanatory power. The fact that most member 
states consider the convention not affecting their vital interests weakens 
the preference. Interests pervade the strength of the preference, and the 
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binding instrument.  
 
4.6  Institutional-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
In Chapter Two, the importance of the EU’s institutional structures for 
explaining its influence or lack of influence was discussed. Competence 
provides a broader framework for the EU to act within, and the mandate 
specifies in detail what the EU is bound to in the negotiations. 
Competence in the convention case is unquestionably a shared 
competence area and the Presidency is representing the EU during these 
negotiations. The mandate for the negotiations on the convention is 
easily identifiable from the Council conclusions. At the beginning of the 
process, the Council conclusion was clearly on a convention and there 
was no leeway for interpretation. According to the mandate for the 
negotiations at the IPF, the EU’s goal was to achieve a convention and 
not continue the policy process with less than the establishment of an 
international negotiating committee (Council of European Union, 
1997a). This mandate was narrow and left no margins for interpretation.  
 
The mandate remained unchanged for the IFF, which generated debate 
at the internal preparatory meetings before the third and fourth sessions 
outlined in previous sections. Despite the controversies, the mandate 
remained unchanged, which meant that it was narrow in its focus of 
achieving a legally binding instrument and discontinuing the process if 
this was not achieved. As outlined above, some member states argued 
the mandate was agreed in the Council and it clear stated what the EU 
should work for in the negotiations (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999a).  
 
Before the fourth session of IFF, the discussion on the narrowness of the 
mandate generated substantial discussions. However, these discussions 
did not result in a changed mandate for the negotiations. Instead, the 
rather narrow mandate was combined with a signal of flexibility. Hence, 
the EU based its negotiation mandate on the Council conclusions that 
explicitly demanded a convention, but combined it with a more flexible 
attitude. At the negotiations, this proved a difficult strategy implement. 
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some member states emphasised the narrow goal stated in the Council 
conclusions and others supported the flexible approach adopted 
informally as a negotiation strategy (Council of European Union, 2000c; 
and 2000d). Thus, this situation, where the EU could not offer a clear 
position in the negotiations, was a result of a narrow mandate combined 
with a strategy of flexibility. It caused an “embarrassing moment for the 
EU and it might have lost credibility in further negotiations” (Interview 
no. 56). At this point, the institutional structures constrained EU action, 
as its mandate was too narrowly defined to overcome the difficult 
situation that occurred. 
 
After the failure at the fourth session of the IPF, the EU decided to 
adopt new Council conclusions. These allowed to a greater extent 
interpretation and flexibility. The formulation was as following:  
 
[…] the EU maintains its belief of the requirement to stipulate a clear 
political and legal foundation, which best could be achieved through 
negotiations on a legally binding instrument (Council of the European 
Union, 2000a).  
 
The latter part, “best could be achieved” allowed broader interpretation 
of the mandate on a convention. The mandate remained unchanged 
until the preparations for the fifth session of UNFF. Before this session, 
when the legally binding instrument was to be decided, new Council 
conclusions were adopted. As the preceding discussion outlined, the 
Council conclusion was given a condition in an addendum “[If this does 
not receive broad support,]” (Council of the European Union, 2005b: 6, 
para. 14), but this did not survive into the final version. The mandate for 
UNFF-5 was similar to previous versions and permitted, in theory, 
broader interpretation. Although a somewhat broader mandate, the 
situation before UNFF-5 was similar to IFF-4 in that the strategy was to 
combine the mandate with a more flexible approach. Only this time it 
produced internal questioning of what could be accepted within the 
framework of the Council conclusions. Hence, the mandate for the 
convention issue was still rather narrow.  
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to achieve a change in the negotiations; thus, it had a reformative 
position in the negotiations on a legally binding instrument. Turning to 
the scenarios outlined in Chapter Two in Section 2.5, the reformative 
position in combination with a narrow mandate coincides with 
prediction 2: If the negotiating mandate is narrow and the position is 
reformative, the EU should not be influential. Achieving change is more 
difficult with a narrow mandate, due to an inability to give concessions 
and to adjust to what happens in negotiations.  
  
However, according to the Schelling conjuncture (which, as noted 
above, suggests that having one’s hands tied internally can be useful for 
extracting concessions externally (Schelling, 1960)), this situation could 
be an advantage in negotiations, if used as a strategy. In this case, the 
mandate remained rather narrow without room for compromises 
throughout the process. The strategy of combining a narrow mandate 
with a flexible attitude appears one way of combining divergent views 
on the issue. However, as a strategy in the negotiations, it was 
inadequate and only contributed to confuse the EU’s position and 
handicapped it in the negotiations. Neither did the EU appear to have 
exploited its narrow mandate to gain concession in the negotiations. In 
this case, the prediction proves to be true, the EU was not influential. 
The explanatory power of institutional structures was verified, the EU 
did not have influence and its institutional structures were a hindrance in 
the negotiations.  
 
4.7  Ideational-based Explanations of the EU’s Influence  
In addition to above explanations, Chapter Two argued that ideational 
factors are important to understand outcomes. This section starts with 
identifying the policy frames and the meta-level frames and discusses 
which meta-level frame that dominated the negotiations on a legally 
binding instrument. Then it analyses the EU’s framing of the EU issue 
and how that can explain the outcome of this case. (See Table 5 for an 
overview of the frames identified in this context.) 
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appear to have constructed the policy solution in two different ways, 
which represent the policy frames in this context. The policy frames that 
dominated this issue case represent two different perspectives on the 
most appropriate form of an international instrument for forests. These 
policy frames are identified as: “the legally binding frame” and “the non-
legally binding frame”. The legally binding frame emphasises that some 
sort of legally binding instrument would be the most appropriate policy 
solution for addressing international forest issues. This frame is 
characteristically expressed in terms of:  
 
Legally binding commitments are preferred since it forms real long-term 
commitment to management, conservation and sustainable development of 
the forests (Council of the European Union, 2000a)  
 
Also this interview quote expresses similar thoughts: “a binding 
instrument would provide a solid frame for cooperation on forests” 
(Interview no. 2). 
 
This frame also asserts the increased status the international forest policy 
area would attain if there would be a convention in place:  
 
A convention would raise the attention to forest issues and create political 
pressure (Interview no. 1);  
 
Forests would secure a spot on the international political agenda if there was a 
convention, it would be easier to argue for funding (Interview no. 45).  
 
Other aspects of this frame are arguments the best approach towards 
deforestation and forest degradation is harmonization of law and 
international regulations by an overarching mechanism at the 
international level, for example: “There is a need for something very 
strong at the international level to get clarification in this area” 
(Interview no. 46). 
  
The other policy frame, the non-legally binding frame, encompasses the 
resistance towards the establishment of a legally binding instrument. 
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and argues in favour of coordinating existing treaties, strengthening 
existing non-binding agreements, and/or establishing a permanent forum 
on forests as these interview quotes show: a legally binding instrument is 
“a lousy vehicle for implementation” (Interview no. 16) and  
 
A convention on forests is difficult, there are problems with implementation 
and what should it regulate. There are already many instruments that cover 
forests, e.g. CBD (Interview no. 28).  
 
In addition, the complexity of the existing legislature is emphasised: “it is 
not rationale to add more international law, it is just getting more 
complicated” (Interview no. 31).  
 
These are the two dominant policy frames within the negotiations on a 
legally binding instrument. Within these frames, there are subtleties of 
exactly what instrument or policy alternative would be preferable. The 
actors advocating a certain frame have different motives, justifications 
and arguments. However, the main course of action is whether or not to 
legally bind an instrument on forests, which also dominated the debate as 
noted above.  
 
The policy frames could be derived from how the forests are viewed and 
the perception of international regulations. Examination of the 
discussions in the process reveals two dichotomous dominating meta-
level frames that appeared to have shaped the negotiations. These meta-
level frames were first identified in the following two statements from 
two different interviews:  
 
Reasons for difficulties to agree on a convention are the forests’ economic 
value, and at the same time being viewed as global common. The voices 
against directly or indirectly guard the national sovereignty of the national 
forest resources. Forests are seen as either global common or national 
resource. These views are conflicting (Interview no. 2).  
 
Forests are all about sovereignty over national resources. It makes it difficult 
with strong commitments at the international level, it is the most important 
reason why there are no strong global regulations. In other areas of 
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but not within this process. Forests are not a global common, which makes it 
difficult to know what to regulate at the global level (Interview no. 45).  
 
In the interview quotes the broader values in this discussion are exposed: 
forests as a global common and forests as a sovereign, national resource. 
The understanding of forests as a global common encompasses the view 
that forests are a global public good, which indicates that the forests are 
considered beyond the jurisdiction of the sovereign state. However, few 
would consider forests as a global common in the same sense as the 
atmosphere or oceans
24. Forests grow on the ground within sovereign 
states. However, the perspective asserts the global aspects of forests rather 
than the national, and focuses on the characteristics of the forests that 
have global scope, such as sinks and trade (Interview no. 46; Interview 
no. 49) and views international regulation of forests as crucial. This is the 
meta-level frame “global regulations”.  
 
As the aforementioned discussion outlined, the other meta-level frame 
asserts forests as a sovereign, national resource and is here called 
“national sovereignty”. This meta-level frame emphasises the sovereignty 
aspect: “Forests are about sovereignty issues: national boundaries are 
important” (Interview no. 47). The analysis of the negotiation process 
produced evidence to support that this frame appears to have dominated 
the forest negotiations.  This is illustrated by following quote:  
 
Within UN, national sovereignty is fundamental. The gains for national 
sovereignty must be greater than the cost of an instrument. There is a 
discourse within the UNFF talks, which is national sovereignty.  International 
rules and measures are also important but have not got strong hold in this 
process as in others (Interview no. 39).  
 
 Reports from the negotiations are expressing similar views: 
 
Sovereignty […] still stand between the international community and any 
consensus on forests (ENB, 1997: 10); 
 
                                                 
24 See Vogler, 2000 for a discussion on global commons.  
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between national control over natural resources and international oversight or 
regulation of “global” environmental concerns (ENB, 1997: 10); 
 
Yet others biggest concern is potential loss of sovereignty, specifically loss of 
control over forest resources within their territory, despite the appeal of 
showing commitment to strengthen the global forest policy dialogue (ENB, 
2007: 18). 
 
The issue of national sovereignty permeated the process, and is 
acknowledged in the outcomes through proposals for action and the 
non-legally binding instrument. 
 
International environmental regulations have increased since the 1970s 
(Carter, 2007). As preceding discussion in Chapter Three outlined, the 
formal treaty-based part of global environmental politics was created 
through UN-summits, the establishment of environmental organisations, 
and negotiations on environmental treaties. The starting point of the 
forest process was UNCED, which resulted in three conventions on 
biodiversity, climate change, and desertification. There was no 
agreement on a convention for forests and forests are sometimes referred 
to as the “missing Rio-convention” (Interview no. 50). In the first years 
of the forest process, there was a firm conviction that convention was a 
proper instrument for tackling global environmental problems. Since 
then, this conviction has been eroded due to lack of implementation and 
the cost of such instruments. Today, there is convention fatigue, or as 
one respondent expresses it:  
 
There is or, I should say there was, a craving for conventions in these kinds 
of negotiations. From Rio there were four conventions [sic] created and the 
forest area should have one as well. There was this firm belief in these kinds 
of instruments but it has lost momentum in the last years (Interview no. 50).  
 
The two dominating meta-level frames, global regulation and national 
sovereignty, influenced the negotiation process. In term of outcomes, 
national sovereignty was more dominant, whereas global regulation 
produced ideas of policy solutions that maintained its hold over the 
process. During the process, the option of a legally binding instrument 
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process did not result in a forest convention. Even though the global 
regulation frame was powerful, national sovereignty frame dominated 
the process and appeared to have had more impact on forest negotiations 
than other environmental negotiations.  
 
 
Table 5: Policy frames and meta-level frames in the negotiations on a legally binding 
instrument.  
 
  Meta-level frame 
 
  Global regulations 
 
  National sovereignty 
 
 
  Policy frame 
 
  Legally binding 
 
  Non legally binding 
 
 
 
In this process, the EU policy frame was “the legally binding frame”. 
Thus, in the EU’s framing of the issue, the legal aspect was important. A 
legally binding instrument would ensure long-term commitment to 
sustainable forest management. Such instrument focuses political 
attention on an issue area and creates an umbrella for the fragmented 
international forest policy hampering powerful measures in the forest 
area. The EU appeared to justify its policy frame by the global regulation 
frame, and the connection between them is quite apparent. This meta-
level frame was powerful, but did not dominate the negotiations on a 
convention.  
 
The EU had influence on the process through the meta-level frame of 
global regulations and it was difficult to openly decline proposals such as 
a convention due to “good-will” reasons. As aforementioned discussion 
showed, although this meta-level frame was influential, the other meta-
level frame of national sovereignty appeared to have dominated the 
negotiations. This opens up for the interpretation that the EU did not 
frame the issue in a “winning” manner or nest its policy frame to the 
dominating frame. According to the prediction outlined in Chapter Two 
(see Section 2.6), the EU should be influential if it managed to nest its 
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influence in this case, the failure of framing could explain the outcome. 
Thus, the prediction of nesting frames is fulfilled in this case.  
 
4.8  Implications of the EU’s Influence  
A legally binding instrument can have both advantages and 
disadvantages. In other environmental areas, such instrument has 
generated cooperation, but also shown lack in implementation. For the 
forest area, the benefits of a legally binding instrument are not entirely 
clear. The question is what it would regulate, which seems remain 
largely unanswered. The EU appears to have searched this cooperative 
solution, without reflecting or internal agreement on what the 
instrument should achieve. In the beginning of the forest negotiation 
process, the creation of a legally binding instrument for forests seems to 
have been a more feasible option, at least discussions were fairly clear on 
that this was an option to negotiate for.  
 
When the instrument proved to be unfeasible, the continuous 
discussions diluted the forest process. If the idea of a legally binding 
instrument would have been abandoned on an earlier stage in the 
negotiation process, the chance of creating a platform for constructive 
exchange of experiences would probably have been greater. Instead, the 
persistence to continue argue for a legally binding instrument eroded the 
credibility of the process. The EU’s position contributed to this erosion. 
The position was mainly rhetoric, but relentless. The EU’s experiences 
of success in other environmental process have created a firm belief in 
global regulations, which contributed to the understanding of this as the 
best solution also in the forest area. However, the EU did not manage to 
act constructively in the negotiations on a legally binding instrument. 
Thus, in this case the EU appears to have further pervaded the process.   
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The analysis of the EU’s influence on the issue of a legally binding 
instrument reveals that the EU did not have influence in this case. The 
EU’s position in the negotiations was in favour of creating such an 
instrument. Rhetorically, the EU argued in favour of a legally binding 
instrument during the negotiation process, in statements, in internal 
meetings, and policy documents, and the evidence found suggests that 
the EU had influence on the process, but not on the outcome, i.e. no 
convention was created. Thus, despite EU support for a convention, it 
was unable to fulfil its goal. Throughout the different negotiation 
forums, the convention issue remained ardently debated and the issue 
remained on the agenda, but the EU did not reach its outspoken goal of 
establishing a convention. Hence, the EU did not have influence in this 
case. The EU’s interests and preference were too weak to make the EU 
powerful in the negotiations and institutional structures were 
constraining even at some points overturning and handicapping the EU 
in the negotiations. The way the EU constructed its policy solution was 
by nesting with the less dominating meta-level frame, hence EU framing 
of the issue was not sufficient.   
 
The explanatory power of the framework in this case is high. The 
problem of this case is that the EU appeared strongly in favour of a forest 
convention, but in reality the EU “kind of wanted it”. Hence, the 
preference was not sufficiently strong. This outcome correlates with the 
prediction; the EU would not be influential, if it holds a weak 
preference. The institutional structures have explanatory power in that 
the weaknesses of the institutional structures constrained the EU, which 
hampered its influence. The inability of the EU to frame the issue in a 
“winning” manner also explains the lack of influence in this case. Hence, 
the three explanations support the outcome; the EU should not have 
been influential in this case. The framework could explain the outcome 
of the EU’s lack of influence. When the EU has weak interests and 
preferences, its institutional structures are constraining, and it does not 
frame the issue in a convincing manner, its influence in international 
negotiations is eroded. The EU could not contribute to strengthen the 
cooperation in this case. 
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or Forest Friendly Solution?  
 
Certification has been a contentious issue in the forest negotiations. The 
debate concerned two important aspects of certification: the role of 
governments in certification schemes and whether or not these schemes 
constituted a trade barrier. In this case, the EU managed to maintain its 
position without affecting other actors. The negotiation process on 
certification is characterized by ambiguity in what to agree on and strong 
divisions between the actors. The overall perception of the EU in the 
certification issue is that it had a firm position on how certification 
should be treated in the negotiations, which was to establish that 
certification should be viewed as a market-based tool for sustainable 
forest management without governmental involvement, and that the 
schemes do not constitute barriers to trade. In the negotiations, the EU 
did not affect other actors, and in turn, was unaffected by other actors 
with opposing views. This chapter examines the main divisions related 
to two aspects of certification, the role of governmental involvement in 
certification schemes and the issue of certification as a trade barrier. As a 
point of departure, the chapter addresses the broader trade-environment 
debate that provides the context for trade related discussions in this 
negotiation process. The meaning of certification is briefly discussed and 
the context for the debate on governments’ role and certification as a 
trade barrier provided. The negotiation process, the EU’s position, and 
the outcome on the issues are then outlined. The analysis covers the 
EU’s influence on the certification issue and explains the outcome.  
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5.1  International Trade and Environment  
Certification can be seen in the broader context of the trade-
environment nexus. The increased linkages between the trade and the 
environment areas have spurred a debate on how they are affecting each 
other. In general, trade can be seen as generating wealth that could be 
used to increase human wellbeing. However, the economic activity that 
trade involves, can in many cases increase environmental damage. In 
addition, wealth created by trade will not necessarily result in 
environmental improvements. Trade can also be good for the 
environment, since it creates wealth that can be used for environmental 
improvement, since the efficiency gains from trade can imply fewer 
resources used and less waste produced, and since trade can enhance 
access to efficient and environmentally-friendly technologies. 
(Neumayer, 2001.) Thus, there are different views on whether or not 
international trade is harmful for the environment, or if it could be used 
to protect the environment (for an overview of the trade-environmental 
nexus, see e.g. Esty, 1994).  
 
The international institutional architecture managing these areas is built 
on different premises. The multilateral trade regime operates on liberal 
principles and free trade. Multilateral environmental agreements are 
based on principles of environmental protection (Eckersley, 2004). 
There are several links between the two areas and discussions on 
managing these links take place in several arenas (Clapp and Dauvergne, 
2005). Controversies of “green protectionism” have been raised in this 
context, i.e. that countries use environmental protection as a trade 
barrier (Chasek et al. 2006). Trade issues related to forests are considered 
in a number of international forums, mainly World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), but 
there are also environmental agreements containing trade provisions, 
such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) (OECD, 1999).  
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Certification has been defined as “an economic policy instrument with 
environmental and trade objectives” (Elliott, 2000: 7). Forest 
certification is a process which results in a written certificate being issued 
by a third party, attesting to the location and management status of a 
forest that is producing timber (Baharuddin and Simula, 1994 cited in 
Elliott, 2000: 1). Characteristically, a forest certification scheme includes 
the development of principles and criteria of sustainable forest 
management; accreditation of independent third parties (certification 
bodies); forest management auditing (verification of compliance with or 
progress towards rules for sustainable forest management); and product 
labelling (tracing forest products through the supply chain) (Gulbrandsen 
and Humphreys, 2006). Over the past years there has been a significant 
increase in the number of certification schemes and it is estimated that 
109 million hectares of forest is certified (UNECE, 2006). 
 
Forest certification is one of the main items of discussion in the context 
of forests and international trade. The issue relates to a broader debate in 
WTO on eco-labelling
25 (Bridges, 2002). Government sponsored eco-
labelling schemes raise concern about competition, as these might be 
skewed in favour of domestic producers. Private eco-labelling schemes 
are sometimes accused of reducing markets for domestic industry and 
unsustainable practices (Chasek et al. 2006). As discussed below, these 
concerns are also present in the international debate on certification.  
 
The promoters of certification argue that certification might provide 
incentive for managing forests sustainably, as products certified as coming 
from sustainably managed forests experience an increase in market share 
and suppliers receive a price premium for selling a green product 
(Bridges, 2002). However, some actors are hesitant towards certification. 
They assert that Western Europe constitutes the biggest market for 
certified products, and most certification schemes for sustainable forestry 
are found in European countries, partly because developing countries 
                                                 
25 Ecolabelling is a voluntary method of environmental performance certification and 
labelling that is practised around the world. The subject of ecolabelling falls under the 
WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
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developing countries are concerned that their non-certified products 
might be discriminated against, thus certification and labelling schemes 
constitute a non-tariff barrier to trade. However, others argue that 
certification schemes are usually voluntary and countries are not forced 
to comply with them (Koleva, 2006).  
 
Another controversy in the context of certification is the role of 
governments in these schemes. Forest certification is driven by market 
actors, as it is a voluntary market-based instrument. However, 
governments have a major role in designing the institutional framework 
and providing assurance of equality in international trade and domestic 
markets
26 (Koleva, 2006). Despite the complex interaction of 
government activities and certification issues, governments have not 
been stakeholder members of the international certification initiatives: 
this relies on the need for these schemes to be voluntary and have 
market-based objectives, which might appear to be compromised by the 
presence of governments in the governance of the schemes. In addition, 
there is a fear that governmental presence could hamper dialogue 
between economic, environmental, and social stakeholders. Even if 
governments have an important role in certification, there is no 
consensus on the extent of governmental involvement (Koleva, 2006).  
 
5.3  Negotiations on Certification  
In the context of the international forest negotiations, certification has 
been addressed under Programme area IV (IPF) and Programme element 
IIb (IFF) together with other trade related issues.  At the beginning of 
the forest negotiations, certification was addressed in a background 
report from the IPF’s Secretariat. The report considered the possibility of 
”the formulation of an internationally accepted basis for product 
certification and labelling schemes and initiatives” (ECOSOC, 1995: 
11). This indicates the rationale for bringing certification into this 
                                                 
26 Governments could also be actors in the schemes as well as forest owners and buyers of 
wood products. They can also contribute to the development of schemes by providing 
capacity building, and moderate between competing schemes etc. (Koleva, 2006: 2).  
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sustainable forest management made it important for assessing the status 
of the current schemes.  
 
During the IPF, the debate on certification was a response to the 
Secretariat’s background report. Some delegations saw this as an appeal 
to create global standards, which caused them to stress that certification 
”has to be voluntary and developed according to specific national 
conditions” (ENB, 1996: 10). The response highlights the sensitive 
nature of the subject, as even discussions in general terms were difficult 
to accept in the negotiations. In broader trade discussion during the IPF 
process, two fundamental views were apparent: those countries that 
prioritised national sovereignty over natural resources, and those who 
favoured international regulation over global environmental concerns 
(ENB, 1997). These divisions had repercussions for the certification 
issue, which proved to be one of the most problematic trade related 
areas, and it was difficult make progress with certification in the context 
of the forest negotiations; the IPF was unable to conclude the work on 
the agenda item and forwarded it to the IFF (ENB, 1997).  
 
Before the second session of IFF, a Secretariat background paper stated 
that “the possible role of voluntary and non-discriminatory timber 
certification in promoting sustainable forests management on a significant 
scale globally is, at best, still not clear” (ECOSOC, 1998a, para. 25). 
Hence, certification turned out to be sensitive and difficult to deal with 
in the negotiations. The formulation of the report indicates no progress 
had been made on the clarification that was sought at the beginning of 
the process. Trade issues, among them certification, were intended to be 
finalised at the second session of the Forum. However, the divisions 
from the fourth session of IPF had not disappeared, and the differences 
resurfaced in the Forum (ENB, 1998). In the forest negotiations, the 
general trade discussions focussed on how trade and environment should 
be mutually supportive, certification and labelling, and illegal trade in 
forest products (ECOSOC, 1998a). Despite intense discussions in a 
working and contact groups, the whole text on the trade issues was 
bracketed (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1998: 6-7). With the creation 
of the UNFF, trade issues became more indirectly covered than in the 
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the avoidance of discussing trade within the framework of the UNFF, 
other than in general terms. Certification was not on the UNFF agenda, 
but was occasionally brought up and is part of the UNFF resolution 3/1 
(Gulbrandsen and Humphreys, 2006), and is mentioned in the non-
legally binding instrument (ECOSOC, 2007).  
 
The role of governments in certification schemes created debate during 
the negotiations. One side in this debate emphasised the need for 
governments to ensure transparency, participation, non-discrimination, 
and open access to schemes. Thus, governments role in certification 
schemes are important according to this perspective. In addition, the 
importance of sovereignty is highlighted, i.e. certification schemes 
should observe national sovereignty. The other side in the debate 
stressed the private and voluntary nature of the schemes, and that 
governments should play a minor role in enforcing harmony among 
them (Koleva, 2006: 22-25). The different views generated tensions in 
the negotiations. At the fourth session of the IPF, the role of 
governments caused lengthy and difficult negotiations. Developing 
countries strongly supported the role of governments in certification 
schemes, as illustrated in the text negotiations, where they proposed that:  
 
governments’ role in ensuring that schemes are transparent, voluntary and 
non-discriminatory; have open access and full participation; observe national 
sovereignty; and do not conflict with relevant domestic regulations (ENB, 
1997: 6).  
 
The EU, together with other developed countries, proposed that  
 
governments have a role in ‘encouraging’ rather than ‘ensuring’ transparency, 
full participation, non- discrimination, and open access to certification 
schemes (ENB, 1997: 8).  
 
The phrasing indicates how the EU wanted to play down the role of 
governments, i.e. governments should not be a guarantee for the 
schemes. The formulation suggested by the EU became part of the final 
conclusion of the negotiations. However, the EU and its supporters did 
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sovereignty (ENB, 1997). A similar debate played out at the IFF, with a 
similar outcome regarding governments’ involvement in certification 
schemes (ENB, 2000).  
 
The second issue that gave rise to tensions during the IPF and the IFF 
negotiations was certification as a trade barrier. At the beginning of the 
negotiations, developing countries (in particular timber producing 
countries) feared that certification would be used as a trade barrier 
(ENB, 1996). The issue continued to be sensitive and difficult to discuss 
without creating divisions between the actors. The question revolved 
around whether or not certification schemes could comprise potential 
obstacles to market access. During the negotiations, “the need to ensure 
that certification should not be discriminatory or used as a form of 
disguised protectionism” (ENB, 1999: 5) was emphasised on several 
occasions.  
 
In the discussions on trade barriers, the issue of whether or not to refer 
to WTO agreements in the final report caused disagreement. Led by 
Brazil, developing countries supported text referring to WTO 
agreements (particularly the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and its Code of Good Practice (TBT)
27) and argued the TBT Agreement 
would be useful in ensuring certification schemes do not become 
disguised trade barriers (ENB, 2000). The EU, together with other 
developed countries, took a position on deleting text in the TBT 
Agreement. The EU doubted that a reference to ensuring certification 
schemes comply with WTO rules was relevant. The negotiations 
returned to this issue several times without reaching consensus (Swedish 
Ministry of Industry, 2000). Thus, one side in the debate emphasised the 
need to ensure certification was not used as disguised protectionism and 
that conformity with the TBT agreement could ensure that; therefore, 
the reference to WTO was needed. The other side argued that 
certification schemes not should be seen as a trade barrier as they are 
                                                 
27 The TBT Agreement covers technical regulations concerning products and their process 
and production methods. It is not clear if schemes for certification of products made of 
sustainably produced timber and eco-labelling will be subject to the TBT (ECOSOC, 
1998b). 
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IFF, the final text takes note of the WTO's work on voluntary eco-
labelling schemes and includes a footnote stating the Forum discussed, 
but could not reach consensus on, the specific reference to the WTO 
(ENB, 2000).  
 
The tariff discussion also surfaced during the second session of UNFF, 
but in a more fragmented manner. During this UNFF session, there was 
a disagreement between developing countries proposing the inclusion of 
references to the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on forest 
products in the context of the WTO Doha agenda, and developed 
countries opposing these references (ENB, 2002). In the compromised 
text the Forum: “Urges countries to promote trade policies and practices 
to support sustainable forest management, including in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and encourages countries to participate in the 
negotiations of WTO in the context of the work programme adopted at 
Doha in order to implement, inter alia, relevant IPF/IFF proposals for 
action related to trade” (ECOSOC, 2002: para. 5).  The compromise 
was an effort to resolve the disagreement between developing and 
developed countries on the proposed inclusion of references to the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on forest products in the 
context of the WTO agenda (ENB, 2002).   
 
When delegates at the seventh session of UNFF negotiated the non-
legally binding instrument in 2007, certification and tariffs became an 
issue in these negotiations. Most contentious in this context was a 
reference to encouraging voluntary measures, such as forest certification 
schemes, which was supported inter alia by the EU, but opposed inter alia 
by Brazil, Colombia, India, and China. Delegates eventually agreed to 
retain the reference stating that “voluntary measures, such as certification 
schemes and other appropriate mechanisms, should be developed in a 
transparent and participatory manner” (ENB, 2007: 7). 
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In the broader set of trade issues in the forest negotiations, the EU had a 
number of goals regarding these issues. These included:  
 
-  To keep the trade discussion general; 
-  To avoid discussions concerning WTO in these forums;  
-  When trade issues were to be discussed, all measures must be 
compatible to WTO rules; 
-  Trade should act as a driving force in this context, but most 
importantly trade liberalisation must be mutually supportive to 
sustainable forest management and the environment (sometimes the 
EU argued that others did not include environmental concerns in 
the discussions in this context) (European Union Commission, 
2002; Swedish Ministry of Industry, 2000). 
 
On certification and labelling in the forest negotiation process, the EU 
argued certification should be market based without governmental 
involvement. As voluntary, market-based tools, certification schemes 
could not be regarded as trade barriers. In the EU’s view, certification 
schemes are not a technical barrier to trade; hence, the IPF and the IFF 
could not refer to the TBT Agreement of the WTO (European Union 
Commission, 2002). The EU argued in favour of voluntary, market-
based systems, which not should be considered as a trade barrier. 
However, this should not be interpreted as an “anti-governmental” 
position. The EU acknowledged the important role of governments in 
certification schemes, but could not agree too extensive interference.  
 
The discussion on whether or not certification schemes constitute a tariff 
barrier proved to be extremely sensitive. The connection between free 
trade and sustainable forest management, which was in the mandate of 
the IFF to discuss, was anticipated as leading to a condition on free trade. 
Accusations of disguised protectionism ran high at occasions. For 
example, the EU’s fought hard for its position that certification not 
should be viewed as a trade barrier, which made some other actors to 
consider the EU out as protectionist. Also other actors were fighting for 
their positions, the G77’s demand for a reference to WTO became an 
emotional requirement (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000).  
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Internally, the EU appeared to be quite aligned on the certification issue. 
The differences that existed were small on regarded governments’ role in 
certification schemes. A survey issued by UNECE shows the member 
states had different opinions on the appropriate degree of governmental 
intervention in private certification programmes (Koleva, 2006). 
However, this division was small and a matter of nuance. Trade issues 
gave rise to discussions on competence within the EU. The Commission 
asserted its right to represent the EU on these issues, and the Presidency 
argued in favour of its competence. The dispute was solved by dividing 
the responsibility so that the Presidency introduced the EU positions and 
the Commission developed thoughts, arguments, and positions during 
the debate (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997a).  
 
Within the IFF, internal EU discussions on trade and environment 
repeatedly returned to the competence issue. In the preparations for the 
IFF’s fourth session, a number of member states asked if it was the 
Presidency or the Commission that held the competence and should 
represent the EU in issues concerning trade (Swedish Ministry of 
Industry, 1999b). The Commission regarded the issue to be a 
Community exclusive competence area, whereas, the Presidencies 
argued that a number of issues within this category were not of exclusive 
competence for the Commission. During the preparatory meeting for 
the Forum’s fourth session, the Commission sought to discuss the issue 
with the new Presidency and stressed the interest of the Commission was 
to use the EU’s collective knowledge in the best way (DFID, 1999). 
During the IFF process, the Commission negotiated on behalf of the EU 
and on several occasions requested discussions on the mandate and a 
clearer strategy on what the EU wanted to achieve regarding trade 
(Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999a).  
 
5.5  The Outcome of the Negotiations  
The outcome of the deliberations on certification was negotiated text in 
form of different policy documents: one proposal for action, one 
paragraph in an UNFF-resolution, and one paragraph in the non-legally 
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and as noted above the process did not make any substantial 
contributions to the international debate on certification. The issue of 
certification is intertwined with other areas and institutions to the extent 
that the forest negotiation process faced major difficulties in achieving 
any concrete and important results on this topic. As Gulbrandsen and 
Humphreys express it: “The IPF, IFF and UNFF have made no 
significant contribution to the international debate on certification, 
although by negotiating [sic] text [the process has] endorsed certification 
as an idea” (Gulbrandsen and Humphreys, 2006: 48). Thus, the main 
quite general result is that the process supports the idea of certification. 
The negotiated text reflects the tensions among the delegates and their 
different views, as shown in table 5 on the following page.  
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Table 6: Outcome of the negotiations on certification. 
The outcome of the IPF 
 
133 (a) The Panel urged countries, within their respective legal frameworks, and 
international organizations to consider the potentially mutually supportive relationship 
between sustainable forest management, trade, and voluntary certification and labelling 
schemes operating in accordance with relevant national legislations, and to endeavour to 
ensure, as necessary, that such schemes are not used as a form of disguised protectionism, and 
to help to ensure, as necessary, that they do not conflict with international obligations. 
(ECOSOC, 1997b, para.133 a). 
The outcome of the IFF 
 
41 (b) Urged countries, international organizations, including WTO (4), and other interested 
parties to undertake, as appropriate, further cooperative work on voluntary certification 
and/or labelling schemes, in line with the recommendations of IPF, while seeking to 
enhance their international comparability and considering their equivalence, taking into 
account the diversity of national and regional situations, and to ensure adequate transparency 
and non-discrimination in the design and operation of such schemes, and are consistent with 
international obligations so as to promote sustainable forest management and not to lead to 
unjustifiable obstacles to market access;  
(4) The Forum discussed, but could not reach consensus on the specific reference to WTO 
in this context. (ECOSOC, 2000a, para.41 b) 
Outcome from the UNFF, UNFF Resolution 3/1 
 
8. Invites the Collaborative Partnership on Forests member organizations, in cooperation 
with others, to work on operationalising the IPF/IFF proposals for action on voluntary 
certification of forest management and related voluntary labelling, with a view to promoting 
sustainable forest management in a way that does not create unnecessary barriers to 
international trade, is non-discriminatory, transparent and in accordance with commitments 
and obligations under relevant multilateral agreements; such work should focus on building 
country capacity and not favour or endorse any particular certification scheme; (ECOSOC, 
2003 Resolution 3/1) 
Outcome of  the UNFF: Non-legally binding instrument V. National policies and 
measures 
 
(x) Encourage the private sector, civil society organizations and forest owners to develop, 
promote and implement in a transparent manner voluntary instruments, such as voluntary 
certification systems or other appropriate mechanisms, to develop and promote forest 
products from sustainably managed forests harvested according to domestic legislation, and to 
improve market transparency (ECOSOC, 2007: chapter V, para. 6x) 
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Certification  
As noted above, the EU argued certification should be market based 
without governmental involvement. According to this view, schemes are 
seen as voluntary, market based tools, and as such they cannot be 
regarded as trade barriers. In the EU’s opinion, certification schemes are 
not a technical barrier to trade; hence, the IPF and the IFF could not 
refer to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of WTO. The 
EU’s position on certification was related to the overarching trade-goals 
mentioned above. In particular, the EU’s emphasis on certification as a 
market based tool clearly link to its important goal of trade liberalisation 
as a driving force for environmental protection, i.e. using market-based 
solutions and trade as a driving force for achieving sustainable 
development. Also, when certification discussions touched upon 
references to the WTO, the EU’s goal of avoiding discussions 
concerning WTO in the context of the forest negotiations becomes 
quite obvious.  
 
Analysis of the proposal for action from the IPF process reveals a rather 
vaguely formulated paragraph with conditioning phrases, e.g. “as 
necessary” (ECOSOC, 1997b, para.133 a). The paragraph 133a 
mentions “voluntary certification schemes”, which is of importance for 
the EU. On the other hand, the paragraph also expresses “such schemes 
are not used as a form of disguised protectionism” (ECOSOC, 1997b, 
para.133 a). According to the EU, certification is not a trade barrier and 
should not be viewed as protectionism. However, the text is vague and 
the EU did not appear to concede much in order to create this 
paragraph, however, it could not influence other actors with other goals 
on this item.  
 
A similar interpretation can be made from the paragraph 41b that was 
the outcome of the IFF. The EU suggested different language for the last 
sentence, instead of “avoids unjustified obstacles to market access”, the 
EU wanted “ensuring adequate transparency and non-discrimination” 
(ENB, 2000: 5). This was not achieved. Developing countries insisted 
on the inclusion of a reference to the WTO and this created major 
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reference and called for also including references to UNCTAD, the 
FAO and UNEP. The delegates could not agree about the reference to 
the WTO and as they did not want to bracket the text (ENB, 2000), a 
footnote to WTO was included in the paragraph: (4) “The Forum 
discussed, but could not reach consensus to the specific reference to 
WTO in this context.” (ECOSOC, 2000a: para. 41 b). This outcome 
reflects the deep divisions and difficulties on agreeing.  
 
The outcomes related to certification from the UNFF consist of 
Resolution 3/1 and the paragraph in the non-legally binding instrument. 
These documents are similarly worded, mentioning “voluntary” and 
“not create unnecessary trade barriers” (ECOSOC, 2007: chapter V, 
para. 6x; ECOSOC, 2003 Resolution 3/1). In the negotiations on the 
non-legally binding instrument, the EU (together with some other 
developed countries) wanted a reference to ”encouraging voluntary 
measures, such as forest certification schemes” (ENB, 2007: 7). Despite 
opposition from Brazil, India, and China, the paragraph states:  
 
Encourage the private sector, civil society organizations and forest owners to 
develop, promote and implement in a transparent manner voluntary 
instruments, such as voluntary certification systems (ECOSOC, 2007: chapter 
V, para. 6x).  
 
This indicates that the EU had influence through inclusion of their 
language in the non-legally binding instrument.   
 
In the negotiation process, the EU pressed for its important objectives 
regarding the agenda items on the role of governments and highlighting 
the benefits of certification. However, the EU realised the difficulties in 
achieving progress on these items in the context of the international 
forest negotiations. Therefore, it appears as if the EU wanted to keep the 
issues off the agenda, and one way of doing that was to keep the 
discussions as vague as possible. The overall perception of the EU’s 
influence on the certification issue is that the EU had a firm position on 
how certification should be treated in the negotiations. The EU pushed 
for certification as a market based tool that does not constitute a trade 
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reflected some of these goals, and compromises with other actors. In 
addition, the vague outcome was an effect of the role the forest 
negotiation process could have for certification. The EU did not manage 
to affect other actors nor was it affected by other actors with opposing 
views. None of the actors wanted to yield on this issue. The EU had 
some, but limited, influence on certification within the forest 
negotiation process, i.e. the EU managed to attain part of its goal by its 
own interventions. Taken together, the EU had some, but limited, 
influence on the outcome and the process.  
 
 
Table 7: Summary of the EU’s goal achievement regarding certification.  
Outcome and Process Goal of the 
EU 
Achieved Partly 
achieved  
Not 
achieved  
Certification- not a trade barrier    X   
 
Certification- market based: no 
governmental involvement 
 X   
 
Process: Keep it off the immediate 
agenda 
X     
 
 
 
5.7  Interest-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
To explain the outcome of this case where the EU had some influence, 
interests and preferences are analysed in this section. For identifying the 
EU’s preference, its position in the negotiations needs considering. On 
governments’ role in certification schemes, the EU’s preference was in 
favour of voluntary, market-based systems (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 
1997a). In the debate on certification as a tariff, the EU’s preference was 
clear: certification should in no way be regarded as trade barriers insofar 
as they are voluntarily (European Union Commission, 2002). The EU 
deemed the discussions on certification in the negotiations biased in that 
the Secretariat’s background reports emphasised possible discrimination 
and trade restriction, rather than highlighting the possible benefits of 
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collective preference of the EU was to establish that certification would 
be viewed as a market based tool for sustainable forest management 
without governmental involvement and that the schemes do not 
constitute barriers to trade. 
 
Turning to interests, the EU’s preferences in trade issues in general are 
based on economic interests (Dür and Zimmerman, 2007). The trade 
aspects of forests are significant for all the member states as among the 
member states, there are both importers and exporters of forest products. 
The member states of the Northern Europe have a positive balance of 
trade regarding forest products, but Central and Southern Europe 
depend on imports of such products. (Andersson, 2007: 136-137). The 
majority of the world’s certification schemes are in Europe, as are the 
markets for certified timber (UNECE, 2006). These conditions indicate 
that the EU had a strong economic incentive for maintaining 
certification schemes as it benefits its own producers and consumers.  
  
From documents and internal meeting notes, the general impression is 
that there were no extensive internal discussions on the EU’s position for 
the negotiations on certification. The discussions focused on the problem 
of discussing certification in the context of these negotiations. Thus, it 
was not differences among the member states that were a focus for 
internal discussions, rather the problems of achieving an outcome in the 
main negotiations. This can be interpreted that the EU was unified on 
how the issue of certification should be dealt within the negotiations and 
what they perceived was possible to achieve.  
 
As mentioned above, one exception of the EU’s unity was discussions at 
the beginning of the process on the role of governmental involvement. 
These discussions reveal some internal divisions regarding the perspective 
on certification. The division between member states concerned the 
degree of market regulation and governmental involvement. Some 
member states were willing to contribute to governmental certification 
systems, which other member states found problematic (Swedish 
Ministry of Industry, 1997a; Interview no. 57). The different conditions 
for the member states generated different perspectives on these issues that 
  126 were to some extent derived from whether the member state was an 
exporting or importing country (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997a). 
However, the different perspectives never pervaded the EU’s position 
and did not appear to create difficulty for the EU to agree on its 
negotiation position. The collective preference in this case was strong 
due to the alignment of the member states and strong economic interests 
that underpinned the preference. The strength is proved by the 
unwillingness of the EU to concede in the negotiations.  
 
The alignment of the member states’ preferences corresponds with 
scenario 1, outlined in Section 2.4 and Table 2. in Chapter Two: If all 
member states have the same preference and this preference is strong, the 
EU should be influential as it will act on its position of strength and 
unity. An exactly identical preference is unlikely and this case highlights 
there was not complete unity among member states and their preferences 
were not identical. However, the differences were minor and more a 
question of nuance. The interest linked to the preference appears to have 
heavily affected the preference. Thus, the material interests underpinning 
preferences in this case increased the strength of the preference. 
Accordingly, the EU should have been influential due to the intensity of 
its preference. However, the EU only had some influence. Thus, this 
case only fulfils the prediction to some extent. The EU’s influence in 
this case could be partly understood from its strong and united 
preferences. The explanations do not stand up to full explanatory power, 
as the EU only was partially influential. To consider this factor to have 
full explanatory power, the EU should have been influential due to its 
strong preference.  
 
5.8  Institutional-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
The analysis of institutional structures derives from competence, 
negotiating mandate, negotiating strategy, and negotiating context. The 
EU’s decisions on trade related matters in the forest negotiations are 
affected by its general trade policies. The trade component in this case 
renders competence more complicated than in the other issue cases and 
the division of competence might be more difficult to decide. As 
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exclusive competence, while environmental negotiations are of shared 
competence, but can contain trade provisions, as with the case of 
certification in the forest negotiation process. In theory, when 
environmental negotiations move on to a trade related topic the 
competence may be exclusive (Delreux, 2006).  However, in practice, 
the actual representation and mandate are more flexible and each 
negotiation process has its own dynamics (Sbragia, 2005).  
 
As preceding discussion outlined, the mandate and competence in this 
case were repeatedly discussed at internal EU meetings. Occasionally, the 
Commission tried to claim its sole right to represent the EU, and the 
Presidency argued for its right. Discussions within the EU expose how 
the division of competence was not established. In the first round of 
negotiations, the Presidency and the Commission found a solution by 
dividing the representation on trade issues (the Presidency introduced 
the issues in opening statements and the Commission took over in 
debates), although, the issue resurfaced in later negotiations when 
discussing mandate and strategy for trade issues (Swedish Ministry of 
Industry, 1997a). However, these discussions should not be exaggerated, 
during the negotiations, the representation appeared to function and the 
EU was able to take advantage of the collective knowledge of the 
member states and the Commission. This might be a result of the 
extensive and well developed policy area that trade constitutes within the 
EU.  
 
In previous chapters, it has been explained how the legal mandate to 
negotiate is decided by the Council and given to the Presidency (in 
shared competence negotiations) or the Commission (in exclusive 
competence negotiations). In this case, the mandate on trade issues was 
not decided in the Council working group on forestry as the other issues 
in the forest negotiations were. Instead, the mandate was decided by 
what was agreed in other Council working groups (Interview no. 57). 
Thus, the mandate for the certification issue in this process was not 
explicitly stated in the Council Conclusions that are prepared for the 
forest negotiations. Instead, the EU was aware of what it could and 
could not accept in this area due to broader policy decisions. 
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In international negotiations with trade provisions, the rules for what the 
EU can agree on are inflexible and compromise is not always possible 
(Delreux, 2006). This might also be the case for trade issues in a process 
not primarily focused on trade. The negotiators in the forest process 
need to consider the trade issue that they may have distant knowledge 
of, and it is easier to be stern and inflexible in external negotiations 
rather than risk crossing internal trade rules. Hence, despite the lack of 
formulations in the mandate, the trade element renders the mandate 
narrow with little room to manoeuvre. The EU could not go beyond 
rules created in other policy areas. The trade element is so strong in the 
certification negotiations that it creates a de facto narrow and strict 
negotiating mandate.  
 
As Chapter Two outlined, in addition to competence and mandate, the 
negotiating context is important for how the institutional structures 
matter for the EU’s influence. The negotiating context can be either 
conservative or reformist. In this case, the EU’s position was close to the 
status quo; hence, a conservative position. This interpretation of the 
negotiating context is based on how the EU’s preference was to 
“defend” the certification schemes and to keep the issue general in this 
process. Different combinations of mandate and negotiation context 
generate predictions on the EU’s influence. In the negotiations on 
certification the negotiation mandate appears to be narrow, which is 
combined with a conservative position of the EU.  
 
The situation corresponds with scenario 1 (outlined in Section 2.5): If 
the negotiating mandate is narrow and the position is conservative, the 
EU should be influential, as the EU has strict orders to defend a position. 
The EU was an inflexible actor in this case and the institutional structure 
bound the EU to goals that went beyond this process. It was difficult for 
the EU to concede in these negotiations. The prediction asserts that the 
EU should have influence under these circumstances. However, the EU 
had limited influence in this case. Thus, the EU’s influence could not 
fully be explained by its institutional structure. In addition, it was hard to 
find evidence that the EU used its inflexibility in this case as a strategy in 
the negotiations.  
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5.9  Ideational-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
As asserted in Chapter Two, the EU’s framing of an issue can affect its 
influence depending on how its frame nests to broader values. In this 
section certification is analysed by identifying the policy frames and 
meta-level frames in this context. This is followed by a discussion on 
which meta-level frame that dominated the negotiations, then the EU’s 
framing of the issue of certification and the nesting of its frame is 
analysed.  
 
Certification is a rather narrow issue in the forest negotiations and the 
policy choices at stake were less clear. However, in the negotiations the 
view on certification seems to have been important, i.e. to what extent it 
should be a market-based tool for sustainable forest management. Two 
dominant policy frames are identified in this context; they are considered 
central as the negotiations focused on clashes between them. The first 
dominant policy frame was held by actors who wanted more governmental 
involvement in certification schemes, and considered certification as a 
potential trade barrier. The characteristic view based on this frame is 
illustrated by the following two statements from the negotiations:  
 
[…] emphasized the role of governments in ensuring transparency, full 
participation, non-discrimination, and open access of schemes. […] also 
highlighted that certification should observe sovereignty (ENB, 1996: 4),  
 
[…] said certification can act as potential obstacles to market access” (ENB, 
1998: 8).  
 
The other policy frame asserted certification as a market based tool, 
hence favoured none or less governmental involvement, which was 
typically expressed by: “governments have a role in ‘encouraging’ rather 
than ‘ensuring’ transparency, full participation, non- discrimination and 
open access to certification schemes” (ENB, 1997: 4).  
 
These two different views articulate the different actors’ view on 
certification. The first perceives certification as a political issue, meaning 
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governments should have a role to ensure non-discrimination etc. This 
view is related to the fact that most certification schemes are found in 
European countries as developing countries lack the resources of 
implementing such schemes (Bridges, 2002). Therefore, according to 
this view, this is a political issue. The second perspective views 
certification as a technical issue, in the sense that schemes are an 
instrument developed with technical criteria for evaluation. According 
this view, the schemes should be market based in order to create the best 
instrument that considers local and national conditions. Thus the policy 
frames identified in the case of certification negotiations are: the political 
frame and the technical frame.  
 
In the broader debate on trade and environment, the dichotomies in this 
context are represented by the following statement:  
 
The goals of preserving global biodiversity and promoting strong trade in 
forest products are complicating factors (ENB, 1995: 1).  
 
Hence, the issue is connected to aspects of the debate on environment 
and trade. The basis for the policy frames appears to derive from 
perceptions of environmental versus economic and social goals of trade. 
Ultimately, national control over natural resources and trade 
liberalisation appear to be the origin of the discussion on what underlies 
the policy frames, which also reveal where these frames derive from. 
The political policy frame is derived from and reflects sovereignty over 
natural resources, such as forests, which were a dominating argument 
throughout the negotiation process and in many of sub-issues. The 
technical policy frame is based on the idea of market mechanisms as a 
tool for achieving sustainable development and is attached to the values 
of mutual support of trade liberalisation and environmental protection. 
Hence, the dichotomously meta-level frames in this context are: 
sovereignty over natural resources and trade liberalisation and 
environment. Both these meta-level frames seem to have a strong hold 
over this process. 
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Table 8:  Policy frames and meta-level frames in the certification process. 
Meta-level 
frame 
Trade liberalisation and 
environment  
Sovereignty over natural  
Resources 
 
Policy frame  Technical frame: market 
based, non-political, not a 
trade barrier 
Political frame: governmental role, 
political issue, can be disguised 
protectionism  
 
 
The EU argued in favour of certification as a market based tool for 
sustainable forest management without governmental involvement, and 
that the schemes do not constitute barriers to trade. The EU treated the 
issue as technical and non-political; thus, in this context, the EU’s policy 
frame on certification was the technical policy frame. This frame nested 
with the meta-level frame trade liberalisation and environment, which 
was one of the dominating meta-level frames. This situation seems to 
apply to scenario 1. (outlined in Chapter Two, Section 2.6): The EU 
manages to nest its policy specific frame to the broader meta-level frame, 
and that framing is reflected in outcomes. This suggests that the EU’s 
framing effort enabled a greater degree of influence.  The EU frames the 
problem in a manner that makes it appear credible and more convincing 
in the context of prevailing values. 
 
The EU had some degree of influence in this case, which could be 
explained by the fit of its policy frame with one of the dominating meta-
level frames. However, the EU did not dominate this issue and could 
not convince other actors of its position. This relates to the existence of 
two policy frames that nested well into two different meta-level frames 
that appeared to co-exist, each influencing the process and outcome: the 
other actors could equally convincingly support their arguments of how 
they constructed the understanding of certification, thus for their policy 
frame.  This outcome is connected to the extent of the EU’s influence in 
this case: the EU had some influence. The EU was able to nest its policy 
frame to a broader frame, but the co-existence of another meta-level 
frame, to which other actors managed to nest their policy frame, 
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full influence. Thus, frames prove to have explanatory power in this 
case.  
 
5.10 Implications of the EU’s Influence in the Case of 
Certification  
This case highlights what sometimes appears to be an inherent difficulty 
in the forest negotiations, that is, the lack of a clear goal of what to 
achieve. In this case, the actors stand out as ambiguous over what 
discussions of certification in this process should lead to. Yet the 
negotiations were contentious and the actors had difficulties to agree. 
The EU’s goals are related to linkages between trade and environment, 
i.e. trade and environment should be mutually supportive. This creates a 
firm belief in market-based solutions, such as certification. In this 
process, these goals collided with other actors’ strong emphasis of 
national sovereignty.  
 
Certification (and the trade issues in general in the forest negotiations) 
appears to have created gridlocks among the actors, which did not 
confine to this issue. The broader process suffered from the discussions 
on certification and other trade-related issues. The EU had limited 
influence in this case, which renders difficulties to substantially interpret 
the implications of its influence. Viewing this counterfactual, if the EU 
would have been influential, the outcome would have been more in line 
with its goals. This would probably have involved a negotiated text with 
stronger emphasis on certification as a market-based tool and less on 
sovereignty. However, the outcome would in all likelihood still have 
been vague, since there was no clear policy at stake. The EU did not 
contribute to strengthen the cooperation in this case. Instead, the EU 
and the other actors created gridlocks in these discussions that might 
have increased difficulties to act constructively in other areas. 
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The analysis of certification in the forest negotiations highlights that the 
EU had some influence in this case. The issue in the negotiation process 
was vague, but at the same time, contentious and the debate did not 
produce significant results for certification schemes. The outcome was 
negotiated text, which reflected a compromise and was vaguely worded. 
The EU argued in favour of certification schemes as a market based and 
voluntarily tool, with less governmental involvement and stressed that 
certification schemes should not be regarded as trade barriers, as they are 
voluntary. In pursuing this goal, the EU was successful in maintaining its 
position and not conceding. However, other actors were equally 
unwilling to give concessions, which led to the compromised outcome.  
This leads to the conclusion that the EU had some, but limited, 
influence in this case.  
 
In explaining this outcome, it was determined that the EU had a strong, 
collective preference derived from economic interests in this area. 
Economic interests and alignment of the member states contributed to 
the strength of the preference. This indicates strong EU influence, but as 
the EU did have limited influence in this case interests and preferences 
explanatory power is lower in this case.  
 
The trade element affected the institutional structures, e.g. competence 
in the negotiations and the negotiation mandate. The mandate for 
certification was decided through agreement in other Council working 
groups. Thus, in the forest negotiations, the EU had to form its 
negotiation position according to a broader decision. The trade element 
created a narrow mandate for the EU in the negotiations on 
certification. The negotiating context was difficult to interpret in this 
case, as there was no clear policy choice at stake in the negotiations. As 
the EU wanted to preserve certification as intact as possible, its 
preference was interpreted as closer to defending the status quo. 
Consequently, certification constituted a conservative case. The 
theoretical framework asserts that a combination of a narrow mandate 
and a conservative negotiating context would have made the EU 
influential. The EU had the institutions “in place”, but still, its influence 
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should be influential. As the EU only had some influence, the 
explanatory value is lower in this case.  
 
The ideational explanation had the most profound explanatory power in 
this case. The prediction was that the EU should be influential when it 
nested its policy frame to a meta-level frame, which the EU did. 
However, the coexistence of a second meta-level frame, to which other 
actors nested their policy frame, made it impossible for the EU to 
influence the negotiations and the outcome. The interpretation of this 
situation was that the EU should have some influence, but was limited 
due to coexisting meta-level frames. The existence of two parallel meta-
level frames, to which each of the opponents managed to nest their 
respectively policy frame, explains why the EU had some influence in 
this case.  
 
This case study raises several important points that refine the 
understanding of the EU’s influence. This represents a case when the EU 
was organised, it had a strong preference and interests, should have been 
enabled by the institutions, and it managed to nest its frame to one 
dominating meta-level frame. Even so, the EU was not as influential as it 
should have been, according to the predictions. This case proved to be a 
difficult case for the theoretical framework to explain. The first two 
explanatory factors have rather weak explanatory power, while the third 
factor can explain the case. The combined factors indicate a strong and 
influential EU that should have been able to act forcefully and convince 
opponents of its position. However, the outcome of limited influence 
suggests the explanatory power of the framework is lower in this case. 
This case shows that the EU did not contribute to constructive 
cooperation. Instead, it rather (together with other actors) created 
gridlocks that rendered difficulties in other issues of the negotiations.  
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Management: Efficiency or Sufficiency? 
 
The discussions on the establishment of a global forest fund became an 
obstacle in the negotiation process. Justifications for a fund included 
developing countries need for funding the transition to sustainable forest 
management. The opponents advocated better use of existing funds 
before establishing new mechanisms. The debate on a fund was marked 
by the classic North – South divide that typically surfaces in negotiations 
on development related issues. Delegates returned to the issue of a global 
forest fund throughout the negotiations. Ultimately, no fund was 
established, although there are suggestions of establishing a voluntary 
fund in a near future. The EU argued against the creation of a forest 
fund, stressing alternatives of private funding and argued for exploring 
existing funds and mechanisms. The EU did not manage to fight the 
issue off the agenda. However, its most important goal of not 
establishing a fund was achieved. Debate on the topic was marked by 
strong tensions among the delegates. In the forest negotiations, the issue 
of a global forest fund and financial issues in general relate to a broader 
discussion over the financing of the implementation of global 
environmental politics. This discussion serves as a starting point for this 
chapter and the negotiation process, the outcome, and the EU’s position 
on these issues are outlined. Subsequently, EU’s influence in this case is 
analysed and the outcome explained.  
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The debate on financial issues in the global environmental context 
originates from questions about responsibility for environmental 
degradation, and ultimately concerns issues of equity (Chasek et al. 
2006). The effects of global environmental degradation have led to an 
understanding that political action is needed. Developed countries, 
which account for the major part of environmental degradation, have 
had to accept their responsibility for addressing these problems. 
Developing countries also need to act, but have difficulty taking this 
responsibility and are reluctant to consider global environmental 
problems in their national politics, unless additional funds from 
developed countries materialise. In order to attain international 
consensus and improve global environmental cooperation, provision of 
additional financial support has proved crucial (Streck, 2001).  
 
A central theme in global environmental politics is “distributive 
justice”
28, which comprises the merging of environment and 
development (Parks and Roberts, 2006: 330). Poor countries that fear 
future restrictions on their economic growth have to threaten non-
cooperation and appeal to socially shared norms of social justice in order 
to achieve this outcome (Parks and Roberts, 2006). The debate on 
distributive justice in the context of global environmental politics has 
been present since UNCHE in 1972, and has been a recurrent theme in 
this context since then. The message from UNCED was that more aid 
from rich to poor countries is necessary to finance environmental 
protection. The commitments have not been honoured. At UNCED, 
rich countries commit to providing US$ 125 billion (of necessary US$ 
625 required to implement Agenda 21). The total of all global assistance 
to developing countries was US$ 52.3 billion in 2001 (Clapp and 
Dauvergne, 2005: 207). Since then, financing has been a constantly 
recurring issue in international environmental negotiations. Lack of 
financial resources is often used as the primary explanation for why 
countries do not implement and comply with environmental standards 
(Chasek et al. 2006).  
                                                 
28 Distributive justice concerns justice in relation to allocation of goods in a society and 
focuses on fair outcomes (Konow, 2003: 1189). 
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Both rich and poor countries agree that in this context more aid is 
needed, but they disagree on where it should come from, how much is 
needed, and how it should be allocated. Furthermore, disputes have 
arisen over the conditionality of environmental aid, that is, over the 
restrictions donors attach to the aid, sometimes this is broad policy 
reforms, such as with structural adjustment loans, or specific measures to 
protect the environment (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). Traditionally, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is seen as the source for “new 
and additional” resources. Private funding is an alternative to increased 
ODA and developed countries tend to emphasise this source of funding 
in international environmental negotiations. However, the 
environmental impact of private global financing on developing 
countries is unclear. Private financing is more difficult to hold 
accountable than public funding (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005).  
 
In this context, the Global Environment Facility warrants mentioning. 
Before the UNCED meeting, an environmental fund was established: 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF is a multilateral fund 
for financing additional cost for countries where projects have global 
environmental benefits.
29 The GEF assists countries to meet their 
obligations from international environmental conventions they have 
signed and ratified. The GEF has been heavily criticized, inter alia, for its 
commitment to only funding incremental costs of projects, the dominant 
role of the World Bank, and the weight given to donors rather than 
recipients (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005).  
 
Discussions on financial resources in the context of the forest 
negotiations have followed a similar pattern as other international 
environmental negotiations. The focus in the forest negotiations is on 
how to finance sustainable forest management. In the Preparatory 
meetings of the UNCED negotiations, transfer of financial resources and 
                                                 
29 The GEF is the designated financial mechanism for a number of multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) or conventions: Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs); UN Convention on Combatting Desertification 
(UNCCD). 
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linked to forests (Strong, 1991) and financial issues came to dominate 
these negotiations. During the UNCED-meeting, developing countries 
frequently used the phrase “compensation for opportunity cost 
foregone”, which would be in the form of financial and technology 
transfer (Humphreys, 1996: 91). This emanates to issues of distributive 
justice that were already a theme in UNCHE 1972 and gained force in 
the UNCED and the WSSD meetings (Parks and Roberts, 2006: 330).  
In the forest process after the UNCED conference, the debates in the 
forest negotiations focused on sources and forms of funding (Braatz, 
2003). 
 
 Developed countries emphasise that resources could come from many 
different sources, in particular from private funding. This was an effect of 
a change in strategy by the developed countries, in which they tried to 
broaden the range of financial issues on the agenda and avoid being 
continually placed in the position of refusing developing countries’ 
demands for the commitment of new and additional resources 
(Humphreys, 2006). Linked to this debate is the question of whether or 
not ODA is declining (ENB: 1996). Mobilisation of international 
financial resources for sustainable forest management has remained one 
of the most critical and politically sensitive issues deliberated since 
UNCED. The main dividing line is between those who emphasise need 
of increased ODA and those who view private funding as an important 
alternative for financing sustainable development of forests (Joshi, 1999). 
The arguments in this debate have been that resources are available but 
are not used efficiently, which is opposed by those who stress there is 
not sufficient resources, particularly in light of declining ODA. A 
number of proposals for strengthening financial resources have featured 
in the negotiations. One of these has been to create a global forest fund. 
International deliberations on a proposal for establishing such a fund 
turned out to be one of the most politically sensitive policy issues in the 
forest negotiation process (Joshi and Chipeta, 2001).  
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In the negotiation process, one side of the familiar debate on sources and 
forms of finance focused on the need for new and additional resources in 
order to achieve sustainable forest management, which have been 
manifested in demands for a global forest fund. The other side 
emphasised the fact that there are several sources of funding besides 
ODA and that existing financial mechanisms should be considered 
before creating new ones. Those defending the proposition of a fund 
consider it as a tool for assisting the international community in 
combating deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, 
and in promoting sustainable forest management worldwide (Tomaselli, 
2006). The arguments in favour of establishing a global forest fund are 
based on the need for new and additional financial resources, which inter 
alia would pay for “global environmental services provided by forests 
and underlie the transition from unsustainable to sustainable forest 
management” (Chipeta and Joshi, 2001 29-30). The argument has been 
expressed as “if funds were available for paying for these kinds of goods, 
people would be compensated for preserving trees instead of logging 
them” (e.g. carbon sequestration is an example of a global public good 
provided by forests) (Joshi, 1999: 21).  
 
The detractors of a global forest fund are concerned that a fund would 
merely reallocate ODA, rather than contributing to new and additional 
resources (Joshi and Chipeta, 2001). In practice, this would mean that 
resources already available for forest management are merely become 
redistributed. In addition, there are voices that caution against creating 
environmental funds without the support of GEF, as experience has 
shown that environmental funds outside GEF are under funded 
(Rechkemmer, 2005). Another important and familiar critique in this 
context stresses that instead of creating a new forest fund, it is essential to 
make effective use of existing funds and mobilise domestic resources 
(Joshi and Chipeta, 2001).  
 
The proposal of a global forest fund was broached during the last session 
of IPF, held in 1997. This proposal found support in calls for new and 
additional resources articulated at the UNCED and the promise made in 
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provided to developing countries to enable them to sustainably manage, 
conserve and develop their forest resources, including through 
afforestation, reforestation and combating deforestation and forest and 
land degradation” (United Nations, 1992: para. 10). With the message 
from the UNCED and in light of declining ODA in the 1990s, 
developing countries asserted that a new global forest fund was needed. 
At the fourth session of the Panel, Brazil proposed establishing a global 
forest fund. The proposal created much debate. Opposition to a fund 
focused on three things: lack of consensus on the need for a fund; the 
late timing of the proposal; and the need for further studies before it was 
considered. Despite the opposition, the final document mentioned a 
new forest fund. However, opposition from donor countries was clearly 
presented and the proposal was listed alongside options to increase 
funding in other ways (ENB, 1997).  
 
During the IFF, the idea of a forest fund gained strength and there were 
several calls for the establishment of such fund throughout the Forum’s 
sessions. The arguments were similar to those featured at the IPF. The 
EU, together with other developed countries, emphasised the 
importance of reviewing existing mechanisms before discussing a new 
fund. Some countries wanted to examine the GEF as a potential source 
of funding for forests before creating new financial mechanisms. In 
addition, several actors questioned the need for new funds, as they might 
detract from other investment creating alternatives. Proponents 
responded that a fund would not detract from other resources. Canada, a 
strong convention proponent, tried to link the fund to a convention in 
stating it could be useful to discuss a new fund in the context of the 
convention. As discussed below, the EU had similar thoughts. At the 
second session of the Forum, delegates requested a comprehensive 
evaluation of the GEF and other financial mechanisms regarding the 
potential for financing sustainable forest management. (ENB, 1998.) The 
Forum failed to reach consensus on the creation of an international forest 
fund.  
 
During the negotiations at the IFF, developed countries tried to 
repackage the phrasing of the text on resources and instead of “new and 
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paved the way for other sources (ENB, 2000: 13). However, the fact 
that they were not going to offer new resources remained (ENB, 2000), 
neither was there agreement on expanding and reviewing the scope of 
existing mechanisms. The final text states “the Forum discussed, but did 
not reach consensus on whether to establish a global forest fund” 
(ECOSOC, 2000a).  
 
The debate continued at the UNFF. The concern was still where 
funding should come from: new or existing resources. As in previous 
sessions, divisions between proponents of a global forest fund and its 
detractors were evident. The reports from the second and fourth sessions 
of the Forum clearly note the lack of consensus between the both sides 
in this debate:  
 
There was an urgent need […] to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
existing mechanisms to help mobilize and channel funds for sustainable forest 
management (ECOSOC, 2002: para. 26),  
 
It was pointed out that although establishing a global forest fund continues to 
be an important issue, establishing new funds would require substantial 
contributions as well as effective mechanisms for deploying the money 
(ECOSOC, 2002: para. 31).  
 
One of the three ad hoc expert group created at the UNFF was tasked 
with finance and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies. 
The report of the expert group on financial issues recorded the lack of 
consensus on the issue: ”The concepts of an institutional investment 
promotion entity drawing its resources from the private and public 
sectors and of a global forest fund, among others, were discussed at the 
meeting but did not result in any particular recommendation” 
(ECOSOC, 2004: para. 43). Thus, the delegates were clearly divided 
over the creation of a forest fund.  
 
The fifth session focused on how to strengthen the Institutional 
Arrangement on Forests (IAF), and financial resources were at the centre 
of the discussions. All key proposals for strengthening IAF were followed 
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implementation (ENB, 2005). Developing countries continued to argue 
for establishing a global forest fund, which was not accepted by the 
donor countries. Instead, they tried to distribute some of the financial 
responsibility to international organisations and the private sector. 
Similar to in previous negotiation sessions, the demand for financial 
assistance was followed by insistence on policy commitments from donor 
countries. However, developing countries did not consider promises of 
new funding in exchange for policy commitments as credible (ENB, 
2005). When a proposal suggested deleting a paragraph on creating a 
global forest fund, G77 proposed “basing the fund on new and 
additional financial resources on a voluntary basis rather than 
commitments” (ENB, 2005: 8).  
 
The same discussion continued at the Forum’s sixth session, where 
discussions on the fund followed predictable patterns; developing 
countries called for the establishment of a global forest fund and 
developed countries stressed the importance of more efficient use of 
existing resources (ENB, 2006b). However, for the first time, the 
concept of a global forest fund survived although in “a very weak form” 
(Davenport and Wood, 2006: 319). A paragraph calling for assessment 
and review of current funding mechanisms stated:  
 
Including if appropriate, the possibility of having a voluntary global funding 
mechanism as a contribution towards achieving the global objectives 
(ECOSOC, 2006, para. 5e).  
 
The G77 proposal from 2005, where “on a voluntary basis” was added, 
appears to have made it possible for developed countries to accept the 
wording on a funding mechanism in the report.  
 
The sixth session was followed by an expert group meeting for 
considering the content of the non-legally binding instrument. Despite 
the agreed wording in the report from the sixth session, the issue of a 
global forest fund became one of the most contentious topics. The 
alternatives under consideration were similar to previous negotiation 
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mechanisms (ENB, 2006a).  
 
The discussions continued into the seventh session of the Forum. At the 
very end of the negotiations, a compromise text was presented with the 
phrasing:  
 
On developing and considering for adoption, if appropriate, at UNFF8 a 
voluntary global financial mechanism/portfolio approach/forest financing 
framework, and convening an ad hoc expert group to develop proposals for 
developing a mechanism (ECOSOC, 2007).  
 
Some developing countries wanted to delete “if appropriate”, but 
developed countries stated that “it would be impossible to decide to 
adopt a financial mechanism at UNFF8 at this meeting” (ENB, 2007: 9). 
Together with the African Group, the EU suggested a compromise 
phrasing: “decide to develop and consider with a view for adoption at 
UNFF8” (ENB, 2007: 9), on which delegates agreed. Hence, the non-
legally binding instrument does not have any concrete text on a global 
fund; however, there are provisions in the text that the issue will be 
addressed at UNFF8 in 2009 (ECOSOC, 2007). The concept of a global 
forest fund was finally placed on the agenda; however, as noted above, 
the word “voluntary” makes it quite weak and does not imply 
commitment from the donor countries.  
 
6.3  The EU and the Negotiations on the Global Forest Fund 
The EU has been against the creation of a new forest fund. For these 
countries, negotiations on the fund concern strategy and emphasising 
alternative sources of funding. During the IFF-sessions, when the issue 
of a forest fund was repeatedly raised, the EU emphasised the importance 
of assessing existing mechanisms and initiatives before considering new 
funds or mechanisms. In later sessions of the IFF, the EU returned to this 
argument and stated that “a forest fund would counteract mainstreaming 
of existing funding mechanisms” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 
  145 1999). In a response to the G77 proposal of considering the creation of 
an international forest fund, the EU suggested:  
 
Using National Forest Programmes to identify appropriate financial strategies 
and funding requirements for SFM and promoting effective utilization of 
available financial resources (ENB, 1999: 4).  
 
With this statement the EU stressed, that instead of inventing new 
mechanisms, focus should shift to existing resources and the national 
level. In line with this, the EU highlighted the need for evaluating 
existing mechanisms for finance before discussing a new financial 
mechanism:  
 
The EU is of the opinion that the financial needs for sustainable forest 
management should be met through effective mobilisation of domestic 
resources […] countries should also focus on the more effective use of 
available funds. The EU believes that existing financial instruments should be 
used to channel the mobilised resources into sustainable forest management 
(Presidency of the EU, 1998: para. 2).  
 
Hence, the EU preferred to investigate existent funds and mechanisms 
for financing sustainable forest management and to ensure this happened, 
the EU asked the IFF’s Secretariat to evaluate existing financial 
instruments before launching any new initiatives (Presidency of the EU, 
1998: para. 5). The strategy appeared to have been to prevent, or at least, 
to postpone the claims for a forest fund.  
 
Internally, there was consensus among member states regarding the 
rejection of a new forest fund. The internal discussions focused on 
tactics, e.g. how to “package” the message, so the EU would not be 
considered negative. Several member states stressed the importance of 
the EU being clear on its position, and at the same time, diplomatic 
(Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999a). This appears to have been 
important for the EU, and in a statement at the third session of IFF, held 
in 1999, the EU dedicated two paragraphs to clarifying its position on a 
fund. In the first, the EU highlights the alternatives to a fund:   
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stresses the importance and wide spectrum of existing financial structures […] 
(Presidency of the EU, 1999: para. 3).  
 
Then the EU emphasises the disadvantages of a fund:   
 
A special fund for international co-operation to promote SFM would 
counteract the needed mainstreaming of funding within existing instruments 
and would itself not secure increased funding (Presidency of the EU, 1999: 
para. 3).  
 
In the internal preparations for the fourth session of the Forum, the EU 
stressed that any language about “new and additional financing” was 
unacceptable (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999c). In drafting the EU’s 
position on financial issues for this negotiation session, the Presidency 
expressed that:  
 
To consider the possibility of creating an international fund is not acceptable 
to the EU and it does not reflect consensus and should be deleted (Presidency 
of the EU, 2000, para. 12e).  
 
On this issue, the EU was united. During the main negotiation session, 
the issue of a global forest fund became contentious. The EU tried to 
transfer this issue and other difficult financial issues under element III
30, 
in order to focus the issues. The goal was to achieve a better overview of 
the consequences and conditions for the improvement of existing 
mechanisms. However, the G77 could not accept this and presented a 
counter-proposal, which still contained clear demands on a forest fund 
and GEF adjustment. The EU considered this a step-back in the 
negotiations and rejected the proposal. The result of the negotiations was 
that the final document contained text stating the forum discussed but 
could not agree on the three proposed measures regarding financing of 
sustainable forest management (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 2000: 7-9). 
The other two were related to the international fund: to assess and 
develop new improved financial mechanisms and assess if existing 
                                                 
30  Programme element III International arrangements and mechanisms to promote the 
management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests  
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sustainable forest management and possibly widen the mandate for these 
mechanisms (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 2000: 8) 
 
During the UNFF, the EU’s position on a fund remained solidly against 
any new financial mechanisms. The EU reiterated the importance of 
making sustainable forest management self-financed in the long-term and 
ensured its devotion and commitment to development cooperation. The 
EU also acknowledged the continuing need for ODA flows, especially to 
the poorest countries (Presidency of the EU, 2001; Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 2001). Facing the first session of the UNFF, the EU’s 
opinion was that the deliberations of financial issues should focus mainly 
on what could be done at the national and regional levels (Presidency of 
the EU, 2001). 
 
The EU’s internal discussions reveal a stern position with strong rhetoric 
on the issue. An internal position paper states:  
 
It should be underlined that the UNFF is not the forum to discuss and agree 
upon financing for development with focus on forestry, but to develop 
polices to enhance the effectiveness of existing financial resources and support 
the creation of an enabling environment for investments (EU Draft position 
paper, 2003).  
 
Similar thoughts were expressed when preparing the strategy for the 
expert group meeting:  
 
There will be a discussion on a “global forest fund”, but it is paramount that 
there is no mutual understanding or position within the EU on the issue of 
creating a new financial mechanism. Any agreement on such a mechanism 
would depend on much broader policy decisions. Therefore, the EU will 
clearly flag its reservations in case such recommendation is elaborated by the 
ad-hoc working group (EU Draft position paper, 2003). 
31 
 
                                                 
31 This statement has complicated wording, which can be somewhat confusing. The meaning 
of “there is no mutual understanding or position within the EU on the issue of creating a 
new financial mechanism” is that there is an agreement among the member state not to 
create a new financial mechanism.  
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”The EU reiterated that it could not accept any new international 
[financial] mechanism” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005b). 
Also, in the EU preparations for UNFF7, the familiar position of not 
creating new structures was revisited and the EU emphasised its 
favouring of strengthening and adapting already existing instruments. 
”The EU needs to consider possible options with regard to means of 
implementation,  inter alia as a bargaining chip to achieve a strong 
instrument” (EU Non-paper, 2007).  
 
For the EU, negotiations on a global forest fund entailed a much 
manoeuvring and this resulted in two tracks of bargaining. First, it was 
important for the EU to be clear that it could not agree on a forest fund. 
At the same time, the EU did not want to appear negative when 
denying additional ODA. Typically, the “no” was sweetened in such 
statements as:  
 
ODA will of course remain of great importance in securing SFM, and the 
EU confirms that it will continue to play a leading role in providing ODA in 
the forest sector (Presidency of the EU, 1996: para. 5).  
 
The EU also cautioned that:  
 
development finance must however continue to become more targeted and 
co-ordinated, […] with a particular emphasis on supporting local and private 
funding on generation of revenues from the forests themselves (Presidency of 
the EU, 1996: para. 7).  
 
The second track was a strategy to connect the forest fund to the 
convention. In response to the demands for new and additional 
resources, inter alia a forest fund, during the IPF, the EU tried to link the 
issue to a convention with both “carrots and sticks”. In a non-paper, the 
EU emphasised the possibility to allocate funding to forests would 
increase with an agreement on a convention:  
 
The European Community also increased its specific financing for tropical 
forests in the hope that eventually a convention would be adopted. A 
convention could provide a framework for funding arrangement and might 
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levels (EU Non-paper on financial matters, 1997: para. 3).  
 
Simultaneously, the EU highlighted that for increased funding a 
convention required: “Without a convention this money may be 
allocated to other purposes” (EU Non-paper on financial matters, 1997: 
para. 5). The following also reflects the EU’s strategy:  
 
Without a convention it is a real danger of forests slipping down the list of 
ODA priorities in favour of other sectors with a clear framework for 
action”(EU Non-paper on financial matters, 1997: para. 5).  
 
At the same time, the EU was unwilling to concede on a new forest 
fund: ”The EU rejects a new financial mechanism within the framework 
of a convention and stresses that the financial needs to achieve 
sustainable forest management should as much as possible be reached by 
mobilization of national resources, including incomes from the forest 
sector and foreign investments. Sustainable forest management can also 
lead to access to new markets for forest products” (Swedish Ministry of 
Industry, 1997a: 8). Hence, the EU was eager to assert the opportunities 
of increased financial flows, if a convention would come into place, but 
was unwilling to promise new additional resources in the form of a fund. 
The EU was resisting a global forest fund throughout the negotiation 
process, and appeared dedicated to maintaining this position.  
6.4  The Outcome of the Negotiations  
To summarise the outcome, the long debate over a global forest fund 
did not result in the establishment of such fund. The reports from the 
IPF and the IFF state it was not possible to reach consensus on the issue 
of a global forest fund (ECOSOC, 2000a; ECOSOC, 1997b). In the 
report of UNFF 5, there is a list of alternative sources of funding to 
consider, reflecting the inability to agree on the topic (ECOSOC, 2005). 
At the sixth session of the Forum, the issue of a global fund survived for 
the first time in the report (ECOSOC, 2006). As mentioned above, the 
non-legally binding instrument does not contain concrete text on a 
future funding mechanism or fund, but the draft ECOSOC resolution 
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(ECOSOC, 2007). (See Table 9. for an overview).  
 
Generally, the outcome reflects the disagreement between those who 
wished to establish a forest fund and those who resisted such and instead 
stressed the importance of utilising existing resources. The moves for a 
global forest fund failed; the small victory for this camp was future 
considerations of financing mechanisms. However, the language in the 
outcome documents emphasises the voluntarily character of a potential 
new financial mechanism. Thus, the outcome of the negotiations on the 
global forest fund reflects developed countries aversion to a fund; they 
could agree to keep the word fund on the future agenda as long it was 
voluntarily, but not to making commitments for new resources.  
 
Table 9: Overview of the outcome of the negotiations on a global forest fund. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) 
 
The Panel also discussed the proposal that an international fund be established […] without a 
consensus being reached on those or other possible procedures: 
68 (a) To urge the establishment of such a fund; 
68 (b) To invite the international community to discuss the proposal; 
68 (c) To pursue action to enhance funding in other ways, inter alia, as proposed in paragraph 
67 (f) above (ECOSOC, 1997b: 26, para 68). 
 
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) 
 
The Forum discussed but was not able to reach consensus on the following proposals for 
action: 
(a) Continue further exploration, identification, and development of new and improved and 
more effective financial mechanisms, and further explore the potential and results of 
innovative use of existing mechanisms […] and sharing experience and information on such 
mechanisms; 
(b) Create an international forest fund to support, inter alia, the additional costs during the 
transition period towards sustainable forest management (ECOSOC, 2000a, para. 31) 
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(g) Creating a global forest fund through new and additional financial resources on a 
voluntary basis; or 
(g) alt Creating a global forest fund as part of the United Nations Forum on Forests Trust 
Fund or 
(g) alt2 Inviting the governing body of the National Forest Programme facility hosted by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to establish a fund to support 
national actions to implement sustainable forest management; 
(g) alt2 bis Also inviting the governing body of the Programme of Forests hosted by the 
World Bank to establish a fund to facilitate collaborative work among members of the 
Collaborative Partnership on Forests at global and regional levels; 
(g) alt2 ter Urging countries to contribute to the National Forest Programme facility and the 
Programme of Forests for these specific purposes as mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above; 
(ECOSOC, 2005, para. 5) 
 
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF 6) 
 
 (e) Assessing and reviewing the current funding mechanisms, including, if appropriate, the 
possibility of setting up a voluntary global funding mechanism as a contribution towards 
achieving the global objectives and implementing sustainable forest management (ECOSOC, 
2006, para. 5e) 
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF 7) 
 
Decides to develop and consider, with a view to adopting at the eighth session of the Forum, 
a voluntary global financial mechanism/portfolio approach/forest financing framework for all 
types of forests, aiming at mobilizing significantly increased, new and additional resources 
from all sources, based on existing and emerging innovative approaches, also taking into 
account assessments and reviews of current financial mechanisms, to support the 
implementation of sustainable forest management, the achievement of the global objectives 
on forests and the implementation of the non-legally binding instrument on all types of 
forests (ECOSOC, 2007, para.4) 
 
 
6.5  Analysis of the EU’s Influence on the Negotiations of a 
Global Forest Fund 
As the foregoing discussion outlines, the most important goal for the EU 
was to avoid the creation of a global forest fund: this goal was clearly 
achieved in the beginning of the process, as the documents in Table 8 
highlight. The decision to create a voluntary fund should not be seen as 
a concession from the EU: the amendment “voluntary” substantially 
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the EU tried to have the issue removed from the agenda by emphasising 
evaluation of existing mechanisms and funds. Most likely, the EU 
wanted to establish there were no new resources available, and move the 
focus towards other alternative sources of funding and towards more 
efficient use of existing resources. The issue of a forest fund resurfaced at 
every session, with the same arguments and counter-arguments. Hence, 
the EU was unable to fulfil this goal, i.e. it had less influence on the 
process (described as “get the issue off the agenda” in Table 10). 
However, the EU managed to achieve its most important goal in these 
negotiations: no new financial mechanisms or funds were established, i.e. 
it had influence on the outcome in this case. This goal attainment is 
indicative of the EU as being influential in this case.  
 
 
Table 10: Summary of the EU’s goal achievement regarding the global forest fund.  
Goal of the EU  Achieved   Partly 
achieved  
Not achieved 
 
Not to create a 
global forest fund 
X     
Get the issue off the 
agenda 
   X 
 
 
6.6  Interest-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
In this case, the EU had influence and in this section interests and 
preferences are examined in order to explain this outcome. The 
foregoing discussion shows that the EU held a collective preference 
throughout the whole negotiation process against creating a global forest 
fund. The preference is identified in various documents. In particular, 
internal discussions reveal the preference against the establishment of a 
forest fund, e.g.: “there is no mutual understanding or position within 
the EU on the issue of creating a new financial mechanism.” (EU Draft 
position paper, 2003) and ”The EU reiterated that it could not accept 
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Foreign Affairs, 2005b). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the strength of the preference is related to 
actors’ interests. Here, the EU’s the underlying interests are examined to 
determine whether they strengthened the preference the EU held 
regarding the global forest fund.  The issue of a global forest fund is 
intimately linked to developing assistance, an area related to several 
different interests, which makes identification of interests complex. In 
general, development policy entails the transfer of financial resources for 
economic and social development and involves political considerations, 
such as the promotion of human rights and democracy assistance 
(Carbone, 2008). Thus, ODA involves a wide range of applicable 
interests and not all are material in character, e.g. poverty alleviation, 
colonial ties, market access, and environmental goals such as reducing 
the ecological footprint and spreading sustainable forest management. 
However, when examining the strategy the EU pursued in this case, i.e. 
stressing the importance of private funding for sustainable forest 
management, it is possible to link the preference against a forest fund to 
economic interests.  
 
On several occasions in the negotiations, the EU emphasised the 
importance of making sustainable forest management self-financing. 
There are two advantages to this, costs of improvement of forests would 
be covered by funding outside governmental budgets, and markets are 
created for environmentally sound technologies. Hence, economic 
interests stand out as important in this case. However, this might 
oversimplify the EU’s interests, as the EU also is dedicated to 
development and environmental goals. The complex linkages to other 
areas dilute the connection between the material interest and the 
preference to some extent. However, the EU’s strong focus on self-
financing indicates that economic interests are of importance in this case. 
Thus, interests are considered as an indicator of how important the 
preference is for the EU.  
 
The analysis of the unity of the member states does not reveal division 
among the member states regarding this preference. On the contrary, the 
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from internal EU meetings. The absence of discussion, and internal 
discussions mainly focused on tactics, indicate accordance among the 
member states. This perception is further strengthened in the 
formulations in position papers, for instance:   
 
[…] there is no mutual understanding or position within the EU on the issue 
of a new financial mechanism. […] the EU will clearly flag its reservations in 
case such recommendation is elaborated by the ad-hoc working group (EU 
Draft position paper, 2003)  
 
The EU reiterated that it could not accept any new international [financial] 
mechanism (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005b).  
 
The fact that no member state objected to these straightforward 
formulations indicates alignment among the member states. Hence, the 
perception is that there was a unity among the member states. The 
preference also appears to have been consistent throughout the entire 
process. Of the scenarios outlined in Chapter Two (see Section 2.4 and 
Table 2.), scenario 1 applies to this situation: If all member states have 
the same preference and this preference is strong, the EU should be 
influential as it will act on its position of strength and unity. As 
mentioned before, it is not likely that all member states hold identical 
preferences, but in this case there was no divergence among the member 
states on this topic. They even appeared remarkably united on the issue 
of a global forest fund.  
 
The member states held the same strong preference against the 
establishment of a forest fund, and the EU did not consider this an 
option. In addition, the interest underlying the preference increased the 
strength of the preference. Hence, in this case, the collective EU 
preference was strong and the EU was influential. Thus, interests and 
preferences explain the outcome. The EU acted from a position of 
strength and could influence the outcome. In this case, the explanatory 
strength of this factor is high.  
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The theoretical framework predicts that the EU should be influential if a 
combination of the attributes in the institutional structure and the 
negotiation context was favourable. In addition, competence and 
negotiating strategy could affect the outcome. The issue of financing 
sustainable development crosses the boundaries of a number of policy 
areas, such as environment, development, and trade. In this case, 
competence is shared; hence, the Presidency represented the EU in 
financial discussions and there were no discussions on competence in this 
case. The mandate for negotiations on the fund does not directly express 
that no fund should be created, in fact the forest fund is barely 
mentioned in the Council conclusions. Instead, the formulations of the 
mandate brought up financial issues in general terms, but with a clear 
emphasis on making sustainable forest management self-financing, the 
importance of several complementary sources of funding, and to 
strengthen  existing financial mechanisms (see below). The negotiating 
mandate did not explicitly state the EU should avoid a fund. Instead of 
stating what the EU wanted in the negotiations (no global forest fund), 
the mandate stressed the alternatives the EU favoured.  
 
The negotiation mandate for the negotiations on the global forest fund 
could be found in the Council conclusions of 2002, 2005, and 2007:  
 
Underlines that one of the main challenges to achieving sustainable forest 
management is to make it self financing in the long run. Public, private, 
domestic and international sources have complementary roles in achieving 
this goal (Council of the European Union, 2002: para. 5).  
 
[…] notes in this respect that financing arrangements for achievement of 
sustainable forest management require strengthening and access to financial 
resources at the international level. Existing mechanisms at global, regional 
and national level should be further strengthened and supported by current 
bilateral and multilateral programmes (Council of the European Union, 
2005a, 8305/05: para. 16; Council of the European Union, 2005b, para.16). 
 
ACKNOWLEDGES the continued need to strengthen and adapt existing 
financing sources in support of SFM and STRESSES in this regard that 
creating an enabling environment for financing of SFM and incorporating 
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cross-cutting strategies are indispensable for achieving SFM; RECOGNISES 
that a value-added NLBI, as described above, will also require the 
development of new mechanisms and innovative ways of efficient SFM 
financing from all sources; CONSIDERS that further coordination of 
international and public forest-related funding is needed and that UNFF7 
should invite the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank and 
other financing institutions and mechanisms to come forward with proposals 
to that effect (Council of the European Union, 2007, paras. 10-12). 
 
This phrasing of the mandate provided a general written formulation 
regarding financial issues and it is problematic to explicitly word the 
mandate so as to avoid a fund. That would be undiplomatic and generate 
a negative image of the EU. However, even if there was a lack of 
explicitness, the mandate expresses what the EU should work towards in 
the negotiations on the fund. The emphasis in the mandate on “self-
financing”, “public and private sources”, and “further strengthening of 
existing mechanisms” indicates what the EU wanted in these 
negotiations. Thus, the mandate is restrictive in the sense that it is quite 
obvious what the EU wanted and what it could accept. The mandate for 
the seventh session of UNFF was slightly different in that the EU 
recognised the non-legally binding instrument would require new 
financing mechanisms. However, the need to strengthen existing 
financing and discussing financing from different sources was still 
emphasised. This should be seen in the light of that the new mechanism 
to be discussed in future sessions is voluntary. 
 
The perception of a narrow mandate is further strengthened by internal 
EU discussions on strategy. The mandate was not discussed in the 
Council working group meetings, all member states appeared to agree 
on the problems connected with creating a new fund. In addition, a 
decision of a forest fund goes beyond what can be decided in the 
Council working group on forestry as outlined above by the following 
quote:  
 
 
 
 
  157 Any agreement on such a mechanism would depend on much broader policy 
decisions. Therefore, the EU will clearly flag its reservations in case such 
recommendation is elaborated by the ad-hoc working group (EU Draft 
position paper, 2003).  
 
This indicated the EU could not make a decision on a fund in this 
context as its decision depended on a broader EU decision-making 
context. In summary, the EU’s mandate for the negotiations on a global 
forest fund was narrow, which did not allow the EU to move from its 
position.  
 
The EU’s position in this case is against creating a fund and thereby 
against change. The negotiation context of the global forest fund is 
considered to be conservative where the EU’s orientation is to defend 
the status quo. Turning to the predictions outlined in Chapter Two (see 
Section 2.5), this situation resembles with scenario 1: If the negotiating 
mandate is narrow and the position is conservative, the EU should be 
influential, as the EU has strict orders to defend a position. The 
combination of a narrow negotiating mandate and a conservative case, 
proved to be beneficial for the EU’s influence in the case of a global 
forest fund. The EU could not be flexible in these negotiations. The 
strategy used in this case, i.e. shift the attention towards alternatives and 
arguing that a decision on a fund could not be taken in the context of 
the forest negotiations, further strengthened the EU on this topic. The 
EU managed to make the constraining institutional structures an 
advantage.  Institutional structures have explanatory power in this case, 
as the EU had influence.  
 
6.8  Ideational-based Explanation of the EU’s Influence 
As aforementioned, the EU’s influence can, in addition to interests, 
preferences and institutional structures, be analysed through ideational 
frameworks. This approach allows examination of how the EU framed 
its policy choice and whether or not this framing nested with broader 
meta-cultural values. The section follows the same procedure as the 
analysis of ideas in the other issue cases: first the policy frames and meta-
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frame that dominated the negotiations, then the EU’s framing of the 
issue of a global forest fund and the nesting of its frame is analysed. Table 
11 provides an overview of the frames.  
 
The actors in the negotiations on the global forest fund appeared to have 
constructed the problem they wanted to address in two different ways. 
The first emphasises better use of existing resources and innovative use 
of existing mechanisms (ECOSOC, 2000a). This underlines the 
perspective that sustainable forest management should be made self-
financing in the long run. Public and private sources of funding have 
complementary roles in achieving this goal (Council of the European 
Union, 2002). The second way of constructing the problem stresses that 
a global forest fund is necessary for achieving sustainable forest 
management as new resources are needed in this area. A fund would 
contribute to resources directly to forest management, which would 
enable developing countries to combat deforestation and forest 
degradation (ENB, 1997). Two policy frames represents these views and 
they emphasises the theme of the debate: the existing resources frame 
and the new resources frame. Thus, the existing resources frame 
constructed the problem in terms of existing resources not being used 
efficiently and the new resources frame constructed the problem as a lack 
of resources for financing sustainable forest management. According to 
this frame, the problem was not that existing resources were used 
inefficiently; it was a matter of insufficient resources.  
 
The next step in the analysis is to identify the meta-level frame from 
which the policy frames are derived. The arguments used in the 
negotiations are recognisable from the broader debate on how to finance 
sustainable development in general. As the preceding discussion has 
outlined, this debate focuses on issues of where funding should come 
from, how much is needed and how it should be allocated. As outlined 
in the beginning of the chapter, this debate origin from questions of 
responsibility for environmental degradation, and ultimately concerns 
over equity issues. The argument is that existing resources are not 
efficiently used, opposed by the argument that existing resources are not 
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interview:  
 
The discussion on financial issues in the UNFF is the same as in all 
environmental negotiations. Either existing ODA is not sufficient to finance 
implementation of agreements etc, or the existing funding is not used 
efficiently (Interview no. 49).  
 
The negotiations on financial issues in general appear to have focused on 
these opposing perspectives:  
 
The question is not one of efficiency, but whether enough resources have 
been mobilized to measure up to the task at hand” (ENB: 1995: 5) 
 
Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of available resources for SFM (ENB: 
2000:4). 
 
The two dichotomous metaphors dominating in this case appear to be: 
sufficiency versus efficiency. The negotiations on the global forest fund 
are a version of these meta-level frames. Calls for “new and additional 
resources” found support in the sufficiency frame, which asserted 
concerns of equity and responsibility for environmental degradation. The 
sufficiency frame had dominated forest negotiations before 1995, and 
continued to be influential in this process. However, over time, the 
efficiency frame became more influential in the process, as the moral 
advantage of the sufficiency frame appeared to be undermined due to 
developments in other environmental processes (Interview no. 55). At 
the beginning of the forest process, the developed countries learned to 
exploit the efficiency frame in financial discussions. They were 
uncomfortable being placed in a situation of constantly denying 
developing countries demands for new and additional funding. Instead, 
they started to stress alternative funding and efficiency (see also 
Humphreys, 2006).  
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Table 11: Policy frames and meta-level frames in the negotiations on a global forest 
fund.  
 
Meta-level frame 
 
Efficiency 
 
Sufficiency 
 
 
Policy frame 
 
Existing resources 
 
New resources 
 
 
 
The EU’s policy frame is the existing resources frame. In identifying this 
policy frame, it was possible to distinguish how the EU clearly expressed 
its preferred policy option: not to establish a global forest fund. In 
pursuing this objective, the EU highlighted the need of using existing 
resources more efficiently. This was further proved by the EU’s 
manoeuvring in order to achieve its goal. The EU appeared to draw 
attention to the disadvantages of a fund and highlighted the alternatives 
to a fund instead of clearly stating no to the suggested policy, e.g. “a 
forest fund would counteract mainstreaming of existing funding 
mechanisms” (ENB, 1999: 5) and “the limitations existing international 
financial arrangements and funds have in supporting sustainable forest 
management” (ENB, 1999: 4). The argument of efficiency was also 
used: ”promoting effective utilization of available financial resources” 
(ENB: 1999: 4). 
  
The other policy frame that dominated the negotiations, the new resources 
frame, was used by the actors advocating a forest fund in view of the need 
for new resources. Although most developing countries are supportive of 
private sector investment, many emphasise it should not be a substitute for 
ODA (ENB, 1998). As the foregoing discussion outlined, the claim for a 
global forest fund rests on UNCED promises: ”new and additional financial 
resources should be provided to developing countries to enable them to 
sustainably manage, conserve and develop their forest resources” (United 
Nations, 1992: para. 10). This frame highlights the most favourable policy 
option in this context which is the creation of an international forest fund as 
a financial mechanism to promote sustainable forest management. Hence, in 
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nested its policy frame to the dominating meta-level frame. In the 
theoretical framework, this situation equals scenario 1 outlined in Chapter 
Two, Section 2.6: The EU manages to nest its policy specific frame to the 
broader meta-level frame, and that framing is reflected in outcomes. This 
suggests that the EU’s framing effort enabled a greater degree of influence.  
The EU frames the problem in a manner that makes it appear credible and 
more convincing in the context of prevailing values. Thus, the explanatory 
power of this factor is high in the case of a global forest fund.  
6.9  Implications of the EU’s Influence in the Case of a Global 
Forest Fund  
This case sheds light on how the EU was influential in preventing the 
creation of a fund. The reasons for not creating a forest fund may be 
legitimate. Such a decision can depend on broader policy decisions and it 
may be impossible for policy-makers to agree on new funding in this 
particular negotiation process. The outcome of the forest negotiation 
process in general has been vague. The process has not resulted in 
mechanisms for implementation or compliance. Therefore, new financial 
resources may be seen as wasted without a better structure. However, 
the establishment of a financial mechanism dedicated to forests could 
have strengthened the cooperation in this policy area. A fund would 
have been part of an institutional framework for forests, which might 
have boosted international cooperation. A cooperative process without 
funding renders difficulties to be constructive and fostering compliance 
(Chasek et al. 2006). The EU’s strong influence in this case did not 
contribute to stronger cooperation in the forest area, even if its reasons 
for not establishing a fund may have been rational. As a result, there is 
no special fund ear-marked specifically for sustainable forest 
management. 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
The analysis of negotiations on a global forest fund reveals that the EU 
had influence. The EU was firmly against the creation of a fund. As the 
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concluded that the EU had influence in this case, but had less influence 
on the process, as it did not manage to have the issue removed from the 
agenda. The EU held a strong preference for not creating a fund. The 
interests linked to the preference were difficult to identify due to the 
complex linkages between development and other policy areas. 
However, the primary interest was found to be investments and trade, 
hence, economic interest which strengthened the preference. In further 
understanding the strength of the preference, the member states were 
considered and it was found that they shared the same preference and 
there was no sign of divisions on this issue.  
 
The institutional structures were beneficial, the combination of a narrow 
negotiating mandate and a conservative orientation of the EU proved to 
be an advantage. The policy frames identified in this context were: the 
new resources frame and the existing resources frame. The first 
constructed the problem in terms of lack of resources for financing 
sustainable forest management. According to this frame, the problem was 
not the inefficient use of existing resources, but a matter of insufficient 
resources and it nested with the meta-level frame of sufficiency. The 
existing resources frame shaped the understanding that existing resources 
were not used in an efficient manner. The arguments derived from this 
frame also stressed the importance of increasing the number of sources of 
funding. This policy frame nested with the meta-level frame of 
efficiency, which was identified as the policy frame of the EU. The 
broader context of this case revealed a debate on how to finance 
sustainable development in general. The debate concerned where 
funding should come from, how much is needed and how it should be 
allocated.  
 
The EU was influential in the negotiations on the global forest fund and 
it was explained by the theoretical framework. The EU was united 
through a strong preference and, the institutions enabled its action, and 
the framing of the issue nested with a broader, dominating frame. In this 
case, the EU’s strong influence did not contribute to strengthened 
cooperation.  
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Over the past two decades, scholarly attention to global environmental 
politics has increased tremendously. With that attention has come a 
newfound understanding of this relatively young policy area. However, 
there are still several gaps in the understanding of processes, issues, and 
actors in this area which demand further analysis. This study has shed 
new light on the EU and its role in global forest policymaking. An initial 
review of the literature on this topic revealed a number of assumptions, 
some of them contradictory. One often repeated maxim is that the EU is 
a consistently powerful actor in environmental cooperation. On the few 
occasions when it is not, failure to influence tends to be attributed rather 
simply to divided member states positions. In the specific area of global 
forest policymaking, two contradictory claims are made. The first stresses 
the EU’s unity and influence in this case (Jokela, 2006). The second 
argue that although the EU had influence, it has not been a leader as it 
was hampered by internal divisions in the forest case (Chaban et al. 
2006; see also Vogler, 2005). Against this contradictory background, and 
considering the EU’s traditional success in global environmental forums, 
this thesis aimed to explain the extent to which the EU exerted 
influence in this case. 
 
The thesis built an explanatory framework capable of illuminating the 
complex factors acting against the EU’s exercise of influence. A central 
premise of the framework held that the EU’s influence on both process 
and outcomes, were best explained by focusing on the interests and 
preferences of its member states, the institutional rules that affect EU 
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take place. It is the combined effect of these factors on the EU’s 
influence, the approach suggested, that best explains the EU’s role in 
these negotiations. The framework was applied to three cases within the 
global forest negotiations: the issue of a legally binding instrument, 
certification for forest products, and a global fund for financing forest 
management. In-depth analysis of each case revealed varying degrees of 
EU influence, shaped largely, but not entirely, by the proposed factors 
outlined in the explanatory framework. This concluding chapter 
summarises the thesis chapters, revisits the research question, and 
discusses the utility of the approach and the implications of the findings. 
It also addresses limitations of the study and offers suggestions for future 
research.  
 
7.1  Overview of Thesis Chapters and Empirical Findings 
Chapter Two outlined the theoretical framework used to guide the 
analysis of the case studies. The central concept of this study was 
identified and operationalised in outlining and elaborating the concept of 
“influence”. How to define influence and how influence is best 
measured were discussed. To make the concept analytically manageable, 
the study used a narrowly focused definition of influence. To specify the 
conditions affecting the EU’s influence, or lack of influence, in the cases, 
three bodies of literature were utilised: interest-based, institution-based, 
and idea-based approaches. Interest-based approaches explain outcomes 
by focusing on the actor, and what factors shapes its preferences. 
Drawing on this literature, interests and preferences were found as 
important for influence. Here, the thesis made the argument that when 
an actor holds a strong preference, it should be influential as it makes the 
actor devoted to achieving its goals and less inclined to deviate from its 
goals. Institution-based explanations provided an insight into how an 
actor can be enabled or constrained by its institutional structures. These 
explanations showed how the EU’s institutional features, in combination 
with contextual variables, could affect its influence. Finally, idea-based 
explanations emphasised the importance of understanding that political 
outcomes must be understood in the light of ideational frameworks, 
  166 which are divided into different levels of abstraction. To explain 
influence from this perspective, the concepts of “frames” and “nesting” 
were utilized. The central argument was that the EU’s influence could 
be understood as how well it nested its policy frame with the prevailing 
meta-level frame. From these three explanatory factors, predictions were 
derived that were used in the three case studies. If the EU’s preference 
for a policy choice is strong, it should be influential; if the EU’s 
institutional structures enable the EU in the negotiations, it should be 
influential; and the better and more convincing the EU can frame an 
issue in the negotiations, the more the EU will be influential.  
 
Chapter Three provided the overarching context for the thesis by 
placing the forest negotiations in a broader framework of global 
environmental politics. The positioning of the forest issue on the 
international political agenda and how this took place was examined, as 
was the EU’s role in global environmental issues, its development, and 
how it came to be involved in global forest policy. The chapter thus 
provides a background of how forest negotiations have evolved and how 
they are pursued by global actors. This contextual discussion is crucial 
for understanding EU participation in this context, and what “successful” 
outcomes usually represent. 
 
The remainder of the thesis applied the explanatory framework 
developed in Chapter Two to the sub-cases in the international forest 
negotiations. Those sub-cases are the respective subjects of chapters 
Chapter Four (a legally binding instrument), Chapter Five (certification), 
and Chapter Six (a global forest fund). Table 12 provides an overview of 
the findings.  
 
Chapter Four analysed the EU’s influence on the issue of a legally 
binding instrument. The EU’s position in the negotiations was 
favourable to creating such instrument. However, the EU did not have 
influence in imposing its agenda of the creation of a legally binding 
instrument. In this case, the EU’s interests and preference were too weak 
to make the EU powerful in the negotiations. Its institutional structures 
did not enable influence, but rather constrain it. The way the EU 
constructed its policy solution proved to be nesting with the less 
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dominating meta-level frame, hence, the EU’s framing of the issue was 
not “good enough”. The EU managed to keep the issue on the agenda, 
and had some influence over the process, but it did not manage to fulfil 
its most important goal. 
 
Chapter Five examined the case of certification in the international forest 
negotiations. In this case, the EU argued for the importance of this tool 
as market based, and worked hard to ensure that any certification scheme 
would not be a barrier to trade. The negotiations ended in a “draw”, i.e. 
the outcome was a compromise as both sides had stern positions. The 
EU had some, but limited, influence. This case provided a more difficult 
case for the theoretical framework. According to the interest- and 
institution-based predictions, the EU should have been influential. The 
situations of strong preference and enabling institutions created 
facilitating conditions for the EU in the negotiations on certification. 
The EU managed to nest its frame to one of the dominant meta-level 
frames, but the co-existence of another meta-level frame eroded that 
effect. Even so, the factors indicated a strong and influential EU that 
should have been able to act forcefully and convince opponents of its 
position. However, the outcome of limited influence suggested the 
explanatory power of the framework was lower in this case.  
 
In Chapter Six the case of a global forest fund was analysed. This case 
concerned the creation of a global forest fund for financing sustainable 
forest management. The EU was firmly against the creation of a fund 
and the negotiations did not lead to the establishment of a forest fund. 
The EU had influence in this case. This case appeared well explained by 
the theoretical framework. The EU had a strong, united preference, the 
institutions enabled its action, and the framing of the issue nested with a 
broader, dominating frame. Hence, the EU had its act together and was 
influential.  T
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97.2  The Research Question Revisited 
This thesis aimed to improve understanding of the EU’s role in 
international forest policy discussions between 1995 and 2007. The 
research question posed was the extent to which the EU exercised 
influence over the process and outcomes of the international forest 
negotiations. In asking that question, the thesis was also interested in 
which factors operate to enable or constrain the EU’s influence. 
Through building a framework integrating three different approaches to 
explaining EU influence in global policy discussion, and then applying 
that framework to three issue cases within the international forest 
negotiations, answers to the questions could be given. The EU exercised 
influence over the process and outcomes of the global forest negotiations 
to a considerable degree. However, that influence varied in each case.  
 
As preceding discussion showed: in the first case (that of a legal 
instrument), the EU had little to no influence. This outcome could 
largely be explained by the predictions of the explanatory framework: 
the EU’s collective preference for its position was weak, it was 
constrained by its institutional structures, and it did not frame the issue 
in a way that resonated with prevailing meta-level frames. In the second 
case (that of certification of forest products), the EU had a medium level 
of influence. This outcome proved more difficult to explain with the 
explanatory framework. The EU had a strong preference, but the 
institutional structures of the EU should have enabled it to exercise 
influence. Moreover, the EU managed to nest its frame within a meta-
level frame. The predictions of the explanatory framework would have 
suggested considerable EU influence, but the EU failed to influence the 
process in its preferred way and had little affect on the outcome.  
 
One potential explanation for this dissonance is that multiple meta-level 
frames existed in this case; as such, “nesting” frames was not an easy 
option and was subject to competition. Nevertheless, the explanatory 
framework was not as helpful in this case. In the third case (that of a 
global fund for forest management), the EU had strong influence in 
affecting an outcome concordant with its position. The EU’s influence 
  170 came about largely because it had a strong collective preference, EU 
institutional structures enabled it to act freely in the negotiations, and it 
succeeded in successfully nesting its preferred policy frame with the 
dominant meta-level frame. As such, the explanatory framework 
demonstrated considerable utility in explaining outcomes in this third 
case. 
 
Overall, the analysis in this thesis illustrates a differentiated but clear 
picture of EU influence over the process and outcomes of global forest 
negotiations. The EU was successful in furthering its position in most 
issue areas at most times of the process. When the “influence facilitators” 
of aligned interests, enabling institutions and nested ideas can be found, 
the EU tends to be influential. When those facilitating factors are not 
present, the EU cannot easily influence either process or outcome. 
 
The findings here thus caution against assumptions of the EU’s weak 
influence in the global forest negotiations. On the contrary, in some 
areas the EU was very influential. Indeed, the EU influenced outcomes 
on two of the most important issues in the negotiations. At the same 
time, these findings repudiate the finding that the EU was uniformly 
influential in these negotiations. Assessment of the EU’s influence in the 
three cases demonstrates that the EU had different “influence profiles” in 
different issues, even within the same negotiation process. Thus, when 
the EU’s influence was enabled by all three components, the EU had the 
highest level of influence and when all three components constrained the 
EU, it had the lowest level of influence. 
 
Moreover, findings reveal that explaining EU influence (or lack thereof) 
only in terms of divided member state positions is too crude. Although 
member state positions are important, as a simple explanation it only 
provides a partial picture of outcomes. Equally important were the EU’s 
institutional structures, which were shown to affect the EU’s influence 
under most conditions. Moreover, how the EU framed their position in 
broader meta-level frames and prevailing public sentiments was an 
important determinate of influence.  
 
  171 It should be noted, as in the introductory chapter, that EU influence is 
not synonymous with an expansion in global environmental governance. 
In this case, the EU’s position was against the development of certain 
instruments (e.g. a global fund for forest management). By exercising 
influence, the EU effectively prevented the realisation of multilateral 
agreements. The EU’s influence is not always directed towards 
promoting environmental cooperation. In this negotiation process, the 
EU was more influential on weighty political issues, such as trade and 
finance, and in these issues, the EU did not use its influence to create 
stronger cooperation. On the contrary, its actions further deprived 
opportunities for cooperation. By the same token, the ambiguity related 
to the convention issue also showed that the EU appeared “half-hearted” 
in its attempt to strengthen the cooperation. Although the EU’s 
“constructive influence” is probably a necessary prerequisite for building 
international environmental regimes, evaluating that claim was beyond 
the scope of this study. However, the concern here was on influence per 
se rather than how that influence may or may not be related to the 
building of international environmental agreements. 
 
In short, this thesis revealed that the EU exercised considerable 
influence. The thesis found, more generally, that assessing the full extent 
of the EU’s influence requires a more in-depth explanatory framework 
of how the EU can exercise influence, and that framework must be 
applied to different dimensions of the discussions (negotiations) before a 
complete assessment can be made. Finally, the outcomes of the 
discussions remind us that EU influence is not always exercised in favour 
of more environmental policy making and governance regime building. 
 
7.3  Utility of the Approach 
Most studies of the EU in international environmental negotiations focus 
either on vague notions of EU leadership or very specific dynamics of 
EU negotiation skills. This thesis took a middle range approach focused 
on the question of influence. This question is usually avoided in most 
studies, considering the difficulties of defining and operationalising the 
concept. As noted above, recent theoretical discussions about influence 
  172 have concerned only the influence of non-state actors in international 
negotiations (see e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2001; Corell, 1999; Arts, 1998). 
In that research scholars complain of the lack of proper definition and 
operationalisation: ”It is surprising that few scholars defined what they 
mean by “influence”—the dependent variable of the studies they are 
undertaking. It is simply a discussion that is left out in most works” 
(Betsill and Corell, 2001: 68). In focusing on the EU, scholars have 
mainly been concerned with its odd “actorness” status and the various 
ways the EU displays leadership. Now that EU actorness is established as 
a phenomenon, it is more relevant to revisit the question of influence in 
the EU context. The task is not an easy one, as Heclo reminded us many 
years ago: ”identifying who has influence in messy, modern policy 
processes can be exceedingly difficult” (1978: 102). 
 
This study has taken a first cut at that challenge by defining influence in 
terms of changed processes and outcomes as a result of EU action. The 
concept was operationalised by first highlighting where influence 
traditionally derives, then presenting how to measure it, and finally the 
specific enablers and constraints on influence. It is the latter effort that 
represents the most significant contribution of the explanatory 
framework. By showing that influence is strongly dependant on interest 
-based concerns, institutional-based considerations and ideational-based 
factors, a framework for exploring the causal detail of EU influence is 
provided. The findings suggest the framework could be applied in other 
settings and in other issue areas with helpful effect. 
 
More generally, this study proves useful as a corrective for overly 
simplified accounts of EU influence in environmental negotiations. In 
previous studies, the EU’s failures are often explained by its internal 
divisions (Carter, 2007; Chaban et al. 2006; see also Vogler, 2005).These 
explanations have some explanatory strength and improve understanding 
of the outcomes. However, by explaining the EU’s influence through 
building a three-part explanatory framework, this study provides a 
useful, nuanced contribution to the existing literature. The framework 
cannot explain everything about the EU’s influence, but can provide a 
fuller picture than by reducing the EU’s lack of influence to a 
  173 consequence of internal differences among the member states and 
inflexible structures.  
 
7.4  Implications  
This study has implications for several different audiences. The following 
discussion identifies three audiences in particular: those interested in 
international forest policy per se, those interested in the practical aspects 
of the EU as a negotiating actor, and those interested in the theoretical 
implications of the EU in global governance.  
 
The study adds to the body of the literature focused on international 
forest negotiations. As aforementioned, earlier research describes the 
forest process as a failure, and weak in substantial outcomes and policy 
coordination (Dimitrov, 2006). The main focus has been to explain the 
absence of a legally binding instrument with the domination of principles 
of neoliberal free trade (Humphreys, 2006), with the unwillingness of 
the US (Davenport, 2005), and with the absence of reliable scientific 
information (Dimitrov, 2006). Only a handful of explanations have 
focused in detail on key actors in the process. By examining the EU, this 
study sheds light on one aspect of the failed negotiations. The EU did 
not act according to its normal behaviour in the global environmental 
area, which could explain the outcome of the negotiations to a certain 
extent. Its acting on these issues in the forest negotiation process 
confirms what other scholars have found, the actors appeared to have 
been uninterested in creating a strong regime in this area. Hence, this 
study highlighted that a key actor did not have a keen interest in strong 
international forest cooperation, despite supportive utterances.  
 
Given the outcome in this case, this study shows that a key actor, such as 
the EU, is important for the outcome of the negotiations. To understand 
these dynamics, it is crucial to understand that a key actor holds 
preferences, must operate within institutional structures, and must 
consider the effects of ideational frameworks. The functional goals of 
negotiating environmental agreements are important, but the behaviour 
of individual actors and their interaction is central for complete 
  174 understanding. For international forest policy processes, this study 
highlights the need to analyse both the practical needs of global forest 
management and the actors and political processes that intervene 
between intentions and outcomes.  
 
The EU in international negotiations is a central focus of this study. On 
a practical level, the message is that the EU needs to be aware of the 
interaction between the member states interests, the EU’s institutional 
structures, and how the issue at stake is defined and understood. In 
explaining the outcome, the factors have to be separated due to 
analytical reasons. In a negotiation, they can be difficult to separate. 
However, to be successful in negotiations, it is important to understand 
that there are several interconnected factors that constrain or enable the 
EU.  
 
In answering the question of the EU’s influence in the forest 
negotiations, this study enhanced understanding of the EU’s role as an 
international environmental actor. Although most scholars analyse cases 
of “successful” EU influence, this study targeted a case of apparent 
failure. EU influence must be carefully measured and assessed through 
several conditioning factors. Those factors must be equal if the EU is to 
exercise influence. For example, analysis of only the strength of 
distribution of preference among EU member states in a negotiation 
cannot provide all information about EU influence. Even if member 
states are closely aligned in their positions on an issue, institutional rules 
and ideational “consistency” in frameworks must also be conducive, if 
the EU is to exercise its full influence. The EU is not uniformly in 
favour of global environmental cooperation, especially if an issue is 
broken down into its negotiation components. On certain issues, the EU 
seeks to keep those issues off the agenda. In some cases, the EU may be 
successful, in others it may not. This study offers an explanatory utility 
for understanding the reasons why.  
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Although the explanatory framework devised in this thesis appears to 
have considerable utility, it cannot explain everything about the EU’s 
influence in international environmental negotiations. One reason for 
this is that the framework incorporates primarily internal variables, ones 
related to the EU’s internal dynamics. External factors are incorporated 
in terms of the focus on ideational frameworks, but other external 
variables, such as the power of the negotiation partners has not been 
incorporated. Other considerations, such as policy uncertainty or issue 
linkages have not been fully explored. 
 
In this respect, the findings of the case studies suggest that additional 
considerations might be added to future designs of the explanatory 
framework. In the case of certification for forest products, the 
framework had some difficulties in explaining the outcome of the EU’s 
limited influence. One reason for this may lie in the opponents’ position 
and the vagueness of the issue. In the case of the global forest fund, the 
framework succeeded in explaining EU influence. However, the 
position of opponents and geopolitical power frameworks undoubtedly 
contributed. For instance, the EU’s strength in economic affairs and its 
relative affluence made the negotiations asymmetric. The convention 
case was largely explained by the explanatory framework. However, in 
this case the EU’s lack of influence was probably affected by the stern 
resistance of opponents and the policy complexity of the forest issue, i.e. 
how to create a global agreement on forests. Hence, the framework did 
not allow analysis of the external variables that might have affected EU 
influence. In order to study influence in complex decision-making 
processes, a delimitation of factors is necessary.  
 
A second limitation of the framework is that it cannot explain how 
influence are exercised and on what resources. The definition of 
influence used in this study was analytically narrow and focused on the 
actor’s goal attainment. Although clear and relative parsimony, the 
approach leaves out interesting issues of what different kinds of influence 
the EU had in the negotiations (such as normative or economic 
influence), as well as how it wielded its influence. For instance, evidence 
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and the convention issue, which could have been explored further. 
However, the framework did not allow deeper analysis of the EU’s 
strategies in that regard. Hence, the framework makes it difficult to 
analyse all aspects of the EU’s influence in this case. Simultaneously, an 
analytical narrow definition makes the analysis more focused.  
 
One limitation to what this study reveals about the EU’s influence 
relates to the issue cases. As described in Chapter One, these sub-cases 
were selected because they represent high-profile issues in the global 
forest negotiations and are central to the development of a 
comprehensive agreement. Additional cases, perhaps associated with 
more practical forest policy concerns at “ground level” might prove a 
useful test of the value of the explanatory framework.   
 
7.6  Further Research 
The findings of this study suggest a need for further research in two 
broad areas. The first area relates to the explanatory framework. As the 
discussion of limitations shows, there are other factors that might 
intervene with the explanations studied in this thesis. Some of these 
factors have been studied in the context of the forest negotiations, but 
not explicitly connected to the EU. Future research could examine 
factors such as power asymmetry in negotiations and the adequacy of a 
global agreement on forests, and determine how these factors affect EU 
influence in the negotiations. Another topic related to the framework, is 
the definition of influence. Given the complexity of the negotiations, 
the narrow definition was meaningful in this study. However, future 
studies could broaden the definition of influence and include resources 
and the pursuit of influence, and apply it to a less complex case. To 
improve the knowledge of the EU in the area of global environmental 
politics, an integration of influence assessment with discussions on 
leadership would be beneficial.  
 
The second area is connected to case studies. The first, and most 
obvious, suggestion for future research is to add more case studies. This 
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assessment of the EU’s influence on other issues in the forest 
negotiations would further deepen understanding and provide a more 
solid basis for generalisation. Additional case analysis would evaluate the 
utility of the framework designed here and provide valuable insights into 
the similarities and differences in the way the EU manages “soft” and 
“hard” issues, i.e. issues in the negotiation process that not concern 
weighty political issues, such as trade and finance. How would interests, 
institutions, and ideas play out in “soft” cases? Such research could 
improve understanding of the EU generally. If future research takes the 
sources of influence and influence strategies into more focused account, 
a useful research design would be to compare if “hard” and “soft” cases 
differ on additional variables, such as the role of expert knowledge or 
norm diffusion.  
 
Another type of study could make a comparison between different 
international processes dealing with forest issues. With the same 
approach as in this study, but expand the number of cases would increase 
the understanding of the EU’s forest policy at the international level. 
Processes such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, International 
Tropical Timber Organization, and the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change all contain forest-related issues. The way the EU frames 
the “forest issue” in the different processes would certainly be different, 
and depending on which aspect of the forests are important, the 
institutional structures would have different impacts, as would the 
interests and preferences of the EU in each of these cases.  
 
7.7  Concluding remarks 
The EU’s role in international environmental negotiations is complex 
and conditioned by several factors, as confirmed by this study of global 
forest policy. A number of key explanatory factors need considering if 
we are to fully understand the EU’s influence and thus to develop a 
nuanced understanding of the EU’s more general role. In many respects, 
the EU “has arrived” as a global actor on the world stage, meaning that 
studying and measuring its exercise of influence should be a top concern 
  178 amongst researchers. In this case, analysis not only improves 
understanding of the EU, but also the EU’s role in global affairs. 
However, we should not forget the case at hand. International forest 
policy affects the health of ecosystems, the wealth of economies, and the 
livelihoods of human beings. For these reasons we should aim to 
continue research into understanding, explaining, and even predicting 
the future direction of international forest agreements.  
  179 References  
Secondary sources  
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000) Hard and soft law in international 
governance. International Organization 54(3): 421-456. 
Allen, David (1998) Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent 
external policy. In Peterson, John and Helene Sjursen (eds.) 1998. A common foreign policy 
for Europe?: competing visions of the CFSP. London: Routledge, pp. 41-58. 
Alvesson, Mats and Kaj Sköldberg (2008) Tolkning och reflektion: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ 
metod. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
-- (1994) Tolkning och reflektion: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Andersen, Ib (1998) Den uppenbara verkligheten: val av samhällsvetenskaplig metod. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur.  
Andersson, Therese (2007) En gemensam europeisk skogspolitik?: en integrationsteoretisk studie av 
ett politikområde på tillväxt. Doctoral Dissertation, Umeå universitet. Statsvetenskapliga 
institutionen, Serie: Statsvetenskapliga institutionens skriftserie, 0349-0831: 2007:4.  
Andresen, Steinar (2000) The whaling regime. In Andresen, Steinar, Tora Skodvin, Jorgen 
Wettestad and Arild Underdal (eds.) 2000. Science and politics in international environmental 
regimes: between integrity and involvement. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 35-
69.  
-- and Shardul Agrawala (2002) Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the climate 
regime. Global Environmental Change 12(1): 41–51. 
Arts, Bas (1998) The political influence of global NGOs. Case studies on the climate and biodiversity 
conventions. Utrecht: International Books.  
-- and Piet Verschuren (1999) Assessing political influence in complex decision-making. An 
instrument based on triangulation. International Political Science Review 20(4): 411-424. 
Bäckstrand, Karin (2006) Global miljöpolitik. In Tallberg, Jonas and Jakob Gustavsson (eds.) 
2006. Internationella relationer. Lund: Studentlitteratur, pp. 315-336.  
Baker, Susan (2006) Sustainable development. London: Routledge. 
Ball, Terence (1988) Transforming political discourse: Political theory and critical conceptual history. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Banfield, Edward C. (1961) Political Influence. New York: Free Press. 
  181 Barletta, Michael (2001) Social construction of ballistic missile threats. Paper prepared for the 
42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 20-24 February 2001, at 
Chicago, IL.  
Barnett, Michael (1999) Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel’s road to Oslo. 
European Journal of International Relations 5(1): 5–36. 
Baxter, Pamela and Susan Jack (2008) Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and 
implementation for novice researchers. The Qualitative Report 13(4): 544-559. 
Bell, Roderick (1969) Political power: the problem of measurement. In Bell, Roderick, 
David V. Edwards and R. Harrison Wagner (eds.) (1969) Political power. A reader in 
theory and research. New York: Free Press. 
Benedick, Richard E. (1991) Ozone diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Betsill, Michele, Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (2006) General introduction. In 
Betsill, Michele, Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (eds.) 2006. Palgrave Advances 
International environmental politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-9. 
Betsill, Michele and Elisabeth Corell (2001) NGO influence in international environmental 
negotiations: a framework for analysis. Global Environmental Politics 1(4):  65-85.  
Biermann, Frank (2006) Global governance and the environment. In Betsill, Michele, 
Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (eds.) 2006. Palgrave Advances International 
environmental politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 237-261. 
Birnie, Patricia.and Alan E. Boyle (2002) International law and the environment. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Braatz, Susan (2003) International forest governance: international forest policy, legal and 
institutional framework. Paper prepared for World Forestry Congress, Quebec City, Canada; 
21-28 September 2003. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ARTICLE/WFC/XII/1053-C5.HTM. Accessed: 14 
October, 2008. 
Brack, Duncan (2007) Illegal logging. Chatham House Briefing Paper, July 2007. Available at: 
http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/1_Illegal_logging_bp_07_01.pdf.   Accessed: 3 
December, 2008.  
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler (2006) The European Union as a global actor. 2
nd ed. 
London: Routledge.  
Bridges, (2000) Bridges Trade BioRes, 2002, UN Forest Forum: Delegates discuss trade and 
certification. 21 March, (2) 5. 
Burchell, Jon and Simon Lightfoot (2004) The EU and sustainable development: the long 
road from Rio to Johannesburg. In Barry, John, Brian Baxter and Richard Dunphy (eds.) 
2004. Europe, globalization and sustainable development. New York: Routledge, pp. 168-
186. 
Cámara-Cabrales, Luisa (1999) Small farmer migration and the agroforestry alternative in the 
Panama Canal watershed. Journal of Sustainable Forestry 8 (3/4): 11-22. 
Campbell, John L. (1998) Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political Economy. 
Theory and Society 27(3): 377-409.  
Carbone, Maurizio (2008) Mission impossible: the European Union and policy coherence 
for development. Journal of European Integration 30(3): 323–342.  
  182 Carter, Neil (2007) The politics of the environment – ideas, activism, policy. 2
nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Chaban, Natalia, Ole Elgström and Martin Holland (2006) The European Union as others 
see it. European Foreign Affairs Review 11(2): 245-262. 
Chasek, Pamela S., David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown (2006) Global environmental 
politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Chipeta, Mafa E. and Joshi Mahendra (2001) Financing sustainable forest management, report from 
the International Workshop of Experts, 22-25 January 2001, Oslo Norway. CIFOR: Desa 
Putera. Available at: 
http://www.clisuriname.com/smartcms/downloads/pdf/FSFM2001.pdf.   Accessed: 8 
October, 2008. 
Christiansen, Atle C. and Jørgen Wettestad (2003) The EU as a frontrunner on greenhouse 
gas emissions trading: How did it happen and will the EU succeed?'. Climate Policy 3(1):  
3-18. 
Christiansen, Thomas (2001) The Council of Ministers: the politics of institutionalised 
intergovernmentalism. In Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) 2001. European Union: Power and 
Policy-Making. 2
nd ed. London: Routledge, pp. 135-154. 
Clapp, Jennifer and Peter Dauvergne (2005) Paths to a green world: the political economy of the 
global environment. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Clegg, Stewart (1989) Frameworks of power. London: Sage. 
Coates, Barry (2002) The world’s biggest summit – so what? London: World Development 
Movement. Available at: 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/other/WSSD04092002.pdf.   Accessed: 11 
October, 2007.  
Conca, Ken and Geoffrey D. Dabelko (1998) Three decades of global environmental 
politics. In Conca, Ken and Geoffrey D. Dabelko (eds.) 1998. Green Planet Blues. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 1-23. 
Corell, Elisabeth (1999) The negotiable desert: expert knowledge in the negotiations of the convention 
to combat desertification. Doctoral thesis, Linköping University, Department of Water and 
Environmental Studies. 
Cox, Robert W. and Harold K. Jacobson (1973) The framework for inquiry. In Cox, 
Robert W. and Harold K. Jacobson (eds.) 1973. The anatomy of influence: decision making in 
international organization. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1-36.  
Dahl, Robert A. (1961) Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Davenport, Deborah S. (2005) An alternative explanation for the failure of the UNCED 
forest negotiations. Global Environmental Politics 5(1): 105-30. 
-- and Peter Wood (2006) Finding the way forward for the international arrangement on 
forests: UNFF-5, -6, and -7. Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law (RECIEL) 15(3): 316-26. 
Delreux, Tom (2006) The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a 
legal perspective on the internal decision-making process. International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 6(3): 231–48. 
  183 Dimitrov, Radoslav (2006) Science and international environmental policy: regimes and nonregimes 
in global governance. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
-- (2005) Hostage to norms: states, institutions and global forest politics. Global Environmental 
Politics 5(4): 1-24. 
-- (2003) Knowledge, power, and interests in environmental regime formation. International 
Studies Quarterly 47(1): 123-50. 
-- , Detlef F. Sprinz, Gerald M. DiGiusto, Alexander Kelle (2007) International nonregimes: 
a research agenda. International Studies Review 9(2): 230–58. 
Druckman, James N. and Arthur Lupia (2000) Preference formation. Annual Review of 
Political Science 3(1): 1-24.  
Dür, Andreas (2008) Bringing economic interests back into the study of EU trade policy-
making. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10(1): 27-45. 
-- and Hubert Zimmerman (2007) Introduction: The EU in international trade negotiations. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4): 771-87. 
Eckersley, Robin (2004) The big chill: The WTO and multilateral environmental 
agreements. Global Environmental Politics 2(2): 24-50. 
Eckstein, Harry (1975) Case study and theory in political science. In Greenstein, Fred I. and 
Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) 1975. Handbook of political science. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, pp. 79-137. 
Eeckhout, Piet (2004) External relations of the European Union: legal and constitutional 
foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989) Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review 14(4): 532-50.  
Elgström, Ole and Michael Smith (2006) Introduction. In Elgström, Ole and Michael Smith 
(eds.) 2006. The European Union's roles in international politics: concepts and analysis. London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-10.  
Elgström, Ole and Maria Strömvik (2005) The European Unions as an international 
negotiator. In Elgström, Ole and Christer Jönsson (eds.) 2005. European Union negotiations: 
processes, networks and institutions. London; New York: Routledge, pp.118-129. 
Elliott, Christopher (2000) Forest certification: a policy perspective. Jakarta, Indonesia: Center for 
International Forestry Research. 
ENB (2007) Summary of the seventh session of the United Nations Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 30 April 2007, 13(162). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb13162e.pdf   Accessed: 11 May, 
2007. 
ENB, (2006a) Summary of the United Nations Forum on Forests Expert Group on the 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument. International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), 18 December 2006, 13(150). Available at: 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb13150e.pdf   Accessed: 12 January, 2007. 
ENB, (2006b) Summary of the sixth session of the United Nations Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 27 February 2006, 13(144). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb13144e.pdf   Accessed: 5 March, 
2007. 
  184 ENB, (2005) Summary of the fifth session of the United Nations Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 30 May, 2005 13(133). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb13133e.pdf   Accessed: 8 June, 2005. 
ENB, (2002) Summary of the second session of the United Nations  Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 18 March 2002, 13(94). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1394e.pdf Accessed: 15 April, 2005. 
ENB, (2000) Summary of the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 14 February 2000, 13(66). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1366e.pdf   Accessed: 15 April, 
2005. 
ENB, (1999) Summary of the third session of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 17 May, 13(55). Available at: 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1355e.pdf   Accessed: 15 April, 2005. 
ENB, (1998) Summary of the second session of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 7 September, 13(45). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1345e.pdf   Accessed: 15 April, 
2005.. 
ENB, (1997) Summary of the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 24 February, 13(34). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1334e.pdf   Accessed: 15 April, 
2005. 
ENB, (1996) Summary of the third session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 23 September, 13(25). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1325e.pdf Accessed: 15 April, 2005. 
ENB, (1995) Summary of the first session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 18 September, 13(3). 
Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1303e.pdf   Accessed: 15 April, 
2005. 
Engel, Stefanie and Charles Palmer (2008) “Painting the forest REDD?” Prospects for 
mitigating climate change through reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. ETH Zurich, Department of Environmental Sciences Institute for 
Environmental Decisions IED. Available at:  
http://www.ied.ethz.ch/pub/pdf/IED_WP03_Engel.pdf   Accessed: 29 December, 
2008. 
Esty, Daniel C. (1994) Greening the GATT: trade, environment, and the future. Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics.  
European Commission (2003) Sustainable forestry and the European Union. Belgium, European 
Communities.  
Falkner, Robert (2006) The European Union as a ‘green normative power’? EU leadership in 
international biotechnology regulation. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series no. 
140. Available at: http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Falkner.pdf   
Accessed: 3 October, 2007.  
FAO (2005) State of the World’s Forests, 2005. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 
  185 Finnemore Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) International norm dynamics and political 
change. International Organization. 52( 4): 887-917.  
Frieden, Jeffry A. (2004) One Europe, one vote? The political economy of European Union 
representation in international organizations. European Union Politics 5(2): 261–76. 
-- (1999) Actors and preferences in international relations. In Lake David A. and Robert 
Powell (eds.) 1999. Strategic choice and international relations. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  
George, Alexander L. (1979) Case studies and theory development: the method of 
structured, focused comparison. In Lauren, Paul Gordon (ed.) 1979. Diplomacy: new 
approaches in history, theory, and policy. New York: Free Press, pp. 43-68. 
Gerlach, Carina (2006) Does business really run EU trade policy? Observations about EU 
trade lobbying. Politics 26(3): 176-83.  
Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999) Conceptualizing the European Union as an international actor: 
narrowing the theoretical capability-expectations gap. Journal of Common Market Studies 
37(3): 429-54. 
Glück, Peter, Richard Tarasofsky, Neil Byron and Ilpo Tikkanen (1997) Options for 
strengthening the international legal regime for forests. Joensuu: European Forest Institute. 
Goldstein, Judith (1993) Ideas, interests, and American trade policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.  
-- and Robert O. Keohane (1993) Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework. In 
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) 1993. Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, 
institutions, and political change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3-30. 
Gowa, Joanne (1994) Allies, adversaries, and international trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Gray, John (1983) Political power, social theory, and essential contestability. In Miller, David 
and Larry Siedentorp (eds.) 1983. Nature of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
pp.75-101. 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H. and David Humphreys (2006) International initiatives to address tropical 
timber logging and trade. FNI Report 4/2006. Lysaker: FNI. Available at: 
http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC20539.pdf Accessed: 23 
September, 2008.  
Gupta, Joyeeta and Lasse Ringius (2001) The EU’s climate leadership: reconciling ambition 
and reality. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1(2): 281–
299. 
Grubb, Michael J. and Joyeeta Gupta (2000) Leadership. In Gupta, Joyeeta, and Michael J. 
Grubb (eds.) 2000. Climate change and European leadership: a sustainable role for Europe?. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 15-24. 
Haas, Peter M. (1992) Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination. International Organization 46(1):1-35. 
-- (1990) Saving the Mediterranean: the politics of international environmental cooperation. New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
Hall, Peter A. (1997) The role of interests, institutions and ideas in the comparative political 
economy of the industrialized nations. In Lichbach, Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman 
  186 (eds.) 1997. Comparative politics: rationality, culture and structure. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 174-207. 
-- (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. Comparative Politics 25(3): 275-296.  
-- (1989) The power of economic ideas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
-- and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) Political science and the three new institutionalisms. 
Political Studies 44(5): 936-957.  
Heclo, Hugh (1994) Ideas, interests, and institutions. In Dodd, Lawrence C. and Calvin 
Jillson (eds.) 1994. The dynamics of American politics: approaches and interpretations. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, pp. 366-392.  
-- (1978) Issue networks and the executive establishment. In King, Anthony (ed.) 1978. The 
new American political system. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, pp. 87-124.  
Heliskoski, Joni (2001) Mixed agreements as a technique for organizing the international relations of 
the European Community and its member states. Den Haag: Kluwer Law International. 
Herrman, Richard K. and Vaughn P. Shannon (2001) Defending international norms: the 
role of obligation, material interest, and perception in decision making. International 
Organization 55(3): 621- 54. 
Hill, Christopher (1993) The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s 
international role. Journal of Common Market Studies 31(3): 305-28. 
Hix, Simon (2005) The political system of the European Union. 2
nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Holmgren, Lisa (2008) Framing global public policy on forests – sustainable development and the 
forest issue on the UN agenda 1972 to 2007. Doctoral thesis No. 2008: 6 Faculty of Forestry 
Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural Science. 
Holsti, Kalevi J. (1995) International politics: a framework for analysis. 7
th ed. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall International.  
Humphreys, David (2006) Logjam: deforestation and the crisis of global governance. London, 
Earthscan. 
-- (2005) The elusive quest for a global forests convention. Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 14(1): 1-10. 
-- (2003) The United Nations Forum on Forests: anatomy of a stalled international process. 
Global Environmental Change 13(4): 319-323. 
-- (2001) Forest negotiations at the United Nations: explaining cooperation and discord. 
Forest Policy and Economics 3(3-4): 125-135.   
-- (1996) Forest Politics: The evolution of international cooperation. London: Earthscan. 
Jokela, Minna (2006) The European Union in global forest governance: the dynamics of social learning 
in the construction of global problems and actorness. Doctoral Dissertation from the Department 
of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Turku, Finland. 
Jönsson, Christer (1991) Cognitive theory. In Kremenyuk, Victor A (ed.) 1991. International 
Negotiations – analysis, approaches, issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 229-
243. 
Joshi, Mahendra (1999) Financing sustainable forestry: issues under international deliberation, 
UNDP Programme on Forests and IFF Secretariat.  Available at: 
http://www.profor.info/pdf/FinancingSustainForest.pdf.   Accessed: 9 October, 2008.  
  187 -- and Mafa E. Chipeta (2001) The global forest fund – from Rio to IFF4: what issues 
remain? In Chipeta, Mafa E. and Mahendra Joshi (eds.) 2001. Financing sustainable forest 
management, report from the International Workshop of Experts, 22-25 January 2001, Oslo 
Norway. Desa Putera: CIFOR. Available at: 
http://www.clisuriname.com/smartcms/downloads/pdf/FSFM2001.pdf.   Accessed: 8 
October, 2008.  
Jordan, Andrew (2005) Introduction: European environmental policy – actors, institutions 
and policy processes. In Jordan, Andrew (ed.) 2005. Environmental policy in the European 
Union: actors institutions and processes. 2
nd ed. London: Earthscan/James and James, pp. 1-
15. 
Jupille, Joseph (1999) The European Union and international outcomes. International 
Organization 53(2): 409–25. 
-- and James A. Caporaso (1999) Institutionalism and the European Union: beyond 
comparative politics and international relations. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 429-
444. 
-- and James A. Caporaso (1998) States, agency and rules: the European Union in global 
environmental politics. In Rhodes, Carolyn (ed.) 1998. The European Union in the world 
community. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 213-229. 
Kahler, Miles (1985) European protectionism in theory and practice. World Politics 37(4): 
475-502. 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing social inquiry: scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Koleva, Marieta (2006) Forest certification – do governments have a role? Proceedings and 
summary of discussions at the UNECE Timber Committee Policy Forum 2005. Geneva 
Timber and Forest Discussion Paper 44. Available at: 
http://www.unece.org/timber/docs/dp/dp-44.pdf. Accessed: 25 September, 2008.  
Kolk, Ans (1996) Forests in international environmental politics: international organisations, NGOs 
and the Brazilian Amazon. Utrecht: International Books. 
Konow, James (2003) Which is the fairest of all? A positive analysis of justice theories. Journal 
of Economic Literature 41(4): 1188-1239. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1983) Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as 
intervening variables. In Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) 1983. International regimes. Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-21. 
Kremenyuk, Victor A. (1991) The emerging system of international negotiations. In 
Kremenyuk, Victor A (ed.) 1991. International Negotiations – analysis, approaches, issues. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 22-39. 
Kvale, Steinar (1997) Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Laumann, Edward O., Peter V. Marsden, and David Prensky (1992) The boundary 
specification problem in network analysis. In Freeman, Linton C., Douglas R. White and 
A. Kimball Romney (eds.) 1992. Research methods in social network analysis. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 61-87. 
Lightfoot, Simon and Jon Burchell (2005) The European Union and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development: normative power Europe in action?. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 43(1): 75–95. 
  188 Lukes, Steven (1974) Power: A radical view. London: Macmillan. 
Macrory, Richard and Martin Hession (1996) The European Community and climate 
change: the role of law and legal competence. In  O’Riordan, Timothy and Jill Jäger 
(eds.) 1996. Politics of climate change: a European perspective. London: Routledge, pp. 106-
154. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1989) Evidence, argument and persuasion in the policy process. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
Manners, Ian (2002) Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. Journal of Common 
Market Studies 40(2): 235–58. 
March, James, G. and Johan P. Olsen (2008) Elaborating on the “New Institutionalism”. In 
Rhodes, Roderick A. W., Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman  (eds.) 2008 [2006]. 
The Oxford handbook of political institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-20.  
Marsh, Duncan R. (2005) Friends and foes: industrialised countries in multilateral 
environmental negotiations. In Kallhauge Churie, Angela, Gunnar Sjöstedt and Elisabeth 
Corell (eds.) 2005. Global challenges: Furthering the multilateral process for sustainable 
development. Sheffield: Greenleaf, pp. 144-170.  
Mazey, Sonia and Jeremy Richardson (1998) Framing and re-framing public policy in the 
EU: ideas, interests and institutions in sex equality and environmental policies. Paper 
written to the workshop on ‘The Role of Ideas in Policy-making’, 23-28 March 1998, at 
Joint Sessions of Workshops, ECPR. Warwick University, UK.  
McCormick, John (2001) Environmental policy in the European Union. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave.  
Merriam, Sharan B. (1994) Fallstudien som forskningsmetod. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Meunier, Sophie (2005) Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiation. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
-- (2000) What Singel Voice? European institutions and the EU-US trade negotiations. 
International Organization 54(1): 103-35. 
-- and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (1999) Who speaks for Europe? The delegation of trade authority 
in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 37(3): 477-501. 
Milner, Helen V. (1997) Interests, institutions, and information: domestic politics and international 
relations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Mitchell, Ronald and Thomas Bernauer (1998) Empirical research on international 
environmental policy, designing qualitative case studies. Journal of Environment and 
Development 7(1): 4-31 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The choice for Europe. London: UCL Press. 
Neumayer, Eric (2001) Greening trade and investment: environmental protection without 
protectionism. London: Earthscan. 
Niemann, Arne (2004) Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 
Committee and the negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services 
Agreement. Journal of European Public Policy 11(3): 379-407.  
OECD (1999) Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Synthesis report of three 
case studies (Basel Convention, Montreal Protocol and CITES). COM/ENV/ 
TD(98)127/FINAL, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
  189 Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pace, Michelle (1997) The construction of EU normative power. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 45(5): 1041-1064. 
Parks, Bradley and Timmons Roberts (2006) Environmental and ecological justice. In Betsill, 
Michele, Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (eds.) 2006. Palgrave Advances 
International environmental politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 329-360. 
Paterson, Matthew (1996) Global warming and global politics. London: Routledge. 
-- David Humphreys and Lloyd Pettiford (2003) Conceptualizing global environmental 
governance: from interstate regimes to counter-hegemonic struggles. Global Environmental 
Politics 3(2): 1-10.  
Payne, Rodger, A. (2001) Persuasion, frames and norm construction. European Journal of 
International Relations 7(1): 37-61. 
Persson, Reidar (2005) Where is the United Nations Forum on Forests going?. International 
Forestry Review 7(4): 348-357. 
Peterson, John and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999) Decision-making in the European Union. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. 
Porter, Gareth and Janet Welsh Brown (1991) Global environmental politics. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.  
Putnam, Robert (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. 
International Organization 42(3): 427-60. 
Radaelli, Claudio M. (1999) Technocracy in the European Union. London: Longman.  
Rechkemmer, Andreas (2005) Global forest management: what has been achieved, what comes next? 
– Critical choices for structural, legal and financial options. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung, August 2005. Available at: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2005/p05-
004.pdf Accessed: 17 January, 2007.  
Rhinard, Mark (2002) Ideas, interests, and policy change in the European Union: the mobilization of 
frames by actors in the agricultural and biotechnology policy sectors. Doctoral Thesis, Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge. 
-- and Michael Kaeding (2006) The international bargaining power of the European Union 
in ‘mixed’ competence negotiations. The case of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(5): 1023-50. 
Richardson, Jeremy (2001) Policy-making in the EU: interests, ideas, and garbage cans of 
primeval soup. In Richardson Jeremy (ed.) 2001. European Union: power and policymaking. 
2
nd ed. London: Routledge, pp. 3-26. 
Rosendal, Kristin G. (2001) Overlapping international regimes: the case of the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between climate change and biodiversity. 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1(4): 447-468. 
Sbragia, Alberta (2005) Institution-building from below and above: the European 
Community in global environmental politics. In Jordan, Andrew (ed.) 2005. 
Environmental policy in the European Union: actors, institutions and processes. 2
nd ed. London: 
Earthscan, pp. 201-224. 
  190 -- and Chad Damro  (1999) The changing role of the European Union in international, 
environmental politics: institution building and the politics of climate change. 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 17(1): 53–68. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Schön, Donald A. and Martin Rein (1994) Frame reflection toward the resolution of intractable 
policy controversies. New York: Basic Books.  
Schreurs, Miranda A. and Yves Tiberghien (2007) Multi-level reinforcement: explaining EU 
leadership in climate change mitigation. Global Environmental Politics 7(4): 19-46. 
Sebenius, James K. (1992) Challenging conventional explanations of cooperation: 
negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities. International Organization 
46(1): 323-65. 
Seyfang, Gill (2003) Environmental mega-conferences: from Stockholm to Johannesburg and 
beyond. Global Environmental Change 13(3): 223-228. 
Sikkink, Kathryn (1991) Ideas and institutions: developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.  
Singer, David (1961) The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. In Knorr, 
Klaus and Sidney Verba (eds.) 1961. The international system: theoretical essays. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1998) The EU negotiates climate change: external performance and 
internal structural change. Cooperation and Conflict 33(3): 227-256. 
-- (1993) Special and typical attributes of international environmental agreements. In 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar, Uno Svedin and Britt Hägerhäll Aniansson (eds.) 1993. International 
environmental negotiations: process, issues and contexts. Stockholm: Swedish Council for 
Planning and Coordination of Research and Swedish Institute of International Affairs 
Report 93:1. 
-- (1977) The external role of the European Community. Hampshire: Gower. 
Smith, Michael (2001) The EU as an international actor. In Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) 2001. 
European Union: power and policymaking. 2
nd ed. London: Routledge, pp. 283-301. 
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford (1992) Master frames and cycles of protest. In 
Morris, Aldon D. and Carol M. Mueller (eds.) 1992. Frontiers in social movement theory. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 133-155.  
Stevis, Dimitris (2006) The trajectory of the study of international environmental politics. In 
Betsill, Michele, Kathryn Hochstetler and Dimitris Stevis (eds.) 2006. Palgrave Advances 
International environmental politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13-53. 
Streck, Charlotte (2001) The Global Environment Facility—a role model for international 
governance?. Global Environmental Politics 1(2): 71-94. 
Strong, Maurice (1991) ECO ’92: critical challenges and global solutions. Journal of 
International Affairs 44(2): 287-300. 
Tallberg, Jonas (2006) Leadership and negotiation in the European Union. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tarasofsky, Richard (1995) The international forests regime: legal and policy issues, Gland: 
WWF, IUCN. 
  191 Tomaselli, Ivan (2006) Brief study on funding and finance for forestry and forest-based 
sector, United Nations Forum on Forests January 2006. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/publications/brief_funding_tomaselli.pdf   Accessed: 
10 October, 2008.  
UNECE (2006) UNECE Markets for Certified Forest Products; Forest Products Annual Market 
Review 2005-2006. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
Vogler, John (2005) The European contribution to global environmental governance. 
International Affairs 81(4): 835-850. 
-- (2000) The global commons: environmental and technological governance. Chichester: John Wiley. 
-- (1999) The European Union as an actor in international environmental politics. 
Environmental Politics 8(3):24-28. 
-- and Hannes R. Stephan (2007) The European Union in global environmental 
governance: leadership in the making?. International Environmental Agreements: Policy, Law 
and Economics 7(4): 389-413. 
Wildavsky, Aaron (1987) Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: a cultural theory 
of preference formation. The American Political Science Review 81(1): 3-22.  
Yin, Robert K. (1994) Case study research: design and methods. 2
nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications.  
-- (1989) Case study research: design and methods. Rev. ed. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 
Young, Alasdair R. (2002) Extending European cooperation – the European Union and the ‘new’ 
international trade agenda. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Young, Oran R. (1989) International cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the 
environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
-- and Michael Zürn (2006) The international regime database: designing and using a 
sophisticated tool for institutional analysis. Global Environmental Politics 6(3): 121-43.  
Zartman, I. William (1994) Two’s company and more’s a crowd: the complexities of 
multilateral negotiation. In Zartman, I. William (ed.) 1994. International multilateral 
negotiation: approaches to the management of complexity; a publication of the Processes of 
International Negotiation (PIN) Project of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers.  
Zito, Anthony R. (2005) The European Union as an environmental leader in a global 
environment. Globalizations 2(3): 363–375. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  192  
Primary sources  
 
United Nations Documents 
 
United Nations, 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), Non-legally Binding Authorative 
Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, New York, 14 August 1992. 
United Nations (1989) GA Resolution A/RES/44/228 of 22 December 1989. 
UN Resolution 44/228, part 1.3, New York, 22 December 1989  
ECOSOC, 2007, E/CN.18/2007/8. United Nations Forum on Forests. Report of the 
seventh session, 24 February 2006 and 16 to 27 April 2007. 
ECOSOC, 2006, E/CN.18/2006/18. United Nations Forum on Forests. Report of the 
sixth session, 13 to 24 February 2006. 
ECOSOC, 2005, E/CN.18/2005/18. Report of the United Nations Forum on Forests Fifth 
Session, (14 May 2004 and 16 to 27 May 2005). 
ECOSOC, 2004, E/CN.18/2004/5. Report of the Ad hoc expert group on finance and 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies - 15 -19 December 2003, Geneva. 
ECOSOC, 2003, Doc E/CN.18/2003/13 Resolution 3/1 Economic aspects of forests. 
ECOSOC, 2002, E/CN.18/2002/14. United Nations Forum on Forests. Report on the 
second session, 22 June 2001 and 4 to 15 March 2002. 
ECOSOC, 2001, E/2001/42/Rev.1. United Nations Forum on Forests. Report on the 
organizational and first sessions, 12 and 16 February and 11-22 June 2001. 
ECOSOC, 2000a, E/CN.17/2000/14. Report of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests 
on its fourth session, 31 January – 11 February 2000. 
ECOSOC, 2000b, E/CN.17/IFF/2000/4,International Arrangements and Mechanisms to 
Promote the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of 
Forests: Elements and Functions for a Future International Arrangement and Mechanism, 
New York, 23 November 1999. 
ECOSOC, 1998a, E/CN.17/IFF/1998/3, Matters Left Pending and Other Issues Arising 
from the Programme Elements of the IPF Process - Trade and Environment, 19 June 
1998. 
ECOSOC, 1998b, E/CN.17/IFF/1998 Background document 18 June 1998. 
ECOSOC, 1997a, E/CN.17/IFF/1997/4. Report of the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Forests on its first session, 1-3 October 1997. 
ECOSOC (1997b) E/CN.17/1997/12. Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Panel on 
Forests on its fourth session, 11-21 February 1997. 
ECOSOC, 1995, E/CN.17/IPF/1995/2, Programme of work of the intergovernmental 
panel on forests, 16 August 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
  193 European Union Documents 
 
Council of the European Union, 2007, 5574/07, Preparation of the seventh session of the 
UNFF7, 24 January 2007. 
Council of the European Union, 2005a, 8305/05, Fifth session of the UNFF5 – draft 
Council Conclusions, 21 April 2005. 
Council of the European Union, 2005b, 8003/05, Preparation of the Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
Council session on 26 April 2005: fifth session of the United Nations Forum on Forests 
(UNFF)- draft Council Conclusions, 18 April 2005. 
Council of the European Union, 2002, 5699/02 United Nations Forum on Forests – second 
session in March 2002 –Council conclusions, 28 January 2002. 
Council of the European Union, 2000a, 7662/00, Ad Hoc Working Party on Forests, 10 
April 2000. 
Council of the European Union, 2000b, 7662/00 ADD 1, Ad Hoc Working Party on 
Forests, 10 April 2000 (Proposals for the Conclusions of the Council. 
Council of the European Union, 2000c, 7391/00, Follow up of IFF, 28 March 2000. 
Council of the European Union, 2000d, 6252/00, Results from the IFF following the fourth 
and final session, 6 March, 2000. 
Council of the European Union, 1997a, 8303/97; Draft Minutes of the 2006th meeting of 
the Council (Agriculture), 4 June 1997.  
Council of European Union, 1997b, 7435/97, Preparation of forest issues, 16 April 1997. 
Council Working Group of Forestry, 2004, Report from Informal Meeting of Working 
Party on Forestry, the Hague, 28-30 December 2004. 
European Union Commission, 2002, Non Paper Lead Country paper in preparation of 
UNFF2 Agenda Item 4 (i) Trade and sustainable forest management. 
European Commission, 1996, 13004/96, Commission Staff Working Paper, 19 December 
1996. 
European Union Commission, 1996, 13004/96, Commission Staff Working Paper, 19 
December 1996. 
EU Non-paper, 2007, EU preparations for UNFF7, Proposal for means of implementation, 
2007. 
EU Draft position paper, 2003, UNFF ad hoc expert group on financing for sustainable 
forest management, December 2003. 
EU Non-paper on financial matters, 1997, 18 February 1997. 
European Court Reports, 1971, Judgement 31 March 1971, Commission vs Council 
(European Road Transport Agreement- ERTA), case 22/70, European Court Reports 
(ECR) 1971, pp. 263 et seq. 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 1990, DOC/90/2. Dublin, 25 and 26 
June, 1990. 
Presidency of the EU, 2001, UNFF first substantive meeting in June 2001 – The EU’s 
position, 2 April 2001. 
Presidency of the EU, 2000, Proposal for alternative wording programme element IIa, 21 
January 2000. 
  194 Presidency of the EU, 1999, Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the EU, Programme 
Element IIa, 3 May 1999. 
Presidency of the EU, 1998, Statement on behalf of the EU by the representative of Austria 
on programme element IIa, 26 August 1998. 
Presidency of the EU, 1996, Statement by the representative of Ireland on behalf of the EU, 
Programme element 2, International cooperation on financial assistance, 9 September 
1996. 
 
 
 
Documents Member states/governmental  
 
DFID, 1999, EU’s Preparation for IFF4: draft mandate, 23 November 1999. Department for 
International Development (DFID), United Kingdom, 1999. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1999, Outline for EU statements on IFF, 13 
December 1999. 
Swedish  Ministry of Industry, 2000, Memorandum, Rapport från den fjärde och avslutande 
sessionen av IFF, 15 February, 2000. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999a, Rapport från ad hoc Rådsgruppsmöte i Bryssel, 7 April 
1999. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999b, Rapport från ad hoc skogsgruppsmöte i Bryssel inför 
IFF4, 17 December 1999. 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005a, UNFF 5 – rådets slutsatser, 19 April 2005. 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005b, Skogsfrågan inför UNFF5, Memorandum 11 
April 2005. 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001, EU issues for UNFF1: Financing SFM, 29 
March 2001. 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000, Working paper UNFF, June 18 2000. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999c, EU’s preparations for the fourth session of the IFF, 
organising the work to evaluate the options and elaborate of a negotiating mandate, 27 
November 1999. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1999d, Swedish considerations on the further preparatory 
work to IFF4 within the EU, 11 November 1999. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1998, Rapport från andra sessionen med IFF, 15 September 
1998. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997a, Rapport från fjärde sessionen av IPF, 3 March, 1997. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997b, N97/26/EUN/97, Rapport från samordningsmöte i 
Bryssel inför fjärde sessionen med den mellanstatliga skogspanelen. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1997c, Rapport från första mötet med det mellanstatliga 
skogsforumet, 29 October 1997. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1995a, Rapport från första sessionen av CSDs skogspanel, 25 
September 1995. 
Swedish Ministry of Industry, 1995b, Föreberedelser för CSDs skogspanel, 5 April 1995. 
 
  195  
 
 
 
Interviews 
See Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
  196  
Appendix  
 
 
 
 
List of conducted interviews by category, date and location  
 
EU officials  
Interview no.14, 7 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 24, 8 December 2004, Brussels  
Interview no. 25, 9 December 2004, Brussels 
Interview no. 26, 9 December 2004, Brussels 
Interview no. 43, 19 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 54, 7 June 2007, Brussels 
Interview no. 55, 7 June 2007, Brussels 
Interview no. 56, 8 June 2007, Brussels 
Interview no. 57, 2 October 2008, Stockholm 
 
State officials  
Interview no. 1, 30 May 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva  
Interview no. 2, 30 May 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva  
Interview no. 5, 31 May 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva 
Interview no. 6, 2 June 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva 
Interview no. 7, 2 June 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva  
Interview no. 8, 2 June 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva 
Interview no. 9, 4 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 10, 4 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 11, 5 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 12, 5 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 18, 9 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 20, 10 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva   
Interview no. 27, 19 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 28, 19 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 29, 20 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 30, 20 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 35, 10 October 2005, Stockholm  
Interview no. 36, 15 October 2005, Stockholm 
Interview no. 42, 6 May 2006, Stockholm 
Interview no. 44, 19 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 45, 19 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 46, 20 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 47, 20 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 48, 20 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
  197   198 
Interview no. 50, 24 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 51, 25 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no 52, 27 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
Interview no. 53, 25 May 2007, Leiden 
 
Intergovernmental Organisations 
Interview no. 3, 30 May 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva 
Interview no. 4, 31 May 2003, UNFF-3, Geneva 
Interview no. 13, 6 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva 
Interview no. 15, 7 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva 
Interview no. 33, 26 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 34, 26 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 38, 3 November 2005, Rome 
Interview no. 39, 3 November 2005, Rome 
Interview no. 40, 4 November 2005, Rome 
Interview no. 41, 7 November 2005, Rome 
Interview no. 49, 24 April 2007, UNFF-7, New York 
 
Non State Actors 
Interview no. 16, 8 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva 
Interview no. 17, 8 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva 
Interview no. 19, 10 May 2004, UNFF-4 Geneva 
Interview no. 21, 7 December 2004, Brussels 
Interview no. 22, 7 December 2004, Brussels 
Interview no. 23, 8 December 2004, Brussels 
Interview no. 31, 25 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York 
Interview no. 32, 26 May 2005, UNFF-5, New York  
Interview no. 37, 20 October 2005, Stockholm 